

# THE ESSENCE AND ASSUMPTIONS OF EVALUATION OF CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

**Irmina DENYSIUK, MA**

National Defence University, Warsaw

**Marta OSYPOWICZ, MA**

National Defence University, Warsaw

## Abstract

*This paper includes discussions about the issue of evaluating CROs. They are an expression of the theoretical exploration of factors and criteria which may have a significant impact on such an evaluation. It should be noted that evaluation of CROs is an important and complex problem, because today, in the real environment dominated by conflicts and crises, there is a real need to involve some of the resources of third party countries to resolve tensions in unstable areas. The need for a response from multinational forces (national, alliance) is dictated by the dynamics of the changes taking place in the security sphere, the multi-dimensionality of crises and conflicts, and their unpredictability (Iraq, Afghanistan). Today it is emphasised that such a commitment will form the basis of future international relations.*

**Key words:** evaluation, criteria of evaluation, crisis response operation

## Introduction

Contemporary conflicts are a complex fragment of reality and are characterised by their high degree of irregularity. This is a consequence of changes in the perception of the security paradigm and in the perception of the impact of security on different areas of life (society, economic, culture, policy, etc.). The essential elements of the reality are different conflicts and crisis situations,

e.g. intra country and international conflicts or natural disasters, and the opposed actions which are directed to prevent and respond to them.

Analysing the essence and determinations of the contemporary security environment and the nature of the crisis response operations<sup>1</sup> it was detected<sup>2</sup> that the present research was focused only on determining whether an operation was a success or a failure or highlighting a course of action<sup>3</sup> taken without clarifying how the presented results were achieved. Authors only presented their own opinions to describe the way the end state can be achieved. Their publication takes a descriptive form without any engagement in arguments<sup>4</sup>; whereas the evaluation of military conflict is based on a few criteria. To the common criteria we can add losses of material or personnel, civilians or soldiers. These have a big impact on the final opinion about these operations (clearly indicating whether it is valued positively or negatively).

The evaluation of CROs is confined to the statement that they are an effective means for influencing international crisis and conflict management. It's difficult to define the effectiveness of this process without pointing out the measurable

1 Crisis response operations – military and non-military action led by NATO cooperated with other international organisations (e.g. political, humanitarian and economic) for the prevention of, reaction to and removing effects of a situation striking the territorial integrity, the political independence and the safety of the Member States of NATO and NATO as an organisation and in case of an armed attack on one of the Member States. When considering the aim of their activities, crisis response operations can be divided into crisis response operations in accordance with article 5 of *North Atlantic Treaty* and Non-article 5 crisis response operations. The largest group of NA5CRO is peace support operations, which are divided into conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking and peacebuilding. We can also identify other NA5CRO.

2 This problem is dealt with by M. Marszałek in his article: *Dylematy ewaluacji operacji wsparcia pokoju* [in:] M. Marszałek, P. Sienkiewicz, H. Świeboda (red.), *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Bezpieczeństwo 2010*, t. II, AON, Warszawa 2011, and in article: *Interwencja humanitarna – typologia, kryteria sukcesu*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON” nr 3(76)/2009.

3 See A. Rabasa, L. A. Warner, P. Chalk, I. Khilko, P. Shukla, *Money in the Bank. Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations*, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RAND Corporation 2007.

4 See in: B. S. Lambeth, *NATO's War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*; A. H. Cordesmana, *The Lessons Learned and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign*; J. Gotowała, *Lotnictwo we współczesnych konfliktach zbrojnych 1945–2003*; J. Zajadło, *Dylematy humanitarnej interwencji*; A. Tames, *Warriors and Nation Builders*; J. Sroki, *Rola Polskich Jednostek Wojskowych w siłach utrzymania pokoju na Bliskim Wschodzie*; H. C. Królikowski, Cz. Marcinkowski, *Afganistan 2002*.


criteria of the evaluation. In turn, indication of these criteria creates difficulties such as variability, the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of CROs and the complexity of the crisis situations. The current operations requirements indicate that their potential and plans need to be adapted to the response on three planes: offensive, defensive and stabilisation. This means that we can use different impact tools, e.g. a kinetic activity (combat, military) and non-kinetic (political, informational, psychological, propaganda, economic and social).

If we take as an argument the complexity of CROs, the main criteria for evaluation will be a success. But what does *success* mean? By what scale or by which criteria should it be defined? The first steps to indicate a line of research will be necessary to analyse and synthesise the factors which can have an impact on activities in the theatre of operations.

