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THE CONTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT THEORY TO MILITARY LEADERSHIP AT STRATEGIC LEVEL

Executive Summary

Successful leaders at the strategic, operational and tactical level have always applied the process functions of management. The destiny of this theory is similar to the destiny of theories of strategy and leadership. Nowadays, none of them are exclusively military theories. The very fact that they have been applied in different fields of human society has contributed to both their theoretical and practical improvement. It is impossible, at the current time, even to think about the managing of a defence system of a country or alliance without the synchronised and unique engagement of civilian and military structures. If they want to keep pace with political, economic, military and other trends, they have to follow the latest achievements in the field

of strategy, leadership and management. They must also be familiar with certain problems, they have to completely understand them and their way of acting must be in accordance with that knowledge. This will provide them with a new and precious experience. That is why the main objective of this paper is to emphasise that the iterative character of management gives strong support to the aforementioned principle.

Introduction

„In a well organised system, even an average person can achieve more than average results; in a badly organised system even an above average person cannot achieve average results“¹.

The contemporary challenges, risks and threats that states and their armed forces face are totally different from those which existed in the past. Hard power gives way to different forms of soft and smart power. The characteristics of contemporary conflicts are asymmetric warfare and the domination of non-contingency operations over contingency ones. In some, the adversary is not physically visible, for example when he appears in the form of diseases and epidemics. Natural catastrophes, man-made and industrial accidents that can be considered as possible adversaries can be impossible to manage. All these issues can cause serious problems for contemporary military leaders at all levels, especially at the strategic and operational level as the highest levels of responsibility.

Armed forces too have changed. As a dynamic system they have undergone numerous and significant changes during their historical development. Managing elements and the managed objects which are the basis of the skeleton of each and every system and subsystem of management have also been exposed to revolutionary changes. The need for their further improvement and harmonisation with progress in the world in which they exist in is an imperative for the leading structures of society. The establishment of an appropriate strategy, the finding of solution for a more efficient way of managing, as well as finding leaders capable of carrying it out, are some of the most important tasks of managing structures within a society.

This paper explores the contribution of management theory to military leadership at the strategic and

operational level. The main questions addressed are: What are the current attitudes related to understanding the essence of the relationship between leadership and management? What demands are put upon military leaders at the strategic level? What are the possibilities of the application of the theory of management in the field of military leadership? Which problems have appeared as a result of ignoring the theory of management in the field of military leadership?

The possible sources of information relating to the aforementioned fields are primarily general theories on strategy, leadership and management. There is no doubt that military organisation is the link connecting these three important theories. It can be said that all three theories have their roots in military organisation and they have been created as a result of long lasting research and dealing with the army by eminent persons throughout the history of human development.

The roots of strategy can be found in military science, but it is widely applied in various fields of human action. The results of its theory, as well as the experiences from its plentiful practice, are used in politics, the economy, public services and other areas. Contemporary strategy is not only military theory. It does not only deal with war waging but also deals with the pre-war and post-war periods. All the aforementioned facts clearly show that strategy is not a simple theory giving static rules and principles in a special area, but that it is a flexible theory which provides conditions and pushes us to think more creatively. I consider strategy as an organised approach based on the unity of theory and practice and directed to solving certain problems. There is no doubt that it is, at the same time, the art and skill of finding the basic drivers of a system, managing the drivers and directing them in a way that will completely exploit one's own advantages, as well as the competitor's disadvantages, in order to achieve the desired goal.

There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted

¹ Živko Dulanović, Management – Process of organizing (Belgrade: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, 1996), p. 354.



to define the concept. As Adair² points out, leadership means that a person is able to lead other people, to direct them to follow him, to give tasks and orders, and to coordinate them in achieving their aims. In my opinion, leadership is a very complex concept which is composed of three basic parts: the necessary possession of certain features, qualities and skills, the desire to be more successful than others competitor and the capacity to be a leader in an organisation based on informal rather than formal authority. Generally speaking, the function-power in the army comes out of rank but when a military leader is considered, it must come out of his knowledge, personal characteristics and his acts.

If properly applied, management theory can be a powerful weapon in the hands of a modern leader at all levels of responsibility. The basic functions of management are: prediction, planning, organising, managing resources, directing, coordinating and control. In contemporary conditions of conflict and with new military and technological achievements, organisational and expert functions become more significant in relation to combat functions. The concept of the commander holding a sword in his hand and leading his soldiers to attack is part of history. The role of an officer as a strategist, the organiser of a complex situation, as well as its commander and expert, has become more and more important. To be good at his role as strategist, manager and leader, he must possess theoretical knowledge, organisational capabilities and readiness to keep pace with contemporary achievements in that field.

It is clear that strategy, leadership and management are the most complicated and, at the same time, the biggest challenges for modern military leaders. Although the theories of strategy, leadership and management are three separate concepts, they are, at the same time, fields of human activity which overlap and support each other. The aforementioned theories are very successfully applied today in various fields of human society because they offer enormous potential that can be adequately applied in practice. All attempts by experts till now to keep these theories conceptually separate have caused some disorientation in practice

and have serious consequences in the majority of contemporary armies.

Current attitudes related to understanding the essence of the relationship between leadership and management

„Successful management is readily measured against objective criteria but commanders are not leaders until their position has been ratified in the hearts and minds of those they command“³

At the very beginning of the consideration of the relationship between the theories of military leadership and management, I would like to stress the fact that military leaders and managers had existed before the theories emerged. Those leaders were people whose very birth gave them some predispositions, which came to the surface at the right time due to their being above average performers in their environment. In the course of human history, there were people at certain times and places who were, thanks to their personal characteristics, qualities and skill, the first among equals and they successfully led their respective organisations. There were also people living in the same conditions who had great feeling and ability for planning, organising and managing different systems. It often happened, especially when members of military organisations were concerned that some of them simultaneously belonged to both groups. The researchers used both groups as a unique example of the development of the theory of leadership as the older and longer studied scientific discipline and the theory of management as its faithful satellite which develop at the beginning of the 20th century. I believe that no one group of explorers essentially wanted to develop two separate theories having nothing in common, but their aim was to create the basis for further improvement of each. I understand their efforts as a precious heritage which should enable us to always avoid starting from „the very beginning“, and to perfect leadership and management as a guide for those who are obviously naturally gifted.

