This article presents a case study on how drones have revolutionised warfare tactics on the battlefield and in war zones, with a particular focus on the conflict in Eastern Europe. It also highlights the limitations and weaknesses of electronic counter-drone systems in disrupting illegal drones, which has led to drones’ significant advantage in air superiority.

Recently, drones have become available to anyone interested worldwide. Beyond its entertainment value, this technology presents numerous possibilities. Many companies, such as DJI, Parrot, Skydio, and XAG, recently have started producing drones for hobbyist applications (Portuese, 2024). Unfortunately, these entertainment drones are frequently misused. Perhaps this increased accessibility has prompted renewed efforts by malicious actors, such as terrorist groups, drug dealers, and criminal organisations, to exploit drones for malicious purposes (Guven, 2024). A drone can carry a high-resolution gimbal camera and fly over strategic areas to gather sensitive and private data as well as perform surveillance and reconnaissance. Drones are used for information collection, surveillance, reconnaissance, combat, and mine detection. It is perhaps not surprising that the primary focus of current concerns regarding low-cost and modified drones is their potential to function as a supply system for explosive devices.

Since the start of the conflict, Ukrainian and Russian forces have engaged in drone-centric warfare, utilising these cost-effective and easily assembled devices to conduct precise attacks and defend against assaults. Several drone attacks have targeted critical infrastructure in recent months (Resendiz, 2025). While it appears to be an innocuous little object, it is, in fact, a lethal weapon that is quite challenging to defend against.

Remotely piloted drones, or first-person view (FPV) drones, worth about $5000 each, have disabled hundreds of vehicles and military equipment on both sides in the Eastern European conflict (Amran, 2024; Korshak, 2025). Incidents at airports and other public facilities highlight the necessity of a new technology that would safeguard against the threat posed by drones (Gong et al., 2024). Drones carrying a few pounds of explosives pose a significant threat to tanks, strategic areas, and other combat vehicles, especially as they become less expensive (Mogelson, 2024). FPV drones can carry mortar bombs or rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) projectiles, while smaller models can transport small amounts of TNT wrapped in duct tape (George-Ion, 2024). They are typically detonated with a couple of rigid wires that connect on impact. Drone performance relies on guidance systems; some models heavily depend on advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, while others integrate inertial navigation systems (INS) with optical and infrared (IR) sensors for enhanced targeting capabilities. Due to their huge potential in warfare, many military manufacturing facilities have shifted their focus to the production of drones that enable remote warfare, a concept not new in itself.

The benefits of drones are highlighted by the following points: fewer soldier casualties, a lower financial burden of conflict, and reduced depletion of tanks, vehicles, and military assets (Galynska and Bilous, 2022). Drones represent the most advanced evolution of this era, combining powerful monitoring capabilities with offensive mechanisms. This evolution highlights the advancement from earlier remote weaponry systems to the contemporary standards in modern warfare. Drones have acted as transformative agents in modern warfare for decades, significantly altering the mechanics of conflict. As these essential tools evolved into more sophisticated systems, they introduced new risks and significant implications for modern warfare (Modebadze, 2021). In this context, one of the key advances in drone technology is the emergence of kamikaze drones, or loitering munitions, which have revealed significant ethical and legal deficiencies in the current international humanitarian law (Kunertova, 2023).

The comparison of missiles and drones reveals valuable lessons. Both missiles and kamikaze drones deliver precise, explosive payloads using advanced guidance systems. According to various sources and reports, the estimated cost of the Geran-2, or Shahed-136, drone ranges from approximately $20,000 to $30,000 (Silva, 2023). It is easy to manufacture or buy from Iran. Using African workers and Chinese components, Russia increased its domestic Shahed-136 drone production. According to information and reports from the frontline, the Shahed-136 has a very low hit rate. The average number of hits is approximately 20%. Alternatively, cruise missiles cost roughly $900,000–$1,000,000 each. The cost of the missile is about 30 times that of a Shahed drone.

Precision-guided missiles and other advanced weapon systems employ improved methods, enabling more accurate attacks. Missiles require extensive infrastructure and specialised knowledge to operate, which makes them more challenging for most states to obtain. Also, their use is more controlled. However, drones are not heavily technology-dependent and can be utilised by any military force. In this regard, kamikaze drones have gained more attention worldwide than traditional remote warfare systems, such as missiles. Because they are cheaper, easier to use, and more prevalent, they are more likely to be deployed against people in a new context war. Kamikaze drones offer distinct advantages. They have numerous unique features that draw great attention to them.

