SECURITISATION AND MACRO-SECURITISATION OF ENERGY SECURITY

Lt.col. Dragan BOJANIC, MSc
University of Defence, Belgrade, Serbia

Summary

The scholars who are engaged in the social sciences create different theories to explain events in international relations. The basics underlying the securitisation theory will be shown in the first part of the paper, following the theory of macro-securitisation that has occurred as a consequence of deepening the theory of securitisation and its expansion to the system-global level. The second part of the paper presents the basics of the theoretical concept of energy security, which is to some extent "problematic" as a rather new concept and very often criticised. The focus of this paper is to recognise the potential that affects the degree of persuasiveness of energy threats, which is a very important factor in the process of politicisation, securitisation and macro-securitisation of this issue.

Key words: energy security, securitisation, macro-securitisation, politicisation

Introduction

Globalisation is undoubtedly the most important process that marked the dynamics and direction of the modern world in the late 20th and early 21st century. Amazing technological breakthroughs, the promised economic superiority and transnational orientation of globalisation have made one of the most optimistic and most popular concepts of social organisation in the development of human civilisation.

By establishing different theories, scientists have been explaining how the world works. They were trying to explain the events, predict the future, but also affect steering of the official policy. The absence of a theory that would manage to explain and define long-term patterns of behaviour of international actors influenced the explanations of international relations and security to be based on several theories. After realist and liberal theories, a number of other theories appeared with which the scientists tried to provide a new point of view and explain everything that the previous ones failed to explain.

One of the important views on international relations and security in contemporary society is given by the members of the so-called Copenhagen school. By making a departure from realism and liberalism, through introducing the subjective into the consideration of security, a new perspective appeared that seems to be able to explain the series of events that the two previous theories had no explanation for. Significant theory which succeeded in doing so is the securitisation theory, later upgraded to macro-securitisation.

Change Of Security Agenda In The Last Decade Of The 20th Century

Since the establishment of the international state system, security has been almost exclusively tied to the military power and territorial security of the state as central security objects and subjects up to the 1970s (Simić, 2002: 23, 25), which is in today's terminology commonly subsumed under the traditional understanding of security. In the 1980s, especially at the end of the Cold War, the concept of security expanded from purely military to non-military threats (political, economic, environmental, societal) and widened to other subjects and objects (individuals, groups, parts of the international system and the international system as a whole). By broadening and deepening the concept, military threats cease to be a central threat and the state ceases to be the central subject and object of security. This approach nowadays denotes the contemporary understanding of security.

The members of the Copenhagen school played an important role in theoretical explaining and shaping the transformation of security[1]. Namely, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies was founded in 1985 in Copenhagen. The members of this school used a specific approach for security studies, called the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. One of the key projects for its development was termed the Non-Military Aspects of European Security, which did not, at the time when the project began, fit at all into the traditional approach of the understanding of the security concept. The most significant ideas, based on which the members of the Copenhagen school developed their teaching, are: securitisation theory, the theory of regional security complexes and the sectoral approach to security. These ideas have taken a significant place in the modern approach to security.

Theory of Securitisation

The essence of the formation and functioning of securitisation theory can be viewed as a very simple example, by comparing the vulnerability of people's lives in terrorist attacks and other events/situations in society. The probability that a citizen of the United States dies in a terrorist attack is about 1:80 000, which is less likely than for a meteor to hit him/her (Mueller, 2006). Also, in the United States, more people die over a year in saunas from a heart attack than lose their lives in the terrorist attacks (same). An even greater difference can be noted when comparing it to HIV, cigarettes, etc.. Nevertheless, the US strategic documents do not give special importance to the problem of the meteor shower, heart attacks, etc., while the terrorist threat is presented as one of the most important threats to the security of US citizens, for whose defence a large number of resources has been mobilised, especially after the events of 11 September 2001. Also, among US citizens, the defence against terrorism is widely supported, despite the foregoing facts. The logical question that consequently follows is: Why is something viewed as a threat, and something else again, despite its increasing importance, is not? The answer can be obtained by applying the theory of securitisation, which states

1 The most famous members of this school are: Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Jaap De Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre et al.

that certain issues can be socially constructed as matters of the utmost importance for collective survival.

The securitisation theory is based on the claim that the concept of security has no fixed meaning and objective, and that the very process of securitisation is defined as a process of linguistic construction of security threats or presentation of certain issues as especially important for the survival of the community which results in taking special measures to combat these threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-27). According to these authors, the concept of securitisation, in fact, represents an extreme form of politicisation of one specific topic (threats, problems, etc.).