² John Adair, *Effective Strategic Leadership* (London, Pan Macmillan Ltd., 2002), p. 84-86.

³ *Leadership in Defence*, (Shrivenham: Defence Leadership Centre, 2004), p. 6.

It is the nature of a human being that he always needs somebody who will lead him; to have somebody who will help him to solve problems of disorientation and uncertainty. That is why this phenomenon was something researchers were concerned with from the beginning of human society. As already emphasised, the first case studies of leaders mostly belonged either to the political or the military establishment and these two fields used to be, and still are, dominant in the research of Adair, Joyner, O'Neil and other researchers. Adair⁴ points out three basic approaches to defining leadership – qualitative, situational and functional. All three are acceptable and still applied. Depending on the approach, the first ones to be analysed and considered are qualities, personal characteristics or skills of contemporary leaders. Adair, who himself has analysed and established 64 leader characteristics gives the example of Professor Bird from the USA who has found 79 characteristics⁵. A very interesting detail appearing in the survey is that the most often mentioned characteristics are initiative and intelligence. All the approaches consider knowledge as one of the most important characteristics of a modern leader. Consideration of leaders at the strategic and operational level insists on generic knowledge as the result of long standing experience. Adair⁶ adds that the other significant fields of knowledge are team work with advisers and selection of appropriate advice, as well as being familiar with the decision making process. After detailed analysis of all the aforementioned approaches, it becomes clear that a leader must be very familiar with the functions of planning, organising, and managing human resources as well as the control function. The leader can have knowledge accumulated in these functions if he has applied management in practice as a process at the tactical level.

In its attempt to emphasise specific features of the relationship between leadership and management, the author of *Leadership in Defence* introduces a separate new concept – *command*⁷. It seems as if this can cause problems in making the distinction between leadership and management. Considering Henry

Fayol's establishment of the theory of management in 1916, Jovanovic⁸ stresses commanding as one of the process functions. It was Fayol who enormously contributed to the understanding of commanding as one of the process functions, not as the mere giving of commands but an extremely complex activity between superiors and subordinates. Since this word sounded too „military“ (understandable given that the theory was mostly based on the successful functioning of a military organisation), it was replaced with the word *directing*. It is possible that the latent opposition between the civilian and military structures was the one which caused the creation of different approaches. In spite of these facts, I think that both sides are today, more than ever, directed to each other in solving the problems at the operational and strategic level and that is why they must use the achievements of both theories in the best possible way. When considering the three aforementioned concepts, the authors of *Leadership in Defence* claim that the joining of the knowledge and skill of both leader and manager in one person is enormously important⁹. This approach is a good starting point for the correct understanding of military leadership at the strategic and operational level.

Continuing the analysis of the relationship between leadership and management, the authors of *Leadership in Defence*, emphasise that these two components lead to successful command and I would like to add that they also lead to the formation of a successful commander. Their conclusion on the need for a harmonised balance between leadership and management in the authority of leader is very important when one analyses experiences in different situations. It is as clear as day that there is not even one military organisation in the world which can have different groups of officers for peace and for conflict situations. According to the authors of *Leadership in Defence*, the specific attributes of these categories are shown separately, but at the same time an obvious truth is presented – „*Leadership, therefore, complements management, it does not replace it*“¹⁰. I strongly believe that the clear relationship between

⁴ John Adair, *The Skills of Leadership* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984), p. 5-18.

⁵ John, op. cit., *Effective Strategic Leadership*, p. 65.

⁶ John, op. cit., *Effective Strategic Leadership*, p. 79.

⁷ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 6

⁸ Petar Jovanovic, *Management – Development theory of management*, (Belgrade: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, 1996), p. 16.

⁹ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 8.




these two theories can be shown as in figure 1. Figure 1 shows the phases of the process which strategic leadership essentially deals with, in the process of formulating and implementing strategy according to Freedman & Tregoe¹¹, as well as the functions of the process of management according to Jovanović¹². Figure 1 on one side also presents the relationship between the desirable attributes of a leader listed by DLC¹³, and on the other side the desirable attributes of a manager according to Jovanović¹⁴. In conclusion, it can be said that both of them have a lot of common desirable qualities and capabilities, as is shown inside the overlap of the circles. It really is possible for a leader to be successful at all levels of decision making if the leader and manager functions are well developed and united in one person. A special quality can be expected at the operational and strategic level as a result of generic knowledge in the course of the development of a leader's career.

In all approaches to leadership known so far, their psychological, sociological, physical and other characteristics have been emphasised; necessary features, qualities and skills have also been stressed but the importance of managing various resources has not been completely defined. It is important for every organisation to have a capable leader, but it also very important to have a whole team of supporting experts who should be managed in a proper way. According to Joyner¹⁵, it is a fact that these two theories – of military leadership and management are two separate concepts, but they are at the same time two fields of human activity which overlap and support one another. Firstly, they have many qualities and capabilities in common. Secondly, they both deal with the extremely complex and demanding process of an iterative character. That is why leaders must be familiar with all the secrets of qualitative analysis; capable of creating a vision based on rich experience; know how to plan and organise their activities as well

as the activities of the teams they work with; be able to direct these activities towards the desired objective; know how to select and manage the driving forces of an organisation; and be able to control themselves, other people and the very process as a whole.

When talking about the distinguishing characteristics a modern leader must possess, initiative and generic knowledge are the key "cross-overs" between political and military leaders at the strategic level. Special attention must be paid also to individual responsibility based on general and expert knowledge concerning the things that have been done and those that have not been done. Every failure made at this level can have fatal consequences for the system and its functioning.

Figure 1 – Common attributes of leaders and managers



Demands put upon military leaders at the strategic level

„To understand where you are and where you intend to go, you must begin by understanding where you have been“

The role of leaders at the strategic level in contemporary conditions has significantly changed in relation to that in the period of the cold war due to new challenges, risks and threats. The short period of the uni-polar world in mankind's history at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, as well as the (re-)appearance of new (old) great powers in international relations, additionally complicated the situation concerning the strategic thinking of

¹¹ Mike Freedman and Benjamin B. Tregoe, *The Art and Discipline of Strategic Leadership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 22.

¹² Petar, op. cit., *Management – Process, functions and areas of management*, p. 28.

¹³ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁴ Petar, op. cit., *Management – Roles and tasks of manager*, p. 437.