The object of study of this paper concerns the CROs and the methods and criteria needed to determine their success. The goal of the paper is to highlight the main aspects of the evaluation of CROs and to analyse factors determining this process. This goal can be reached through the analysis of operational, contextual and behavioural factors.

## **The complexity and multifaceted nature of CROs**

Assessment is an important element of the research. It is one of the components of the first phase of the operational planning process (OPP) (Picture 1). However, considering the multifaceted nature of military actions, we should note that evaluation is a complex issue. If we want to prepare an effective assessment we shouldn't limit ourselves to a subjective judgment expressed as a success or failure, because this isn't adequate to all military and civilian projects implemented during operations. While the objective assessment of operations, based on analysis of the synthesis of factors, and on selected criteria, will contribute to the planning, organising and conducting of future operations.



Source: own based on M. Marszałek, I. Denysiuk, *Koncepcja użycia sił zbrojnych w wojnach nieregularnych*, Praca naukowo-badawcza nr III.5.1.0., AON, Warszawa 2011, s. 105, za: JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, 05 October 2009, .p. X-15.

**Figure 1. The assessment as part of the operational planning process**

In order to evaluate CROs we need the criteria. The Polish Evaluation Society (PES) determined the universal indicators of the research's success<sup>5</sup>: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability effects. We should, nevertheless, consider the question: whether the research of the evaluation of CROs fulfils all of the indicators adopted by the PES? It seems so. It's hard to evaluate operations without reference to the appropriateness of military action or to the selection of forces and the measures used by them. The durability of the effects is an important criterion of evaluation; analysts of conflict situations indicate that about 44% of countries are again entangled in conflict five years later<sup>6</sup>.

Contemporary studies about the evaluation of CROs indicate effectiveness and performance as primary criteria. In the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual No 3-24* both measure of effectiveness (MOE) and measure of performance (MOP) are

<sup>5</sup> Which are universal in studying the success of any project, regardless of industry.

<sup>6</sup> See in: *Obszary działań i zadań sił zaangażowanych w odbudowę i utrzymanie bezpieczeństwa w środowisku miejskim*, praca naukowo-badawcza nr I.1.7.1.0. pod kierownictwem M. Marszałka, AON, Warszawa 2012, p. 7.

listed. MOE refers to the results/impact of the activities carried out and these should be verified by comparing them with the end state of operations assumed in the OPP. In turn, the MOP is a criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of tasks; it should be understood as an assessment of the level of “cost-effectiveness” of the project, the ratio of the expenses/costs/risks to the results and outcomes.

Considering the assessment of CRO issues, we should agree with the statement that it's important to achieve not only the end state (political and military) of an operation but also any of its components, ex. operational goals. This also affects the legitimacy of the adoption of the reference point of the assessment; in practice this means the opportunity to compare the level of security, stability and reconstruction etc. with the earlier state. It is important to monitor a conflict situation in order to achieve an end state of operation. This can generate problems related with the multifaceted nature of the CROs. Also important will be the examination of each area of operation (military and non-military) in which the forces are engaged. This means that the evaluation should be made on each of the logical lines of operation (LLOs).

Undoubtedly it is easier to assess a single task, a task in the area of one LLO or a task to achieve a single goal. However, the overall evaluation of the operation is very important too, because it allows us to determine whether the operation was a success or failure.

The difficulties in preparing a process of evaluation for CROs are a result of the complexity of the crisis situation/conflict and that the fighting involves a lot of participants and civilians. An important aspect of the contemporary operating environment is also the urbanisation of an area, the so-called urban environment in which the forces conduct their activities, because it is more sensitive than “open space”. The next important factor is local society. This is often the most authoritative assessment of the scale, which is the degree of (dis) satisfaction, (not) adapting to change, and (un) willingness to obey the rule of law, government, and personal participation (participation) in the exercise of power.