The rapid and effortless detection and neutralisation of drones presents a challenge for many radar systems and anti-drone measures. Even the most expensive Patriot anti-missile batteries, owned by powerful nations, are not explicitly designed to destroy the drones used in recent attacks. These small drones are incredibly manoeuvrable and can torment a soldier until his brutal demise. The most domestically available options are small quadcopters made from inexpensive, readily available Chinese parts and mostly controlled via FPV goggles. Employing missiles against them, such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), is ineffective. These drones are tiny and have almost no IR signature for a missile to lock onto.

This article is structured as follows: Section 1 is the Introduction. Section 2 discusses the importance of the drone in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Section 3 presents the limitations of the existing countermeasures in destroying drones. Section 4 introduces new anti-drone solutions present in the conflict. Section 5 highlights the study’s findings, demonstrating both advantages and disadvantages of the new countermeasures and innovative approaches. Finally, we end with a Conclusion in Section 6.

In the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, kamikaze drones come in all shapes and sizes and have relatively small battery capacities. Unlike advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with extensive sensors and communication systems, drones are designed to stay airborne for extended periods, identify targets with high precision, and then crash into their targets, sacrificing the drone itself. The investigation report from the conflict area mentions that the most popular drone utilised is a commercial FPV drone (Locher et al., 2025). The FPV drone utilises a technique that enables the pilot to operate it via an onboard video camera, which feeds real-time visual data to the pilot, allowing the drone to be navigated beyond the pilot’s line of sight (Agarwal, 2024). Binding is the process of establishing a strong and lasting connection between a sender and a recipient. The receiver accepts commands exclusively from a particular sender, disregarding all others. The receiver is said to be effectively “bound” to the sender. For example, if a device is bound to a particular transmitter, it will only respond to instructions from that transmitter, even if other transmitters are close. In this regard, binding a drone to its remote controller will ensure that the drone only responds to commands from its designated controller, preventing interference from other devices. The use of inexpensive commercial drones in warfare for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, combat, artillery targeting, and information and psychological operations highlights that genuine capability does not necessarily derive from costly bureaucratic defence procurement processes. Drones provide solutions in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine’s production objective for 2025 is 4.5 million FPV drones, up from 20,000 per month last year. Russia is ramping up production equally. Figure 1 presents the components of an FPV drone. Figure 1a shows the control of FPV with fire retardant (FR) goggles, and Figure 1b shows the FPV drone control with radio frequency (RF) remote control.

In the conflict, both adversaries are extensively using drones on the frontline. As shown in Figure 2, four groups of drones are utilised in the conflict. Micro-drones are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and can carry a tiny camera. Mini drones used for kamikaze operations can carry ammunition. Medium drones can transport payloads of more than 50 kg and operate for up to 15 hours in ISR applications, thereby supporting troops. Heavy drones, including those used for combat and ISR, are often employed as rockets.

Figure 2 shows how consumer drones are deployed in the Ukrainian conflict as suicide drones, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, surveillance aircraft, and relay aircraft. Both adversaries have used the so-called kamikaze drones in the Russo-Ukrainian war (Oleksenko et al., 2024; Seo et al., 2023). Figure 3 exposes several proposed missions of an FPV drone in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Since February 2022, FPV drones have been employed in implementing various tactical methodologies in the Russo-Ukrainian battlefield (Ibrahim, 2024; Zafra et al., 2024). Each adversary is continually planning its next move. On 1 June 2025, Ukrainian drones struck more than forty Russian aircraft, including A-50, Tu-95, and Tu-22 M3, according to sources from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The report indicates that Russian strategic bombers are facing significant losses within Russia. The SBU carried a large-scale special operation to eliminate enemy bombers deep within Russia (Fenbert, 2025). The SBU drones targeted aircraft that bomb Ukrainian cities every night. This special operation was called Spiderweb, but some referred to it as Russia’s Pearl Harbour. An FPV drone-based operation by Ukraine was executed approximately 1,700 km from Ukrainian territory (Adams and Lukiv, 2025). This is likely the largest and most significant drone-based sabotage operation in history. Russia’s losses have already exceeded $7 billion. On 30 May 2025, Ukrainian soldiers from the “Birds of the Magyar” drone unit eliminated another high-value target: a BM-21 Grad multiple-launch rocket system (Kozatskyi, 2025). A precise hit neutralised both launcher and its payload. The BM-21 Grad, once a symbol of concentrated artillery fire, is now increasingly vulnerable to $1,000 drones equipped with inexpensive cameras.

Table 1 exposes some tactical methodologies employing FPV drones in the frontline of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Table 1 illustrates various tactics employing FPV drones in the battlefield, including those with fibre-optic connections; they were employed for structural analysis, leaflet dropping, and as FPV dragons, among others. Both adversaries acquired commercial and laboratory drones to address their deficiencies. All the components of these drones are readily available in the market, and permission is not required to obtain and use them. Table 2 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of consumer drones within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (Chaari, 2024; Wackwitz, 2024).