¹⁵ Rick Joyner, *Leadership, Management and Five Essentials for Success*, (Charlotte: Morning Star Publications, 1994) p. 8-10.

leaders at the strategic level. The process of strategic anticipation, estimation and analysis, as well as the process of defining the mission, goals and objectives, up to setting the strategy, making the plans and undertaking the necessary actions in significantly changed conditions for solving future conflicts are enormously important for contemporary strategic leaders. There are numerous demands as well as problems to be solved. Some possible solutions have been given in the theory of leadership. In this part I want to emphasise only a few interesting demands from the aspect of possible influence on the theory of management.

Leaders nowadays are in a much more difficult position than they used to be in the past, when they mostly relied on their formal authority based on their position and their rank in their society or military organisation. They did not have the tools and procedural techniques which are at the disposal of contemporary leaders for high quality analysis, estimation and anticipation of the future state of the system. The expectations of common people concerning the leaders at the strategic level have changed a lot. The level of education of these common people is much higher today, they can access much more information thanks to the transparency of the system, they actively participate in democratic authorities and their demands are bigger than they used to be. One of the similarities that can be found is the fact that people always let their heart and feelings lead them where their leaders are concerned. On the other hand, contemporary leaders must use reason, truth and realism more than ever as their leading ideas. Any kind of improvisation, no matter whether a political or military leader is concerned, will put them into the category of those who were bad rulers and who were leading their followers wrongly.

Analysis of the relationship between the theory and practice of leadership at the strategic level raises something, it seems to me, of a chicken and egg problem. Clausewitz's attitude, analysed by Mahnken¹⁶, can be one of the possible solutions to the problem. The core of the attitude is that the theory is that no one is given eternal knowledge. The task of scientific theory is to provide us with the knowledge which will help us in further thinking over a problem

as well as in advancing our own practice. I believe that the answer to the question posed above can be found in that interactive relation between theory and practice. Our approach to this problem must not be one-sided, but the exit out of the problem should be sought in the possible influence of theories close to its solution. This point is very important from the aspect of the leaders and their way of thinking, especially concerning implementation of the knowledge from the field of management theory and practice in the area of strategic leadership. Considering the responsibility of leaders in relation to strategic planning, the authors¹⁷ of *Leadership in Defence* emphasise that „they require leadership as well as management“. This is, at the same time, the starting point and initial demand which must be followed and obeyed by the one who wants to become a successful military leader.

Besides the aforementioned aspect, the second very important reason for emphasising the necessity of changes relating to demands put upon military leaders at the strategic level is the constant improvement of the interactive process of strategy creation and formulation. One possible approach to the process is shown in figure 2, and is the result of the combining two approaches – one, according to Freedman & Tregoe¹⁸, and the other according to Miličević¹⁹. Analysis of the approach gives us two principal ways in which the demands put upon contemporary leaders at the strategic level can be considered. Firstly, they can be considered in relation to defined basic phases of the process. Secondly, they can be considered from the aspects of: planning and organising, directing the team, finding, selecting and managing the basic drivers of a system; providing the necessary control, i.e. feedback. However, it is clear that a modern leader nowadays has to pay attention to actual experiences from both the theory of leadership and theory of management.

Grattan²⁰ highlights the attitude claimed by military theoreticians throughout history that war waging

¹⁶ Thomas, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁷ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁸ Mike Freedman and Benjamin B. Tregoe, *The Art and Discipline of Strategic Leadership*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 22.

¹⁹ Vesna Miličević, *Management – Strategic management* (Belgrade: Faculty of Organizational Sciences, 1996), p. 496.

²⁰ Robert F. Grattan, *The Strategy Process* (New York: Plagrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 39-57.



is at the same time extremely unpredictable and a contingent activity. Mahnken²¹ also underlines that they have often emphasised the statement that there are no stable rules and principles in war. However, the level of the development of human civilisation, technology and techniques does not allow modern strategists to justify their acts by the unpredictability and contingency of war, as was possible in the past. A high-quality analysis and synthesis of data gathered from the external and internal environment is one of the significant obligations of leaders at the strategic level, especially if based on experiences from similar conflicts from the past, informational globalisation, and strategic intelligence.

A very interesting question has been raised recently: Is research in strategy used as a tool for creation of a certain national policy or does the policy itself influence the acceptance of new strategies? As a possible answer to this question, I would like to highlight the importance of Hamel & Prahalad's attitude, explained by Joyce & Woods²², about strategic thinking and strategists – according to them a strategy in which strategic level leaders create the future (if that is possible) is much better than the one in which the leaders are focused only on prediction of the future. The attitude of contemporary leaders at the strategic level towards the aforementioned question is very important. Taking the initiative before and from the very beginning of a conflict, gives political and military leaders the possibility to shape the environment in which certain activities are performed, and can significantly reduce uncertainty. „*An uncertain environment can be made more or less certain through our influence*“²³ was a statement emphasised during a lecture at Royal College of Defence Studies (2010). The example given was the influence of strategic level leaders in the Middle East upon the oil price and consequently upon indirect shaping of the environment. Nowadays, we are also witnesses to a similar environment, creating the purpose of which is Russia's changing of its attitude towards the conflict in Ukraine. Where military leadership is concerned, this statement is of enormous significance because

initiative is one of the most important principles from the strategic down to the tactical level.

It is not only those military leaders who have to understand the genesis of the problem, but they also have to systematically analyse and evaluate the situation in general, both in the operational and the internal environment, and, based on the results, they propose certain solutions. They have to make the connection between past, present and future, as insisted upon by Chowdhury in his explanation of the Janusian leader type²⁴. There is no doubt that they have to completely understand the environment in relation to the challenges, risks and threats that can affect the system. It is the initial supposition that they do possess knowledge gained from their experience of the past – the knowledge accumulated during their development from tactical through to operational level. They also have to be familiar with the current situation in the environment, especially where the driving forces of a system are concerned. Finally, it is necessary for them to have their vision of the future, especially from the aspect of the problem solved. They should then be ready to make a decision about the implementation of the best strategic options they have at their disposal in order to make the system they represent function in a successful way.