Whilst considering the previous points, it is advisable to quote the definition of evaluation. According to L. Krzyzanowski, **the assessment (evaluation)** of CROs can be perceived as a value judgment [...] any statement expressing the positive or

negative attitude of the evaluator to the subject of evaluation<sup>7</sup>, during which the evaluator can be recognised as an individual or as a group of people or international organisations<sup>8</sup>. In a situation where we are preparing an evaluation of CROs, the evaluator can be a soldier who took part in the operation or a theorist dealing with the issue or a representative of an international organisation responsible for preparing and conducting an undertaken action<sup>9</sup>. The subject of an evaluation can be both a real and conceptual component of reality, (...) <sup>10</sup>, which involves: the characteristics of something (a person), a collection of these characteristics, i.e. the state of the thing (personality); the changes in these states, i.e. a process (behavioural, action); the events, i.e. the culmination of the results of the process (facts, as an event resulting from human activities); a relationship, i.e. the relationship and interaction that occurs between the things (peoples), the states of affairs, the process and the events<sup>11</sup>. To perform an effective evaluation of CROs we should choose a subject for this process. For example, the subject can be the organisational structure of multinational forces or the hierarchical relationships between the elements forming these structures.

There are different classifications of evaluation, e.g. the standard evaluation<sup>12</sup> and the utilitarian evaluation<sup>13</sup>. When considering the quantitative criterion, one can distinguish a single-<sup>14</sup> and multi-criteria<sup>15</sup> evaluation. Taking into account

7 L.J. Krzyżanowski, *O podstawach kierowania organizacjami inaczej: paradygmaty, modele, metafory, filozofia, metodologia, dylematy, trendy*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1999, p. 204.

8 See in: M. Osypowicz, I. Denysiuk, *Istota i założenia oceny operacji reagowania kryzysowego* [w:] M. Kopczeński, I. Grzelczak-Miłoś, M. Walachowska, *Paradygmaty badań nad bezpieczeństwem. Zarządzanie kryzysowe w teorii i praktyce*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań 2013, p. 130.

9 See in: Ibidem, p. 130.

10 L.J. Krzyżanowski, *O podstawach kierowania...*, op. cit., p. 204.

11 Ibidem, p. 204–205.

12 The standard evaluation – concern for the internal values of a system, on the basis of which we predict that the system is necessarily good or bad, or that something is the goal of the proceedings; P. Sienkiewicz, *Teoria efektywności systemów*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk, Łódź, 1987, p. 32.


13 The utilitarian evaluation – concern for the external values of the system, on the basis of which we can decide that a system is good or bad for something, because of something, or that something is the means to something else; Ibidem, p. 32.

14 The single-criteria evaluation – the assessment is formulated based on one, and only one, criterion of evaluation; Ibidem, p. 33.

15 The multi-criteria evaluation – the assessment is formulated based on a minimum two criteria of evaluation; Ibidem, p. 33.

the evaluator criterion, we can distinguish an individual or group (collective) evaluation<sup>16</sup>.

In the case of evaluation of CROs we are using one of the two assessments favoured by the time criterion (Figure 3): a retrospective evaluation (*ex post*) or prospective evaluation (*ex ante*)<sup>17</sup>.



Source: owned by the P. Sienkiewicz, *Teoria efektywności systemów*, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk, Łódź, 1987, s. 32.

**Figure 2. The classification of evaluation by the time criterion**

**The retrospective evaluation** is an assessment formulated for the past states of the subject of the assessment (in relation to the time when the assessment is carried out [ $t_0$  - added by author])<sup>18</sup>. The evaluation of this type, in particular, consists of checking in the case of military action (war), when the two fighting parties are regular armed forces, which are similar in terms of the quantity and quality of its potential. If you use them in the process of evaluating CROs we can encounter a number of difficulties. Firstly, these operations are considered as a volatility, multidimensionality and dimensionality of actions. Secondly, the ratio of quantitative and qualitative fighting parties. In the case of operations, we deal with regular forces (division army or coalition of states) leading an action with irregular forces (e.g. guerrillas or insurgents). It should also be

<sup>16</sup> See in: Ibidem, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> See in: Ibidem, p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem, p. 32.

noted that multinational forces are military units that have undergone military training. However, the guerrillas (insurgents) are non-military units without military training. Their motivation to act is a religious or a historical precedent (revenge). Considering the differences one should seek methods for the selection of the appropriate criteria and, hence, proper conduct for the evaluation of these activities.

The next type of evaluation is a **prospective evaluation**, which P. Sienkiewicz defined as an assessment formulated for the future states of the subject of the assessment (in relation to the time when the assessment is carried out [ $t_0$  - added by author])<sup>19</sup>. They play an important role in the decision-making process for the preparation and conducting of CROs<sup>20</sup>. Keep in mind that the prospective evaluation is based on the retrospective evaluation<sup>21</sup>. Considering the possibilities arising from using them, it should be noted that, correctly implemented, *the ex post* evaluation process will contribute to the avoidance of many problems in the complex, the *prori* evaluation process<sup>22</sup>, as considered by M. Marszałek.