The basic elements of the theory of securitisation are a: speech act that is, securitising move, securitising active participants, functional active participants, special measures and the audience. In securitisation theory, security is conceptualised as a speech act (the so-called Securitising move), that formulates a certain political issue as particularly important for the survival of the community and thus moves it outside of the established rules of the game (Buzan et al., 1998: 25-26). In other words a securitising move is a discourse which presents some issue as an existential threat to a given reference object (Litavski, 2011: 16). The acceptance of this discourse by the audience and the approval of special measures are considered successful securitisation, while not accepting the discourse can be considered only as a securitising move (Buzan et al., 1998: 25-26). A speech act is usually accompanied by special security grammar such as: a reference object, existential threat, the point of no return, and the like. Actors who conduct securitisation moves are securitising actors (the same: 35-36). These are usually state representatives but also the opposition parties, various movements, NGOs, etc. that is, all who have social capital and interest to convince the audience to accept special measures. Functional actors influence the dynamics of the security sector, but they are not reference objects, nor actors who call for securitisation in the name of the reference object, but actors who significantly influence decision-making in the field of security (the same). Special measures are the kind of activities that deviate from the usual standards and may consist of the use of force, coercion, suspension of certain rights and other acts that are exempt from the rules and procedures that would otherwise have to be respected. The audience consists of all those whom the securitising actors are trying to convince to take special measures because of the specific nature of certain issue (the same).

Expansion of Securitisation Theory - The Theory of Macro-securitisation

In order explain the concept of macro theory of securitisation, we must first start with the explanation of the level of analysis that members of the Copenhagen School developed in their papers as an analytical framework for security research. Buzan et al. (1998: 5-6) define several levels of analysis:

1. *International system*, meaning the largest conglomerate of interaction and interdependence of units which do not have any system level above them. This level currently covers the entire planet, but in the past, more or less unrelated international systems existed simultaneously.
2. *International subsystems*, meaning groups of units within the international system that differ from the whole system by the special nature, the intensity of interaction or interdependence. These subsystems can be territorially coherent and then they represent regions (for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - *ASEAN*), otherwise they only remain as subsystems (for example, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries - *OPEC*).
3. *Units*, meaning the actors made up of different sub-groups, organisations, companies or the multitude of individuals who are cohesive, interdependent and differ from other units (for example, states, nations, transnational corporations, etc.).
4. *Subunits*, meaning organised group of individuals within the unit that may affect (or try to) the behaviour of other units (for example, bureaucrats, lobbyists, etc.).
5. *The individuals*, meaning the lowest level, most of the majority of analysis in the social sciences.

Starting from the Buzan and Weaver level of analysis (2009: 255-257), the Securitisation Theory is linked to the intermediate level (of the state, nation, etc.), while the macro-securitisation is ranked higher, between intermediate and system level. As well as the securitisation, macro-securitisation involves a speech act, securitisation actors and audience, and operates under the same rules that apply to other securitisations, that identifies the existential threat of a significant reference object first, and then makes a request for the adoption of special measures (Weaver in Buzan and Waever, 2009: 257; Buzan, Weaver and Wilde

in Buzan and Weaver, 2009: 257). In addition to identifying processes at different levels, macro-securitisation is used in an attempt to connect all securitisations at the intermediate level and transfer them to the global level (Buzan and Weaver, 2009: 257). Therefore, successful macro-securitisation requires such an expansive dynamic to be able to include other securitisations (Litavski, 2011: 34). This should be such that it subordinates other securitisations to itself.

Buzan and Weaver (2009: 256-260) also associate the concept of security constellation with macro-securitisation. Macro-securitisation generates constellations, while one constellation may be generated from the opposing securitisations where each of them is shown as the biggest threat to what the other protects. Constellations indicate that there is a universal form of mutual relations in all social structures of securitisation or the association with the political processes at other levels, hence the impossibility of creating isolated securitisation.

The Concept of Energy Security

The majority of authors agree that the concept of energy security has no universal meaning. Along the energy chain (of oil and gas), across transit countries to the consumers, energy security is interpreted in different ways, depending on whether reference is made to producers, consumers or transit countries (Novičić and Đukanović, 2010: 420-421; The New Energy Security Paradigm, 2006: 9). In addition, the meaning of energy security is also associated with the geographical position of the country itself (the same).