During the lecture, *Military Instruments of Power – The Clash of Strategic Theory and Practice* RCDS (2010), two extremely important questions, posed in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 21st century, were considered. These two questions are very topical even today, bearing in mind the fact that, from time to time, the strategy and national policies of a country face some unsolvable problems. „*Who are the people who deal with strategic thinking nowadays?*“ and „*who are those who apply the strategy today?*“. I would like to add one very important question to these two – *How can we create strategic military leaders?* Careful analysis of these questions proves that a significant number of new demands put upon strategists can be identified today. I would like to concentrate on the demand for the creation of future leaders. The people dealing with strategy today, if they have passed every level of development from tactical up to operational, represent an exceptional union of theory

²¹ Thomas, op. cit., p. 68-78.

²² Paul Joyce and Adrian Woods, *Strategic Management-a fresh approach to developing skills, knowledge and creativity*, (London: Kogan Page Limited, 2001), p. 7, p. 185.

²³ PhD Mohamed Ramady „*The Credit and Financial Crisis: Implications for the Arabic Gulf One Year ON*“.

²⁴ Subir Chowdhury, *Management 21C*, (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Ltd. 2000), p. 17.

on one hand, and the practice and experience on the other. The way to develop leaders from tactical up to strategic level is not the mere attaining of necessary knowledge from different fields, including the theory of management, but it is also the application of knowledge throughout their career. In order to create potentially successful leaders at the strategic level, their expert knowledge must constantly be improved and their managing capabilities and their decision-making quality from tactical through to operational level must constantly be monitored and evaluated. After analysis of different concepts of organisations according to Milićević²⁵, it can be said that a military organisation is a typical example of a unit constantly being in a learning process, whose members are in a continuous process of education and advancement due to the character of their job and their desire. Such an organisation is a real nursery of potential military leaders, from tactical up to strategic level, who have to work on their personal professional promotion, but who also have to educate some new leaders.

There is a serious risk inherent in separating strategic thinking from the practical realisation of a strategy, as pointed out by Joyce & Woods²⁶. While explaining leadership at the strategic level, the authors of *Leadership in Defence*²⁷ point out the potential danger of distancing the leaders from the organisation, as well as weakening their influence. This can happen in some cases due to their not being real experts, a lack of understanding of the organisation or maybe due to the fact that their leadership is based only on their formal-law position within the system. The other cause for distancing can be found in the lack of feeling for the people dealing with strategy to understand other people as well as a lack of empathy for being in these people's shoes. As insisted by the authors of *Leadership in Defence*, in order to provide the necessary transformation of a big strategic objective into small individual goals of common people and vice versa, the strategists must understand the attitude of these people even if it is sometimes opposite to theirs, because this understanding can be of decisive importance for a success or a fiasco. It is a fact that realisation of the created strategy by the decision taker at the top of a system depends on the manager

– executors in the lower layers. This gives additional importance to the executors understanding of the essence of the created strategy at the operational and tactical level. Their level of understanding can be a firm indicator of their readiness to cope with higher level problems. However, all these issues cannot be transformed into practice unless one demand is fulfilled – to reduce any causes of misunderstanding and not permit the alienation of the leader from the executor.

In a case where the military leaders only obey adopted routines and given orders (which are probably two of the most important characteristics of a military organisation), there is a real danger of bureaucracy and uniformity of management which can further lead to a lack of creativity. The application of scientific achievements from the theory of management provides conditions for the creation of experimental models for checking different scenarios. This is very important for a leader's creativity. On the other hand, if the leader relies too much on his formal authority, personal qualities and characteristics, and on his capability for persuasion (the contemporary theory of leadership is mostly based on these things), there is a danger of losing contact with reality and making unrealistic decisions. For all the aforementioned reasons, the most desirable thing would be to unite all the positive cognitions in research to date in order to educate and create a leader.

Besides, I think that a kind of „competition“ must constantly be present among the leaders during the process of strategic thinking while a strategy creation is still in progress. Concern, from the point of view of the management logic, would enable several options to be offered which would differ in relation to the ratio of the engaged resources (forces, means and time) in achieving the desired goal as well as to the way the set objective is achieved. Eventually, it would create a positive competitive atmosphere and result in the best quality strategy.

The aforementioned facts prove that, when the demands put upon the strategic level leaders are concerned, there is still a lot of space and time for implementation of contemporary achievements in both the theories considered above. This is the only way in which the theory of strategy can be sublimated and made more efficient.

²⁵ Vesna op. cit., p. 509-510.

²⁶ Paul and Adrian, op. cit., p. 280-288.

²⁷ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 5.



Possibilities of applying the theory of management in the field of the military leadership

„In today's volatile world, having a robust process to guide strategy formulation and implementation is nearly as important as the content of the strategy itself“²⁸

At the very beginning of my consideration of the possible influence of the theory of management upon the theory of military leadership, I want to underline a very important compatibility which deserves careful analysis. It is a fact that the economy is the driving force of all activities in a society – including military ones. The economy, the government and military, as well as other drivers of any society are mutually strongly connected and dependent. Joyce & Woods²⁹ argue that experts in strategic management have described three kinds of strategy in the field of economic development. According to Ansoff, Argenti and Porter, the period from 1960 to 1980 was a time of *„strategy as calculating“* when the principal aim of strategy was to improve the company and make as much profit as possible³⁰. As for the military systems of this time, it was the period of the Cold War and deterrence strategy when the main aim of strategy was the improvement of military capacities and creation of imposing military formations, which, as time passed, became bigger and bigger ballast for the respective countries.

According to Nutt, Backoff and Mintzberg, the period from 1980 to end of the 90s was a period of *„strategy as discovering“* when the very strategy of the company was the centre of attention. Compared to the situation in army organisations of that time, it is clear that this was a period of drastic changes in the strategies of all contemporary military systems. The end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the world division into blocks, new challenges, risks and threats made the formulation and implementation of totally new strategies and their improvement the centre of attention in almost all armies in the world.