As nations such as Iran, Israel, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, Turkey, and China develop several types of drones tailored to their strategic objectives, it is essential to recognise the inherent diversity of these systems (Henriksen and Bronk, 2025). Although all are classified as kamikaze drones, they show significant differences in technology, guidance system, and operational effectiveness. It is vital to understand the distinctions and categorisations of drones, as they lead to markedly different consequences on the battlefield. These distinctions need to be considered when overseeing and regulating the use of drones. Table 3 outlines the various types of drones used in the conflict in Eastern Europe, highlighting unique technological approaches, such as specifications and categories, and their implications in modern warfare.

As shown in Table 3, six guidance systems are implemented in the drones used in the conflict. This section presents and discusses each of the guidance systems.

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS): This method enables precise positioning and navigation by utilising satellite signals to determine the drone’s location and path. The intricacy of GNSS systems can vary significantly: sophisticated drones employ multi-frequency, multi-constellation GNSS receivers to enhance accuracy and reliability in adverse environments. Conversely, simpler models may rely on single-frequency receivers with limited capabilities.

Based on the six guidance systems presented above, Table 4 categorises drones into three types: high sophistication, moderate sophistication, and basic sophistication. This classification relies on their guidance technologies and control systems. According to Table 4, European and the US countries utilise highly sophisticated drones, whereas Iran employs less advanced ones due to limited access to technology. Variations in guidance systems, particularly in terms of accuracy and effectiveness, create distinct strategic roles for kamikaze drones.

Figure 4 shows Russian drone strikes on Ukraine from January 2025 until June 2025. According to this chart reference, the number of strikes increased significantly in March 2025. The increase presents a significant limitation for counter-drone and EW systems, as the number of attacks is extremely high.

The rising frequency of assaults by FPV drones highlights the inadequacies of current technologies, including RF jammers, handheld gun jammers, lasers, high-power microwaves, and trained eagles, in thwarting and neutralising illegal drones. There are various technologies for countering drones worldwide, each with different capabilities, as shown in Figure 5. Experts have determined that the demand for anti-UAV devices in the market is increasing rapidly. The jammer device can disrupt radiofrequency communication with drones; nevertheless, it cannot halt autopilot-programmed or autonomous drones. Anti-drone systems, trained eagles, and capture systems have limitations, including a limited range for intercepting swift and nimble drones. Current anti-drone technologies are well-established in their inability to disable drones entirely. With over 75% of the drone market share, DJI drones are the most popular consumer drones on the market. Many experts recommend two primary methods of defending against these drones in the conflict in Eastern Europe: an anti-drone jammer gun and a system called DJI AeroScope. DJI, the same company that manufactures DJI drones, also produces DJI AeroScope, which is referred to as an anti-DJI drone. The DJI AeroScope can reveal the locations of drone operators and neutralise drones, but this applies only to DJI drones manufactured after 2014.

The increasing number of attacks by modified and programmed drones demonstrates the limitations of current countermeasures against drones. We assess the effectiveness of each technology in neutralising drones at various distances and under different weather conditions. Table 5 presents various anti-drone technologies, outlining their advantages, disadvantages, and approximate costs.

Table 5 lists most of the technologies and methodologies used to neutralise and eliminate drones. Regarding anti-drone measures, popular devices are not widely available, require significant knowledge, are expensive, and sometimes exhibit low performance efficiency. The table also highlights the drawbacks of these technologies. As previously mentioned, drones have become a symbol of the conflict in Ukraine, with both sides using them extensively for reconnaissance and munitions delivery. Faced with the weaknesses of the technologies described in Table 5, both sides sought to build effective defences against the drone threat, employing various methods, including fishing nets, anti-drone weapons, mechanical cages, and advanced EW jamming devices, to disrupt drone frequencies over large areas. The following section presents counter-drone solutions within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Two innovative technologies, semi-autonomous drones with terminal guidance and fibre-optic-guided drones, can potentially render RF jammer counter-drone systems obsolete. Both operate wholly beyond the scope of jammers. This implies that the anti-drone system is currently ineffective.

As numerous solutions and techniques have been available since the first day of the fighting between Ukraine and Russia, this section presents several efficient solutions capable of destroying any drone in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, as illustrated in Figure 6. Some solutions are active, while others are passive.

Ukraine announced that it would start building an army of robots and implementing EW to neutralise Russian drones (Ukrainska Pravda, 2023). This section presents Ukrainian solutions and innovative techniques for neutralising Russian drones. Ukraine has actually used these measures to defeat Russian attacks (Sutton, 2024).