Daniel Yergin (Yergin, 2006: 70-71) distinguishes three categories of states according to which he defines energy security: states which export energy to whom the energy security is a continuous maintenance of the requirement for energy that is exported and thus increases government revenue; developing states to whom the main concern is a change in energy price and the impact of these changes on their further development; countries dependent on import of energy, such as the USA, for which energy security involves the security of energy supplies, especially oil and gas in sufficient quantities at affordable prices. Although most states may be classified in the previous division, Yergin (the same) makes a difference in

defining energy security in individual countries: for the Russian Federation, the main goal of energy security is to re-establish, and later to maintain, state control over "strategic resources" as well as to gain priority over the main pipelines and market channels for the supply of the international market; for India and China, energy security is reflected in the ability to adapt quickly to the new dependence on the global market; Japan represents a completely neutralisation of the scarcity of domestic resources through diversification, trade and investment, while in Europe, the central debate is about how to manage dependence on imported gas.

The New Energy Security Paradigm (The New Energy Security Paradigm, 2006: 9) points out that the concept of energy security unites the energy, economic growth and political power within, and that the defining itself varies depending upon for whose interests the term is defined. The stated text, in addition to the specifics of the term in dependent countries, developing countries and countries exporting energy[2], highlights that the decision-makers, when considering energy security, focus on securing the infrastructure from terrorism, wars and natural disasters, while large companies care about the integrity of the entire energy network.

According to Daojing (Daojiong, 2006: 2-3), the very concept of energy security is not simply a combination of energy and security, but contains three core objectives: availability of energy needed for economic and social development, freedom from interruption in the supply and availability of energy at affordable prices. The set goals are primarily directed to achieving the welfare of the nation, while the indispensable component of the energy and security is highlighted in the background. Daojing (the same) further points out that military power is not the main instrument for achieving energy security, but that the geopolitical factors as well as the national policies of the countries that control the development of energy capacity and energy transport have the crucial role. Sharma also supports this claim (Sharma, 2007: 159), noting that consideration of energy security includes components of geopolitics and the bilateral relations between the two countries (as well as diversification of supply sources and diversification of the types of energy through renewable and non-renewable sources). Stringer (Stringer, 2008: 122-123) suggests that when considering energy security all elements of national

2 Energy security in dependent countries, developing countries and countries exporting energy is defined in a similar way as it is with Yergin (Yergin, 2006).

power: diplomacy, military, economy, as well as informal links must be taken into account. This corroborates Yergin's claim (Yergin, 2006: 69) that the concept of energy security does not stand by itself, but it is important in the interaction between states.

The European Commission (European Commission, 2004 in Grošelj, 2007: 7) defines energy security in the EU as "demand management, the use of new energy resources such as renewable energy, creating streamlined internal energy markets and the control of imported energy reaching special relations with supplier countries". This definition is the result of the energy dependence of the EU and its reflection of the wishes for a more stable energy market.

According to Barton and others (Barton et al., 2004 in Savković, 2007: 30), energy security is defined as "a state in which one nation and all citizens and businesses have access to sufficient quantities of energy at a reasonable price, without the risk of supply disruptions in the near future." (Nadić and Milašinović 2008: 135) argue that this definition establishes energy security as a subspecies of national security, and it could be considered approximately equal to energy independence. Consequently, they define the global energy security as "a process in which a stable, secure and continuous flow of energy (primarily oil and gas) to all nations is provided, while ensuring the minimum interests of producers, in terms of stable prices and reliable demand" (the same: 136).

In the opinion of Simurdić (2009a: 54), energy security represents "a stable demand and low prices that justify the high costs of research, production and construction of transport infrastructure: gas and oil pipelines for the producers. For consumers, it is the reliability of supply, at reasonable prices, while the transit states calculate that such a position guarantees them the supply and revenue from taxes on transit." As a basic two elements, he highlights - a stable and secure supply and a rounded competitive energy market (Simurdić, 2009b: 7).

Similar to the previous definitions, Jelena Radoman (2007: 36-37) defines energy security at the global and national level as the "availability of energy sources, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices, stability of supply, as well as physical security of gas and oil pipelines."

The National Security Strategy of the RS (2009: 21-22) in part of the economic policy under the concept of energy security "means the divergent trends of supply,

stability of supply and energy production, creating the necessary autonomy and strengthening of regional positions in the supply of energy." However, in the very next paragraph, the goal of economic policy, by which energy security is provided, becomes the support to defence and security measures for the needs of the population and providing logistical support to all structures in the national security, in accordance with the state, and in the case of threats to its security. The goal, set in this way, seemingly narrows the previously defined energy security term and brings it primarily in connection with military security.