According to Ohmae, Hamel and Prahalad, the period from the end of the 20th into the beginning of the 21st century has been and is going to stay in field of economy and strategic management as a time of *„strategy as making“*³¹. The centre of attention in this period is the customer (or user of services) and his demands. The author of the article *„New Masters of Management“*³² underlines two main challenges in management – the attitude towards the customer and economic business as one of the preconditions for cost reduction. As far as a military organisation is concerned, this is the time for improvement of existing strategies and creation of new ones, in which users of services, states or organisations and the systems inside them become the centre of attention. Besides, one of the most important tasks in future will be to reduce the costs of military systems. Five New Demands for the creation of the new NATO Strategic concept confirm the states' strong reflection of this situation and their mutual cooperation in the field of defence and security. Kamp³³ claims that all the demands confirm that the centre of gravity in the new strategic concept will be the improvement of NATO as one of the key military political organisations in the world. Economic and strategic management experts have obviously first accepted the achievements from the area of strategy according to the roots of military science. They also take into account contemporary trends and movements, both in international and internal relationships, and they connect theory to practice and vice versa. Joyce & Woods underline a very interesting attitude based on the formulation and implementation of strategy by two groups – economists on one side and strategists on the other. The first group wonders if the things functioning in practice would also function in theory, while the second group wonders if the same things acceptable in theory could function in practice. The most important thing here is that both sides, in this way, not only improve the theory, but also the practice in the field of strategy as science. Any theoretical advance or use of theory which is compatible with the theory of strategy could significantly influence and increase

²⁸ Mike Freedman and Benjamin B. Tregoe, *The Art and Discipline of Strategic Leadership*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 18.

²⁹ Paul and Adrian, op. cit., p. 28-32.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 32-33.

³¹ Ibid. p. 34-36.

³² A special report on innovation in emerging markets – *„New Masters of Management“*, *The Economist*, 17th April 2010, p. 13.

³³ K. H. Kamp, *„The Way to NATO's New Strategic Concept – Towards a New Strategy for NATO“*, vol. 51 no. 4, 2009, p. 21-27.

the success and efficiency of leaders in formulating and implementing strategy. Conversely, a lack of permanent advancement in the field of theory, as well as a lack of rational and critical analysis of existing practice, can endanger strategy creators and the very system in such a way that, in the procedure of strategy creation, they can get a „strategy by default“ – a strategy that does not take in to account the fast changes in the environment and the characteristics of future conflicts.

Analysing the fields of the possible contribution of the theory of management, I think that special attention in the field of strategic leadership should be paid to the process of creation and implementation of strategy. As already emphasised, this is essentially an iterative process composed of several phases. When analysing the process of creation and implementation of strategy, as well as when considering possible influences on the military leaders, I relied on the following authors' contribution to the theory of Strategic Management: Milićević³⁴, Joyce & Woods³⁵ and Freedman & Tregoe³⁶. Based on this, I have adapted the process to the needs of a military leader as shown in figure 2 as one possible approach. Thorough analysis of the essence, significance and contribution of every phase within the process confirms that it is necessary for a military leader to study and take into account the influence of management with its process functions.

Strategic analysis means research of the external (general and operational) and the internal environment as well as the use of large volume of data and information in the process of strategy creation. „Managing information is still instrumental in business success!“ claims Chowdhury³⁷. These two dimensions of the environment and the system under consideration stand in a specific interactive relationship and it is very important to consider all the consequences of their mutual activities. It is especially important to consider these environments in relation to the challenges, risks and threats which can be found in them as separate categories. During the phase of data collecting and processing, the approach of making a connection between three points, as stated

by Chowdhury, can be very useful for the leaders. The first point concerns the past, which is extremely important due to the valuable experience that can be found there. The second point represent the present, i.e. the knowledge we have about a current situation. The third point is the future, the desired final state we would like to reach. In relation to our knowledge, this state is based on our doubts, expectations and anticipations.

We can rely on our own experiences, but the experiences of other people and countries can also help us to solve our problems when they are similar to ones appearing in the past and present.




Figure 2 – Process of Strategy Formulation and Implementation

Projects to be researched should be analysed in detail; we have to determine the level of success achieved by strategists of these times and we have to find the reasons and consequences of both their success and their failure. During the process of analysis, as well as during consideration of the place where we used to be, where we are now and where we want to be, leaders must be careful not to fall into classic trap that

³⁴ Vesna, op. cit., p. 496.

³⁵ Paul and Adrian, op. cit., p. 94-97.

³⁶ Mike and Benjamin, op. cit., p. 22.

³⁷ Subir, op. cit., p. 1.

„you cannot see the wood for the trees“. In order to overcome this problem, a clear picture of the vision they have can help them a lot. A clear and thorough situational analysis of the system helps in identification of its strong and weak points, as well as in the creation of a strategy which will prefer the strong points. According to the UK Defence Leadership Centre³⁸, the following things can be enormously helpful in this phase of the strategy creation: well measured qualitative and quantitative analysis of Political, Economic, Military, Social, Technological, Legal and Ethical issues; estimation of the environment; and the PESTLE (M) technique. This method enables leaders to make „images“ of the situation in the environment and to create the vision. Besides this method, the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) method is also one that can be applied in this phase of analysis. Finally, it is very important for the strategic level leader to understand that the data and information gathering and processing is a permanent and continuous process. It is not completed with moving to the next phase, but it influences all other phases with new and important data which can be applied in order to make corrections in all other phases.

Planning of action directions relating to the system in question is the phase in which the mission is defined, as well as general and specific objectives, as Milićević³⁹ stresses. The following issues must be taken into account when a mission is determined: the basic values and beliefs the system is founded on, the nature of the system, time determinants, capabilities in relation to resources and expectations of the environment outside of the system. While studying the three approaches to mission formulation given by Milićević, Freedman & Tregoe and Joyce & Woods, I can conclude that the last approach is very applicable from the aspect of strategic leadership. This approach states that the *mission* of the concerned system is a short and precise statement of intended beneficiaries, main activities, the desired end state and basic assumptions. As can be seen in figure 3, mission formulation is one of the key activities in the symbolically presented „cumulative“ process of formulating and implementing the strategy. When we considered the relationship between *knowledge*,

understanding and *actions*⁴⁰ taken, we had reached the moment when the leader, based on generic knowledge of the external and internal environment, had to show his ability to understand the situation. This is the phase in which the leader and his team have to define goals and objectives. Accepting the basic meaning of the word *goal* according to the Macmillan English Dictionary⁴¹, we can consider goals as values we hope or wish to achieve, applying the appropriate strategy and having a higher level of generality in ourselves. *Objectives*, again according to the Macmillan English Dictionary⁴², are also the expectations we want to reach, but they have been formed as the result of planned and rationalised activity. For this reason, the very expectations are more concrete and directed and, what is most important, they are measurable. A significant contribution of management can be expected in this phase through understanding and implementation of the process functions of planning and managing resources by the military leaders, whose compatibility provides good conditions for a successful carrying out of this phase.