Most of the drone strikes in Ukraine are linked with Shahed-136. It has an estimated range of around 2,500 km, making it a long-range weapon capable of striking deep within enemy territory. It uses a simple GPS guidance system for navigation. It is powered by a small piston engine, allowing it to hover in the air before diving onto its target in a kamikaze-style attack (Bertrand, 2023; Kharuk, 2024). Although it is relatively slow and noisy, making it vulnerable to interception, its high numbers and low cost make it a persistent threat. Using this drone in saturation tactics complicates air defence efforts, as it overwhelms systems with multiple incoming threats. Conversely, rudimentary drones, such as the Shahed-136, which rely on basic GPS and minimal optical sensors, exhibit a higher susceptibility to errors and, thus, a greater likelihood of inflicting collateral damage due to their limited precision and adaptability. Various techniques and solutions are presented in the subsequent section for neutralising Russian drones.

Drones have transformed military tactics, significantly altering the dynamics of warfare. In response to this multi-purpose technology, military personnel must continually monitor the skies to detect drone attacks. Despite challenges, such as limited battery life and the necessity for specialised training, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have utilised FPV technology to enhance their offensive and defensive capabilities. This study underscores the vulnerabilities of the existing technologies designed to intercept drones. It also examines the latest technologies employed in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to counter drones. The lack of countermeasures against drones makes equipment an immediate target by drones, making it crucial to address this issue.

Drone countermeasure technologies have several drawbacks, explained as follows:

The jammer device can disrupt radio-frequency communications of drones, but cannot neutralise autonomous drones. The jammer is unable to prevent drones from operating at a frequency that exceeds 6.2 GHz. Therefore, there is no system that effectively combats illicit drones. Anti-jammer systems have been installed in suicide drones by numerous criminals and terrorists in recent years, rendering the radio-frequency jammer incapable of neutralising them. A hostile drone can continue its mission independently even if the radio communication between the drone and the operating station is disrupted by radio frequency interference (Chaari and Al-Maadeed, 2021).

The high temperature around the antenna affects its directivity and efficiency, as illustrated in Figure 21. This heat propagation from HPM systems poses a significant challenge for any corporate army. The thermal camera of the adversary will be able to observe the transmitter location from a great distance, making it highly vulnerable to attacks by multiple forces, kamikaze drones, and aircraft.

Full-automation drones can use various tools to plan their flight as autonomous learning systems. A radar system with the capacity to detect objects with low radar cross-section is the most effective method for detecting them.

To mitigate the threats posed by this advanced technology, frontline areas are implementing various EW and counter-drone systems designed to disrupt enemy drones. Adapting to the war situation and utilising available resources to produce innovations is a good idea. This research presents and studies all available technologies used to destroy and stop drones before they are used in attacks as well as key robots and drones involved in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Although passive anti-drone methods, such as grid barriers and netting, are quite effective, their inconsistent results highlight the need for more standardised and potentially advanced counter-drone technologies. Based on the results of the analysis, the passive counter-drone methods have some drawbacks. The innovations employed by both adversaries during the conflict have advantages and disadvantages, as outlined in Table 6, which highlights the benefits and drawbacks of each anti-drone solution.

Recent events have demonstrated the effectiveness of low-cost drones in warfare and the challenges and expenses associated with establishing robust defences against drones in critical at-risk areas. Drones and robots have substantially altered the dynamics of conflict. Ukraine and Russia will continue to employ drones throughout the conflict and beyond, as these technologies have successfully addressed many of their operational challenges. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, drone defences have been largely ineffective, primarily due to the ineffective performance of jammers, as some drones are immune to jamming. As these systems become less effective, a new Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) will be required. Currently, the most effective way to prevent drone attacks is through netting. Essentially, netting should be placed at strategic locations. Fortunately, affordable nylon netting effectively deters these attacks. Experts recommend using basic automatic weapons to target drones from the air. This indicates that novel solutions are also insufficiently effective. The threat presented by small drones is significant and likely to persist. The use of drones has become a dominant force on the battlefield. A high-efficiency system must be able to detect and stop every illegal drone.

Governments should collaborate to develop advanced counter-drone technology that prevents drones from posing risks in civilian areas and on the frontlines. The international community should pressure drone companies to stop selling their technology to conflict zones globally. FPV pilots kill people without experiencing the emotional weight of their actions. The issue is of paramount significance due to the rapid pace of technological advancements in the field of warfare. This situation has prompted a call for urgent international cooperation to establish comprehensive regulations that address the challenges posed by illicit drones. No nation is immune to the frontline drone.