A number of different approaches in defining energy security suggest that it is an open and flexible concept. The very absence of a single, precise definition is the main disadvantage of the concept of energy security. Although it is a threat that is recognised by the majority of countries in the world, totally opposed concepts in setting certain groups of countries is its major drawback. Consequently, it is not possible to define a single, universal, way/model of achieving energy security, as well as a universal model to measure the degree of energy security and performance achievement in reaching it (Božanić, 2011).

Energy Security Potentials in the Process of Macro-Securitisation

The credibility of a threat to collective survival in the case of macro-securitisation must be significantly higher than the threat that is securitises. Accordingly, energy security should have the potential to convince the audience of the importance of global threats to the survival of the world's collectiveness or at least its greater part. Energy security has its economic, political, military and environmental dimension that finds its source in a deficit of energy resources, supply disruptions, uneven distribution of energy resources and armed conflicts with an energy background, environmental pollution and climate change. The above problems have reached global proportions and they are inevitable factor in the process of securitisation of energy security as well as its macro securitisation.

Energy use has defined social and economic development of society since ancient times (Mandal et al., 2010: 153). This is how cheap and good quality oil enabled

many countries, especially those which are the most developed, very fast and overall economic development (Đajić, 2002: 69-73). The level of standard of living increased due to cheap oil and many industries, petrochemical and transport have developed (the same). Energy has become an integral part of the life of modern man, which would not be a problem for the human community if energy quantity was sufficient, but mankind is largely relying on energy from fossil fuels, which are extracted from the earth's reservoirs, and it already became clear that these reservoirs will „dry up" at a certain point in time. There are various estimates that talk about the exhaustion of energy sources, and, according to one, the existing world oil reserves can last 41 years, natural gas 67 and coal 92 years (Klare, 2005 in Kovač and Stojković, 2009: 106). Previous experience shows that forecasts are often far from reality (Đukic, 2009: 48), because the process of assessment is complicated by a series of circumstances: the possibilities of technology for testing reservoirs of energy are limited, so by the development of new ones, new discoveries of reservoirs of energy are also coming up; population growth and a luxurious lifestyle constantly affect the increase in consumption; Oil companies are trying to extend the period of oil production. Only one thing is certain in terms of oil, gas and coal, as the predominant fuel in the production of electricity, is that the source that will surely be exhausted, because man does not produce it but pumps it out of the ground. These facts reinforce the fears of the unavailability of energy, perhaps in the relatively near future.

The second aspect of the economic dimension is the increase in energy prices. Although the real energy shortage has not happened yet, because deficiencies were usually made up and disorders of the historical development of mankind did not occur, energy prices are constantly rising. Thus, in 1947, oil cost $3 per barrel, in July 2008, around 147, and at the end of 2008 dropped to $41 per barrel (Rapaić, 2009: 524-525), and in March 2012 the price of one barrel was around $122 (OPEC, 2012), after which it again began to fall. The prices of other energy sources usually follow the prices of oil. For energy importing countries this has a great impact on the increased trade deficit and the reduction in the trade surplus, because they have to allocate a much larger amount of money to purchase the same amount of energy.

The power of energy (at the moment mostly oil and increasingly gas) lies in the possibility of its influence on political developments worldwide. It is the strategic

dimension of energy that has resulted in energy security becoming one of the major themes of world politics for many years (Đukic, 2009: 17-21). According to Kovač and Stojković (2009: 99) „significant disruption in the supply of oil would have incalculable consequences for the national economy of most countries and would endanger state security." They further emphasise the political importance of energy security, claiming that, even in the case of minor disruptions in supply, direction of political activities and efforts occur.

Unequal arrangement of energy reserves on one hand, but also uneven consumption on the other hand, are important elements of the energy paradigm. Specifically, „the economic, political and military power are available to those who have less energy (and energy they need for further political expansion), while those who would like to limit current global political power, and even the very process of globalisation, have energy reserves" (Dekanić et al., 2004: 16 in Lazić, 2009: 14). Most of the conflicts in recent history, strategically, carried elements of conflict related to energy or mineral raw materials (Kovač and Stojković, 2009: 97), although promotion of democracy, spreading of human rights and the like are usually proclaimed as the main triggers for military intervention. (Stojanović, 2009: 224-225). This claim is supported by the fact that the majority of military interventions after the Second World War took place in the Middle East, where the world's largest oil reserves[3] are located (the same: 196, 200-201). Obvious examples of energy wars are the first and second Gulf War, intervention in Afghanistan, the conflict in Georgia, the intervention in Libya and others. State governments that have carried out military intervention[4] did not cite predominance of energy resources as the reason for conflict; however, a good number of experts