Creating a strategy is the phase in which the leaders and their teams develop several alternative strategies which would enable realisation of the planned direction of the action. One of the most acceptable methods from the aspect of military leaders can be the method of „scenarios“ as explained by Joyce & Woods. They especially insisted on implementation of strategic thinking by means of the technique of constantly asking the question „What if ...?“ After creating several options, the military leader must decide which of the offered strategies is the most appropriate. It is necessary to consider all the implications of the strategic alternatives for the system in question, especially human and material resources, their time limits, and the changed character of conflict. This phase is one of the most sensitive in relation to all possible later consequences.

⁴⁰ <http://www.rapidbi.com/created/knowledge/understanding/action.html>.

⁴¹ Macmillan English Dictionary, (Oxford: Macmillan Publisher Limited, 2002), p. 609.

⁴² Ibid, p. 974.

³⁸ Defence Leadership Centre, op. cit., p. 66-67.

³⁹ Vesna, op. cit., p. 496-497.




Figure 3 – Creation and implementation of a strategy as a „cumulative“ process

The issue that is of special importance here is the (un-)fulfilled connection between knowledge, understanding and actions undertaken (in that order) and this concept is the essential one for every contemporary leader. A military leader should decide on the strategy which: supports the general strategic interests of his state; accepts the basic values within the concerned system; is adequate for the available resources; exploits his advantages in relation to the competitor; has an acceptable level of risk and is not too prone to up-dating during its undertaking. The approach explained by Freedman & Tregoe⁴³ can be extremely useful in solving this problem. This approach says that the most important thing is to find the driving forces of a system, to understand their good and bad sides, and to define the key capacities. The SWOT analysis method can also be very useful in the process of decision making. This method should not be neglected in this phase due to its positive characteristics in the analysis of advantages, weak points, capabilities and dangers of the created strategies. It is obvious that application of

various methods from the field of management, and especially knowledge about the process function of resource management, is indispensable in this phase. A thorough review of resources issues by the leader and his team, related to the activities implied in the strategy under consideration, can make it clear in advance that it has good perspectives for success during its implementation.

Strategic master project planning, according to Freedman & Tregoe⁴⁴, is a phase in which single projects within the set strategy are located practically. In other words, their relation with already known values such as available forces, means and time is to be defined during this phase. Military leaders and their teams have to provide in their Plan a sure form of communication between strategic levels on one side, and operational and tactical levels on the other side. This means that the participants at the operational and tactical levels must always have in their minds the mission of the related system during the strategy implementation, as shown in Figure 3. In order to provide two way communications, Joyce & Woods⁴⁵ suggest the involvement of lower levels in this phase. It could be very useful and is also in harmony with the fact that a military organisation is one which teaches and educates its leaders for higher levels. Bearing in mind the fact that the core of this phase is the process of strategy creation and implementation defining the order of the activities, priorities, executors and terms, it is very important for a military leader to have knowledge about the process functions of planning, organising and resource management.

In its essence, strategy implementation is the realisation of the plan made in the previous phase. It is of vital importance for military leaders at all levels and in both directions to provide clear and precise understanding of the essence and importance; to persuade their followers of the necessity of realising the plan; to demand their maximum devotion; and to provide the conditions for the undisturbed flow of information needed for success. The other important thing for the leader is to provide control and, consequently, the necessary feedback. Control is of special significance nowadays if we have in our minds the relationship and level of interest of ordinary

⁴³ Mike and Benjamin, op. cit., p. 55-78.

⁴⁴ Mike and Benjamin, op. cit., p. 22-23.

⁴⁵ Paul and Adrian, op. cit., p. 281.



people to the activities of political and military leaders on one side (a worrying lack of interest!) and the media on the other (a very high level of interest!). It is also very important for strategic level leaders to provide at all levels a proper understanding and respect for the major values that the strategy and system are based on. It is necessary to constantly have in mind the fact that certain actions at the tactical and operational level can be of strategic significance in the process of the strategy implementation.

The process of strategy creation and implementation, as can be seen in figure 2, is essentially an iterative process, beginning with analysing and planning and finishing with realisation, control and feedback. Since the process of management is based on the five aforementioned functions and bearing in mind their similarity and iterative character, I believe that the achievements based on this theory should not be neglected but rather can be applied in the field of strategy.

The problems appearing as a result of ignoring the theory of management in the field of military leadership

„All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which great victory evolved“⁴⁶

When you just read the literature about strategy, leadership and management, everything seems understandable, simple and easy to implement. However, recent security threats and the issues involved in addressing them have confirmed that things are not as simple as they look at first sight. Events have further confirmed that strategy, leadership and management are scientific theories where their understanding and knowledge are concerned, but have also confirmed that they are arts when it comes to putting them into practice. Before the establishment of management as a scientific theory, well-known military leaders were successfully dealing with predicting, planning, organising, resource managing, commanding and control during the course of history. It is a fact that military organisations, as well as other well organised

systems, were a perfect example for the establishment of the theory of management at the beginning of the 20th century. During the last century, all levels of command had at their disposal, besides other things, three well developed scientific theories – strategy, leadership and management, assuming that they would be successfully implemented in practice. The analysis of military conflicts in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century obviously shows certain mistakes which are the logical consequence of an incomplete application of the process functions of management by leaders starting from the strategic level down to the lowest levels.

The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 could be considered as the main reason for the USA inviting the allies to start the war against terrorism. Soon after this, accompanied by the understanding of most of the international community, as well as through their allies' support, the US military intervention in Afghanistan took place. Analysis of the containing conflict between NATO, i.e. ISAF forces at this moment, and the terrorists and the insurgents, shows that there are certain problems in the strategic approach which could have been avoided.

Firstly, there is an impression that, bearing in mind the complexity of the situation and the later emerging problems, the implementation of the strategy was started too quickly. It is a fact that al-Qaeda terrorists carried out a few attacks in the 1990s and that a lot of work has been done concerning their ideology, organisation and manner of acting. The book *Know Thy Enemy*⁴⁷, looks at only part of the information related to al-Qaeda but it was sufficient enough for careful creation of a strategic approach. However, it is clear that too little attention was paid to the analysis of previous similar conflicts during the process of strategy creation. For example, there was a conflict between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. In the title of his article *We learn from history that we learn nothing from history*⁴⁸, Brigadier J K Tanner, with good reason,

⁴⁷ Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, *Know Thy Enemy – Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures*, (Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama: USAF Counter proliferation Centre, 2003), p. 17-37.