One of the main elements of the evaluation of CROs is the selection of the appropriate criteria. We can identify a different type of conflict, so we can also distinguish a different type of CRO. The process of preparing CROs is determined by the various factors (determinants). These factors are also the basis for the selection of a criterion of evaluation that the authors wanted to bring to the reader's attention.

## The factors determining the preparation and conduct of CROs

The preparation and conduct of CROs is based on an assessment of three categories of their success: operational, contextual and behavioural.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem, p. 33.

<sup>20</sup> See in: M. Marszałek, *Interwencja humanitarna – typologia, kryteria sukcesu*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON”, nr 3(76)/2009, p. 66.

<sup>21</sup> See in: P. Sienkiewicz, *Teoria ...*, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>22</sup> See in: M. Marszałek, *Dylematy ewaluacji operacji wsparcia pokoju* [w:] P. Sienkiewicz, M. Marszałek, H. Świeboda (red. nauk.), *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Bezpieczeństwo 2010*, t. II, AON, Warszawa 2011, p. 199.



The operational factors are defined as the measures and methods (resources) used in the preparation and conduct of a CRO. They include: the mandate of operations, the potential and the organisational structure (national, multinational and coalition), and the tactics of operation.

The mandate of CROs has defined the tasks assigned to the implementation of a multinational division and it defines the end states of operations which achieve is using to define of success of operations<sup>23</sup>. The potential in military terminology is used to determine the combat capability of states or coalition of states. According to the Alliance, military potential is identified with a *military capability* which is defined as *the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernisation, readiness, and sustainability*<sup>24</sup>. The organisational structure is defined as a hierarchical and functional way to prepare a multinational division consisting of resources and measures dedicated by the countries involved<sup>25</sup>. A correctly prepared organisational structure allows for the efficient conduct of an operation, and the optimal use and management of national contingents separate to a multinational division. The next important operational factors are tactics. This term is defined as theoretical rules and practical methods for preparing and conducting CROs by the tactical unit in accordance with the mission and the tasks appropriate to the situation and conditions<sup>26</sup>. Correctly prepared tactics by the commander of operations allow for the successful completion of implemented actions (reaching an end state<sup>27</sup>).

CROs are often conducted in difficult conditions (e.g. geographical, historical, political, religious or cultural). Accordingly, contextual factors which include

23 See: P. F. Diehl: *Peace ...*, op. cit., p. 123.

24 Joint Publication JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, 5 April 2000, p. GL-9.

25 See: A. Tyszkiewicz, *Operacje stabilizacyjne na podstawie doświadczeń Polskiej Dywizji Wielonarodowej w Iraku*, wyd. BELLONA, Warszawa 2005., p. 125.

26 See: *Ibidem*, p. 153.

27 End state – The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's **Involvement**; *NATO's Operational Planning Process. The COPD – Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*, NATO School – Joint Operations Department, pdf; (29.11.2012).

the kind of war, the phase of operational deployment and the geography of the conflict<sup>28</sup> play an important role in preparing and conducting operations.

There are three kinds of war: interstate, intrastate and conflict combining the features of both of these kind of war. Today, we are often dealing with an intrastate conflict characterised by:

- *civil conflict often involves more than two identifiable groups in conflict; by definition, an internationalised civil war involves more than two actors; (...)*
- *beyond the difficulty of aggregating multiple preferences in support of a peace operation, the geographic requirements are different in a civil conflict than in an interstate one. Civil instability may mean that several groups are operating in different parts of the country. This could necessitate that the peace operation covers a broader territory, opening up the possibility of more violent incidents. (...)*
- *civil conflict may be quite dangerous to a peace force, and the situation more difficult to control. James (...) notes that in civil conflict, “Arms are likely to be in the hands of groups who may be unskilled in their use, lack tight discipline, and probably engage in guerrilla tactics. Light arms are also likely to be kept in individual homes, and may be widely distributed.” These conditions expose the peacekeepers to sniper fire and other problems, as well as making it virtually impossible to secure a given area fully<sup>29</sup>.*