3 In the Middle East there are about two-thirds of the world's oil reserves (Novičić and Đukanovic, 2010: 423).

4 State officials of these governments often make statements that support the thesis that some wars are led for energy. So, for example former Deputy Secretary of Defense of the USA, Paul Wolfowitz, said in Singapore, 31 May 2003: "The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is economic; we just did not have a choice when it comes to Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil"(Mavrak, 2009: 137). So, the world powerful ones are ready to fight against a dictatorial regime, but only against those whose states lie at significant sources of oil. This was just such a situation in Libya, whose regime was, from the "Western perspective," characterised as dictatorial, while on the other hand, there are dozens of other dictatorial regimes that those worlds powerful ones are not interested in (Miroslav Lazanski in the TV show "Upitnik", 2011).

agree that these conflicts are based on the struggle for oil and gas sources or ways of delivering energy to the consumer (Božanić, 2011: 13- 15).

All relevant indicators clearly show that the entire planet is exposed to climate change, but on the other hand there is no consensus about the main cause for it. One stream associates climate change directly with human activity, combustion of fossil fuels and the discharge of excessive emissions of harmful gases, primarily carbon dioxide. Consequently, some countries are already taking measures to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and have tried to influence the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions[5]. The second stream excludes human action and stresses that climate change is, as Milutin Milanković claims in his Canon of Insolation, "natural, cosmic process that man cannot influence" (Brown, 2008: 48-51). On the other hand it is unequivocally clear that the human community strongly influences the environmental conditions with its actions. This issue is global in scope because the safety of the environment does not refer to the nature or the Earth[6], but the environment is a basic prerequisite for the functioning of the human community (Litavski, 2011: 57). Negative impacts to climate change and the environment are not framed by state borders but they are a common problem for the entire Earth's population.

The previous analysis suggests that the issue of energy security has global proportions. A large number of stakeholders (individuals, states, international organisations, transnational actors, etc.) empower the securitisation of energy security at the intermediate levels and the formation of a series of security constellations that could be generated in one macro-securitisation.

5 The European Union advanced the furthest upon this issue, considering the problem of climate change the indistinguishable companion of energy from fossil fuels (Simurdić, 2009b: 7), and hence its strategic commitment to the use of cleaner energy sources, primarily gas.

6 From the geological point of view, the problem never existed - Earth has been in place for billions of years, and what happened on its crust since, let's say, the Industrial Revolution to the present day, is irrelevant (Lithuanian, 2011: 57). To the Earth's crust, the nuclear winter, global warming, ozone hole, the disappearance of the dinosaurs, the possible disappearances of human beings are relatively unimportant events (the same).

The Politicisation of Energy Security

In addition to the construction of the reference object, which must be able to mobilise a wide range of other policy actors to successfully generate macro-securitisation, the power of the securitising actor is also important (Buzan and Weaver, 2009: 255-76). For example, the global war against terrorism was launched by the USA, as, at that time, the only superpower in the world, and is still accepted by other actors. Analysis of specific securitisation at the intermediate level is preceded by the flow analysis carried out by the politicisation of the world's most powerful actors. By studying official documents and other political activities of the organisation, it is possible to analyse the flow of politicisation of energy security in the world.

The United States of America is the second largest oil producer in the world. Although it produces enormous quantities of oil, the USA satisfies half of its oil needs by importing from others[7], which leads to an explanation of the existence of a desire for domination in the oil-rich areas (Milić, 2011: 55-56). Therefore, attention has been paid to the issue of oil in US policy for decades. The national group for the development of USA energy policy published a document entitled "National Energy Strategy" in May 2001, better known as the Cheney report (by Vice President Cheney, who was chairman of the group). The said report emphasises that the United States, in 2001, was faced with the most serious energy shortage, since the oil crises in the seventies. According to them, the crisis is reflected in the increased prices of energy, in complete and partial shortages of energy, the lay off of workers or the cut in production in order to absorb the high cost of energy (Iveković, 2003).

In 2002, the USA National Security Strategy (2003: 33) defined a comprehensive strategy to increase energy security as one of the points. The text of the strategy states that the USA will strengthen "their own energy security and common prosperity of the global economy, working with allies, trading partners, and energy on expanding the sources and types of global energy, especially in the western hemisphere, in Africa, Central Asia and the Caspian region."