⁴⁸ J.K. Tanner, *We learn from history that we learn nothing from history*, The British Army Review, Vol. 148 Winter 2009/2010, p. 27.

⁴⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. and tr. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1963).

emphasises this remark by George Bernard Shaw about history. Everybody knows that every conflict has its own and new characteristics and that there is a difference between the Mujahidin in the past and the Taliban today. However, there are similarities such as area and weather conditions, the partial strength of the enemy, his armaments and equipment, the insurgent's tactics, the way he is supplied and others. Describing the enemy forces, Schneider & Post say that „*Al Qaeda also maintains its own guerrilla army ... Most of the members had fought in either the Soviet/ Afghan war or other regional conflicts...*”⁴⁹ Respecting of the aforementioned facts regarding knowledge about the history of military and non-military conflicts has contributed to the fact that the majority of contemporary armed forces have been developing and seriously approaching implementation of the lessons learned concept.

Secondly, when determining the *centre of gravity*, the strategist gave that place to the al Qaeda terrorist core as well as to the Taliban regime they were supported by. The presence of local „war lords” made the situation even more difficult. That is why they were the target of initial air attacks performed by the allies. The cells of al-Qaeda are spread all around the world and it questions the correctness of determining the *centre of gravity*. As argued by Schneider & Post, „*Al Qaeda`s global network consists of permanent or independently operating semi-permanent cells of al-Qaeda trained militants established in over seventy-six countries worldwide, as well as allied Islamist military and political groups globally*”⁵⁰ The only partially certain fact was the location of the Taliban regime and its local military leaders. The bombing itself caused collateral damage and it worsened the already problematic attitude of the local inhabitants in relation to the foreign soldiers. The initial air strikes and collateral damage caused part of the population to adhere to the terrorist core due to their wish for revenge, as well as mercenaries from other Muslim countries in the region. Analysis of the structural dispositions of the inhabitants, mutual links, causes and consequences makes me conclude that a more efficient combination of Coercive Diplomacy and Behaviour Modification Strategy, as explained by Schneider & Post⁵¹, could have brought better results.

Admiral James Stavridis also states in his article, *NATO – Taking a Fix, Charting a Course*⁵² (2009), that the Afghan people are the *centre of gravity*. This statement arises from the hope that, strongly supported by a united international community; this conflict will be positively solved in favour of Afghanistan and the people living there.

Thirdly, there are obvious problems relating to the carrying out of the mission concerning stabilisation and reconstruction within the strategy implementation and after the completion of the principal combat operations. There is a vacuum in the establishment of new authorities and the creation of normal living and work conditions. The fact that this is the task of military and civilian structures means that it is necessary to plan, prepare, organise and carry out the required issues in a better way. The development of the situation in Afghanistan shows that there is a problem concerning the setting of the mission because there were no corresponding forces to carry the mission out at that time.

To be more precise, it was only at the NATO Summit in Istanbul, 2004, that a new concept of forces was initiated when, apart from other things, the following category was predicted. „*Today, we have: ... decided to further the transformation of our military capabilities to make them more modern, more usable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions*”⁵³. Such mistakes can be enormously reduced if the approach taken to the phase of strategic planning is more appropriate and if knowledge from the field of management is applied.

Fourthly, from the beginning of the conflict, the number of the allies` security forces has been increasing constantly, as can be seen in the NATO „*Afghanistan Report 2009*”⁵⁴. The report published in „*Progress Afghanistan 2008*”⁵⁵, says that number of members of domestic security forces – National Army and Afghanistan police – is increasing too. It would be logical that a constant increase of the security

49 Barry and Jerrold, op. cit., p. 33.

50 Idem.

51 Ibid, p. 271-304.

52 James Stavridis, op. cit., p. 46.

53 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_text.htm , *The Istanbul Declaration 2004*.

54 *Afghanistan Report 2009*, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, p. 7.

55 *Progress Afghanistan 2008*, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, p. 8.



forces contingent, as well as the establishment of new authorities in Afghanistan, would mean a better security situation in that area. However, the number of improvised explosive devices is greater and greater as time passes and this information can be found in the report „*Progress Afghanistan 2008*“⁵⁶. The data shown in the Afghanistan casualty and fatality tables for the period from 2001 to 2010 indicates that the number of military and civilian casualties is constantly increasing⁵⁷. It is obvious that the security situation is not in harmony with the increasing number of security forces and this is something that requires control of the implementation, revision and updating of strategy.

Analysis of the conflict in Iraq in 2003 also indicates the presences of certain problems in the process of strategy formulation and implementation. The inglorious adventure of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his regime in the aggression against Kuwait in August, 1990 finished with the intervention by the USA and its allies in the Gulf War in 1991. This outcome only intensified his wish to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that was his principal occupation in the 1990s. As the years were passing, he was becoming a more and more serious threat to the countries in the region and to the world as a whole.

The USA reaction to the al-Qaeda terroristic attacks of 9/11 was fast, but the strategic approach to the problem of Iraq was being built very carefully. However, some mistakes were made during the process of strategy creation and especially in the analysis of the external situation. The consequence of these mistakes was the intervention of the USA and a few allies in Iraq in 2003 without a UN Security Council Resolution and without receiving significant support from other members of the international community. On the other hand, Saddam and the Iraqi regime were much more successful concerning this matter but it did not provide them with a significant strategic advantage „*Saddam was quite effective in his pre-2003 diplomatic efforts towards the near abroad*“⁵⁸. The mistakes made in the phase of strategic intelligence data gathering

and analysis brought to defining, among other things, neutralising the threat of the WMD and cutting the support to al-Qaeda terrorists from the Iraqi regime as the principal objectives of the USA and allies. Soon after the attack on Iraq, it was found that none of these two objectives were based on the reality in the terrain. This fact added to the already weak support of the international community for a final solution of the situation. It is clear that high-quality internal and external analysis of the environment is an inevitable precondition for further successful creation of strategy.