The next contextual factors are the phase of operational deployment. The operational deployment is different in a different phase of conflict. There are four phases of conflict: (1) before the escalation of conflict, (2) the escalation of conflict, (3) the post-cease-fire and (4) after the disputants have signed the peace agreement. Research indicates that a multinational division has huge problems with the preparation and conduct of CROs during the second phase of conflict – the escalation<sup>30</sup>. If necessary in this phase they are preparing and conducting peace enforcement operations. *Peace operations are generally given credit for conflict abatement in the post-cease-fire, pre-settlement phase. (...) Yet the consensus seems to be that peace operations are most effective in the fourth conflict phase, after the*

28 See: P. F. Diehl: *Peace Operations*, Polity Press, 2008, Cambridge, p. 135.

29 See: *Ibidem*, p. 135–136.

30 See: *Ibidem*, p. 138.

*disputants have signed a peace agreement (not merely a cease-fire), and the force is charged with assisting in the implementation of that agreement*<sup>31</sup>.

The third important contextual factors are the geography of conflict, in particular: topography and the size of a territory covered by the conflict. Consideration of these factors in the preparation and conduct of CROs contributes to ensuring security for a multinational division.

The last groups of factors determining the preparation and conduct of operations are behavioural factors which concern the rules of the conduct of actors involved in conflict. They include: the primary disputants and third-party states (neighbours, major powers and subnational actors). The primary disputants will always strive to maintain the *status quo* beneficial to their own policy. *One might speculate that as the peace operation evolves, one or more of the disputants may be disadvantaged by the maintenance of the status quo in a traditional mission or by elections and changes in society during a peacebuilding one. At that stage, the interests of such parties will be no longer to support the operation but rather to renew violence*<sup>32</sup>. The involvement of third-party states may have a positive or negative impact on the success of the activities carried out by a multinational division. The negative impact of neighbours (e.g. dealing in weapons with one of the disputants) may lead to an escalation of conflict and in that situation this may cause difficulties for the military contingents. A positive impact may depend on using one of the prevention options (e.g. economic – embargo) against a country engulfed by conflict and, consequently, this can accelerate the peace negotiations. The major powers have a special position in the group of third-party states, which include both military and economical development countries. These countries have the military potential to create their own multinational division. In addition, they are dominant players in international economic organisations (e.g. The World Bank or International Monetary Fund) the tasks of which are to ensure global economic security. *Third-party states are not the only relevant actors, as many operational deployments are subject to the actions of subnational groups (...). These include ethnic groups, competing political movements, and terrorist organisations. The behaviour of these groups can be especially important when peace forces are thrust*

31 Ibidem, p. 138.

32 Ibidem, p. 143.

*into areas of international instability. (...) Unlike third-party states, however, subnational actors affect peace operations primarily by direct actions of support or opposition*<sup>33</sup>.

In summary, the operational, behavioural and contextual factors should be analysed during the operational planning process. Including them in the OPP may contribute to enhancing its effectiveness and efficiency and, consequently, to establishing the foundations for acknowledging that the operation was a success. In addition, these factors, which can be used as indicators (criteria) for preparing a retrospective assessment and drawing conclusions, can be also used in the planning process (organisation) of future CROs.

## Summary

The discussion included in this paper refers to the issue of the evaluation of CROs. They are the expression of the theoretical exploration of factors and criteria which may have a significant impact on such an evaluation. It should be noted that the evaluation of CROs is the actuality, an important and a complex problem, because today, in the real environment dominated by conflicts and crises, there is a real need to involve third-country resources to resolve tensions in unstable areas. The need for a multinational forces (national, alliance) response is dictated by the dynamics of changes taking place in the security sphere, the multi-dimensionality of crises and conflicts, and their unpredictability (Iraq, Afghanistan). Today it is emphasised that such a commitment will be the basis of future international relations.

The problem, which was pointed out in the introduction (the evaluation of the operational activities by the forces) is so important that its solution will provide the opportunity for making an objective assessment of these activities and provide guidance for planning future activities.

In this article, the author described the complexity of the conflict situation and actions taken to prevent it, the response to it and the attempt to mitigate

33 Ibidem, p. 145.

its effects. In addition, the study showed the validity of the factors affecting the external environment, distinguishing three types: operational, contextual and behavioural. There have also been efforts to indicate the possibility of preparing an assessment based on the criterion – time. According to this criterion the key to the evaluation of CROs, the *ex post* and *ex ante* assessment, highlighting its main priorities, application and possible limitations was highlighted.

In summary, it should be noted that the aim of the article - identifying the key aspects of the evaluation of CROs and analysing the factors which impact that assessment - has been achieved.

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