7 USA consume about one-quarter of total world oil consumption (Lazić, 2009: 29)

Later, the USA systemic documents concerning national security and defence potential for engaging the US (National Military Strategy of the United States in 2004, the National Defence Strategy of the United States in March 2005 and the National Security Strategy of the United States from March 2006) show the connection of economic superiority that the USA intends to maintain at the global level with the energy necessary for economic prosperity. Ensuring energy security becomes the primary interest of the USA. The whole chapter of National Security Strategy of the United States, from 2006, entitled Opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to ensure energy independence, says that most of the energy that drives the global economy comes from fossil fuels, especially oil (Mavrak, 2009: 137-138).

The National Defence Strategy of the United States in 2008 (2008: 15, 26-27) did not bypass energy issues, but went even further. Firstly, it clearly defines that an increase in demand for energy can affect the safety and security problems. In this regard, it emphasises the protection of the US and its allies from attack and extortion and highlights securing of global commons and, with them, the access to world markets and resources using all available means (diplomatic power, soft power and force). In addition, it is emphasised that the benefit of the global economy is associated with easy access to energy resources.

"Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe", says the European Security Strategy (2006: 6). In addition to energy security being, "one of the greatest risks and challenges for the Union" (Simurdić, 2009a: 50-51), the problem is also current at the national levels, and, therefore, there is no coincidence in some authors believing that "the question of energy in the EU is one of its best regulated questions" (Sinanović et al., 2010: 6), which of course does not mean that it has found the formula for quality assurance of energy security. At the centre of the energy problem is the dependence of EU countries on energy imports. The problem is further deepened by the fact that the greatest amount of energy is imported from/through the Russian Federation and what is dramatic is that the dependence is increasing year by year, which began to provoke fear of the use of energy for political purposes for the Europeans. Monaghan also confirms this (Monaghan, 2005: 13) when he says that he believes that oil and gas are for Putin what nuclear weapons were for the USSR.

Possessing the energy sources as well as controlling the greater part of its transportation routes haven't affected one of the world's largest energy exporters, Russia, lightly treating the problems of energy security. For Russia, energy is the key to its economic development after the Cold War, as well as in the future, and on the other side, the reason it re-emerged on the world scene. In order to better utilise their capacities, the Russian government adopted an Energy Strategy of Russia in 2003 for the period up to 2020, which replaced a similar document from 1995. The document itself emphasises the importance of energy for Russia as well as its plans for the future. Through the gas and oil, it plans to become the fifth largest economy in the world by 2020 (Trenin, 2009: 16). One of the priority objectives of the strategy emphasises the need for greater exports to markets outside the European continent (Götz, 2004 in Kovačovská, 2007: 11). Accordingly, it is clear that Russia is not satisfied that its economic development, which is determined by the profit from the export of energy, depends on most of the European countries that are the biggest importers of Russian gas and oil, which on the other hand, set reducing energy dependence on Russia as a priority objective.

For NATO, energy security has become a security risk (Simurdić, 2009b: 7), and "when a military-political alliance such as NATO considers a particular topic in the context of global security, then it is considered an attempt to securitise the issue" (Radoman, 2007: 41). At the agenda of the NATO summit in Riga in 2006, energy security had an important place. Some of the participants advocated for the redefinition of Article Five of the NATO Treaty, equalling the denial of energy with a military blockade or other forms of demonstration of force at national borders (Kovač and Stojković, 2009: 101-106). After the summit, the energy challenges were still considered as a question of protecting "critical energy infrastructure"[8] (Simurdić, 2009a: 55-56), but the next Strategic Concept also recognised energy challenges. The importance of protecting the transport of energy is highlighted in it (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the NATO: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010), but the view that the challenges of energy security are part of the agenda is also clearly emphasised. This concept predicts maintenance of energy security, the protection of key elements of the

8 The protection of "critical energy infrastructure" means the protection of the pipeline as well as facilities for liquefied natural gas, refinery, key transit routes, the narrows and straits (Simurdić, 2009a: 55-56).

energy infrastructure, protection of transit areas and lines and consultation in emergency situations. However, a dilemma remains, how the newly defined challenge, energy security, will be treated, speaking in terms of Article Five of the NATO Treaty (Giegerich, 2010).

China and India are taking a series of measures to meet their energy needs, which are growing much faster than in the EU, Russia and the United States, primarily because these are countries whose economies are on the rise. In the struggle for energy sources they are included in almost all major locations around the world (Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Caspian region), so that energy security at the global level cannot be considered without them.