The basic mistake the USA and their allies made when creating the strategy was the one made in the process of choosing the main drivers of the strategic approach to the problem in Iraq. Similar to the situation in Afghanistan, the strategy mostly relied on military forces and the short-term planning of military operations. Obviously bad long-term planning, especially in relation to the stabilisation and reconstruction operations, endangered all those activities that had been done in a good way in the initial military actions of the allies. Brigadier J K Tanner emphasises, in his article in *The British Army Review*⁵⁹, that non-existence of a plan and preparation and the training of the forces for the post-war insurgency situation was one of the basic problems. Closely connected with the aforementioned problem was the mistake made in resource management. Theoretical and practical experiences from Afghanistan were slowly transformed into practical solutions, as confirmed by C. Richard Nelson in his article, „*How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation and Reconstruction Efforts?*“, where he quotes the statement given by former Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in June, 2005. Short-term prediction and planning are sometimes simple, but long-term planning in the process of strategy formulation always demands a lot of attention and time.

Despite the heroic devotion shown by the soldiers of the Western alliance during the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were based on a central idea of a global struggle against terrorism, certain problems appeared at the tactical level – problems which could have had serious implications of strategic significance. Kendall W. Stiles underlines that the

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵⁷ www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/628B66C9-9B5F-4424-8FD5-88DC83EFB655/0/opherrick_casualtytablesto_15april_2010.pdf, UK Military and Civilian casualties.

⁵⁸ Barry and Jerrold, op. cit., p. 193.

⁵⁹ Tanner, op. cit., p. 28.



behaviour of some USA soldiers in Abu Ghraib, torture and prisoner abuse as well as the large number of killed soldiers, directly influenced the fact that 58% of publicity in the USA was against further engagement of their country in that mission⁶⁰. This and similar situations show that it is necessary to be maximally serious in the approach to the phase of control of strategy implementation from the operational down to the tactical level.

It was very important to respect the basic values a system could be based on in the process of strategy formulation and implementation in the all strategic approaches. In his article, *NATO – Taking a Fix, Charting a Course* (2009), Admiral James Stavridis underlines the six principal values NATO is based on. The aforementioned facts clearly show that political and military leaders at the strategic level must pay special attention to the process of strategy creation and implementation, as well as to attaining knowledge in the field of management theory whose latest achievements support the process.

CONCLUSION

„KNOWLEDGE ⇒ UNDERSTANDING ⇒ ACTIONS“

It is clear that a person who wants to be a military leader or a manager, especially at strategic level, has in both cases to use features of his personality, qualities and capabilities in order to manage people and processes in the best possible way. It is impossible to think about command and leadership in the military if there is not knowledge about the basic process functions of management – planning, organising, resource managing, directing, coordination and control. Besides the basic management tools, a strategic level military leader must be familiar with the process of strategic management. He/she should know all the possibilities of strategic analysis, planning the direction of action, formulation of strategy, strategic planning of a project, and implementation and control of strategy realisation. It is not possible to understand the problem if the leader does not have this knowledge; if there is no knowledge or understanding, it is impossible to define the actions needed to find the solution at strategic level.

It is obvious that strategy, leadership and management are studied by a large number of good scientists and researchers who are well published and yet it is still not clear why there are so many mistakes by strategic military leaders in practice. The analysis leads me to the conclusion that there are several answers to this question. The process of strategy creation and formulation is very complex and it demands team work by military and civilian personnel. A leader who has all the good characteristics, qualities and skills must be ready to unite his individual contributions into a harmonised whole. I agree with the statement of the Australian, General Slim: „*A man has no right to set himself up as a leader – unless he knows more than those he is to lead As the leader rises higher in the scale, he can no longer of course, be expected to show such mastery of the detail of all activities under him*“⁶¹. However, I am also sure that if there is no knowledge relating to the three aforementioned areas, there is no understanding and trust between the leader and his followers. „*If people do not believe in the messenger they will not believe the message*“⁶².

One of the possible answers is that every leader has this powerful tool in hand but some of them do not know how to use the tool properly. The management processes are of an iterative character. This means that a mistake made in one phase can result in serious consequences in the following phases. I strongly believe that, if a leader has succeeded on the way from tactical through to operational levels; he/she can be, at the strategic level, an example of perfect unity of theory and practice when it comes to the strategic problem solving and strategic decision making. This is confirmed by the fact that in the strategic approach to solving the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq the major part of the activities, especially concerning short-term planning, had been done at tactical and strategic levels. I do not think that the problem appears because there is no vision but I believe that the problem lies in the lack of clear definition of the mission, in formulating the strategic approach – especially when long-term planning is concerned. This leads us to the relationship between strategic level military leaders and political leaders, i.e. the relations between the military and civilian components of the strategic team. It is unthinkable today to solve

⁶⁰ Kendall, op. cit., p. 136.

⁶¹ John, op. cit., *Effective Strategic Leadership*, p. 70-71.

⁶² Subir, op. cit., p. 19.



the problems of contemporary threats against the security of a country or alliance without a common civilian and military approach. Both components must understand the essence and extent of Clausewitz's statement on war: „*It is clear, consequently that war is not mere act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means*“⁶³. This means that everybody must apply his knowledge in accordance with his competence and from the field he/she is in charge of, especially in the strategy and leadership areas as management tools and methods, thus contributing to solving the problem.

Strategy does not give ready made solutions to various possible conflicts and seniority or position does not guarantee the best possible leading of followers in different situations. It is very important for a leader to understand that it is the same in management – it does not give ready made answers. Management provides theory on the basic process functions applicable at all command levels. Strategic management as a part of general management provides the theory on managing the activities of a whole system in the process of solution finding at the strategic level. Besides the process functions, the theory offers different powerful methods and techniques applicable in various areas and during the most sensitive phases – analysis of environment, planning, organising and resource management. Management as theory and practice offers significant experiences for its application in different situations. The experiences, both positive and negative ones, have been registered and await further study. Fayol wrote that: „*Management plays a very important part in the government of undertakings; of all undertakings,....*“⁶⁴ which Crainer & Dearlove highlight. Starting from the old saying that a mine disposal expert can make only one mistake, it is clear that Fayol (a mining engineer) did not make mistakes and his theory can still be applied in practice after almost a hundred years.

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⁶³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1989).

⁶⁴ S. Cranier and D. Dearlove, (*Handbook of Management*, Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited. 2001), p. 21.

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