An inevitable part of the major problems of energy security are the companies dealing with the exploitation of energy sources and energy trade (primarily gas and oil), because about 80 percent of oil and gas sources is in the hands of the states and their oil companies, which dictate the rules or try to dictate them (Simurdić, 2009a: 49). Companies tend to maximise profits in the long run, and to achieve that they need stability and market access (Nye, 2006: 277). On the other hand, the actualisation of energy problems as an excellent justification for the increase in energy prices works in their favour, and hence the realisation of extra profit. In the period from 2001 to 2008, oil prices went up three or more times, which, according to the words of Henry Kissinger, represents "the largest transfer of wealth in human history" (Simurdić, 2009a: 50).

Due to the possible large potential impact of climate change on human population, this issue is being considered at the highest international levels. Thus, the Montreal Protocol[9] (1987), through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change[10] (1992), via the Kyoto Protocol (1997), in which the States Parties undertake obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Vukasović, 2009: 13). In addition, the non-state actors are more notable in the world at this point.

The reality of energy threats has been recognised by both small and large states, and everybody is dealing with the problem in a way, concern about energy

9 Montreal Protocol regulates the release of chemicals that adversely affect the ozone layer and the atmosphere (Vukasović, 2009: 13).

10 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change included those emissions not covered by the Montreal Protocol (Vukasović, 2009: 13).

dependence, on the security of transit, on the sale of energy and the like. This indicates that energy security has clearly gone beyond pure economics and, from non-politicised subjects, went into the field of politicisation and became the subject of public debate, policy and decision-making of other states and transnational entities.

Securitisation of Energy Security

Dramatisation of energy issues at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century significantly influenced the foreign policy operation of a large number of states. Energy interests influence the creation of new forms of friendship-enmity in the world. In the overall race of states to ensure their energy security there occurs the creation of security constellations that sit essentially beside the political pervasive and energy dynamics. It is exceptionally difficult to prove securitisation within the constellation, because one would have to establish special measures approved by the audience, and they very often fall outside the framework of rules for one side, while the second considers these as normal activities. Identifying a securitising move is much easier. The events related to the gas crisis in Europe, the conflict in Georgia and the intervention in Iraq will be taken as examples of securitisation.

Energy relations between Russia and the European Union, encouraged by the gas crisis, have acquired a new form of distrust. The central (energy) problem of the European Union is the heavy dependence of its states of energy imports[11], but also heavy dependence on energy imports from Russia. The implementation of the energy strategy dependence on Russian gas in the EU will grow even more, which increases the European fear of the use of energy as a means for the Russian Federation to achieve political and other similar goals.. On the other hand, for the Russian government to avoid dependence on a European market in its energy strategy, the need for increased exports to markets outside the European continent

11 The rate of EU energy dependence on oil imports in 2006 was 83.6% and 60.8% of natural gas (Europe in Figures- Eurostat yearbook 2009: 457). Out of the total oil and gas imports in 2006, the EU imported 32.9% of oil and 40.4% of natural gas from the Russian Federation (the same: 456).

has been highlighted as the priority objective (Götz, 2004 in Kováčovské, 2007: 11). Despite the tendency to get rid of a dependent relationship, the European Union and the Russian Federation are located in a complex relationship of interdependence, which will, at least judging by the indicators so far, be difficult to get rid of. The complexity of their relations particularly came to the fore during the Russian - Ukrainian gas crisis (2006 and 2009). By suspending the gas supplies to Ukraine, Europe is in the midst of winter left without heating. While Russia has said that it is a pure economy, Europe has blamed Russia for the use of energy for political purposes. Both had legitimate reasons for such claims. Although the current problems were overcome at that moment, Ukraine has remained a major transit point for transportation of gas from Russia to Europe, Europe remains dependent on Russian gas, and Russia on the European market. The security dilemma is best explained by Robert Jervis who says that it is "a situation in which the procedures by which one country tries to increase its own security at the same time reduces the safety of others" (Jervis, 1978 in Simić, 2002: 26). The energy security dilemma is defined analogously: procedures by which one country tries to increase its energy security, at the same time reduces the energy security of others. Politicisation of the problems of energy supply open up a space for the energy security dilemma between the EU and Russia (Radoman, 2007: 43). The event could be seen to a certain extent at the level of a securitising move that, as a result of this crisis, some policy implications did not come out. In fact, although Ukraine is deeply involved in NATO membership, the gas crisis caused these issues to be paused, both by NATO and by Ukraine (Petrović, 2010a: 32), which later even adopted a law by which it stopped further aspirations towards NATO.

Another problem that in this constellation has a significant role is the Georgia – Russia relationship. Some of the authors (Jović-Lazić, 2008: 33-35; Đordjević, 2008; Trifunović, 2010: 301-302) argue that the conflict between Georgia and Russia has an energy background. In fact, Georgia is one of the key places in the transport of Caspian oil and the only country through which gas or oil can be sent to the West, and not use Russian territory while doing so (Socor, 2004 u Jović-Lazić, 2008: 35). After the conflict over disputed territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Russian forces were stopped at the line of the almost completed pipeline - the oil pipeline that is supposed to lead from Azerbaijan to Georgia (Russian SS-21 and SS-26 missiles used against Georgia in Trifunovic, 2010: 302). In the opinion of Bartuška (2010) and Trifunović (2010: 432), this conflict is the message

of Russia to its neighbours that energy arrangements in the Caspian basin cannot be negotiated without its guarantees, but also a clear message to NATO about Russia's willingness to protect the interests of energy and military force. Much like with Ukraine, the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is designed to prevent the integration of Georgia into NATO, but also to complicate the possibility of alternative energy supply routes through Georgia (Brown, 2010a: 32).

Citing a number of reasons (but not the exercise of energy interests), the United States, in 2003, mobilised around themselves the so-called "Coalition of the willing" and invaded and occupied Iraq. According to Chomsky (2008: 79-81), the main reason for the war in Iraq was to establish secure military bases in the region, which is located in the heart of one of the largest sources of energy, which should primarily serve the interests of the United States. By establishing control over Iraq, the US has vastly increased control over global energy resources, which at the present time "is a key lever to control the world" (the same: 161-164). In support of this thesis, Janković (2007: 281), explains that the true intentions of the United States - and they are discovered upon the adoption of the draft law on the use of oil by the Iraqi government in 2007. According to this law, the oil fields were to be handed over for exploitation by large British and American companies for 30 years. This conflict is the epilogue of decades of striving for USA mastery of oil wells in the area of Iraq. In the case of Iraq, the regime of Saddam Hussein and the fight against terrorism was securitised, but the energy remained as a secret securitisation threat in the background.

These are not the only areas that arise as a result of securitisation energy threats. Until recently, the events in Libya were the centre of world attention, and now attention is slowly moving towards Iran and Syria. Africa has become an area of strong conflict of the energy interests of China and the United States at the beginning of the 21st century (Brown, 2010b: 129-134). Oil, at least for now, successfully influenced the prevention of US influence in Venezuela because Hugo Chavez was very clear: the smallest manoeuvre of the United States against him and he would draw oil production to China or India (Brown, 2010b: 137-138). In other words, wherever there are energy sources, and these are not owned by the major powerful ones, there will be a conflict of interest, "the world's great players."

Macro-securitisation of Energy Security

According to Litavski (2011: 44-55), macro-securitisation of the global war against terrorism is currently successfully led on the world stage (GRPT). Whether energy security will reach such proportions will depend upon several factors: the power of the actors and their interests in carrying out macro-securitisation of this problem, an increase/decrease of convincing energy threats or possible pandering of energy security under some other form of macro-securitisation as, for example, it could be a macro-securitisation of climate change.

Successfully designed macro-securitisation may determine, demonstrate and identify leadership which would be a tremendous benefit for the actors already doing it (Litvanski, 2011: 36-37). The benefits could be reflected in the promotion of demands for the implementation of special measures; forming alliances, labelling spheres of influence, as well as the retention limit (the same). Looking at the current world's most powerful actors, it might be assumed that there is still no such interest, which would connect the securitisation's lower level in a macro-securitisation of energy security. In fact, the US is successfully implementing the securitisation of GRPT and they already have benefits from it as previously discussed. For them, energy security is current and is under the macro-securitisation of GRPT, so it is logical to assume that the United States, which already benefits from macro-securitisation, will not construct a second one in order to confirm the benefits that they already have. Membership of the majority of EU countries in NATO has also identified the direction towards the support of the EU macro-securitisation of GRPT. Russia is an actor who has reached its present power on the sale of oil and gas. While energy security for Russia is among the top priorities, action towards macro-securitisation has an intermediate - regional level, across multiple securitisations, by which it tries to highlight its sphere of influence (region of the former USSR). China is a relatively new player on the world stage, which is seeking its place when it comes to energy security. The continuous increase in demand for energy that comes from these countries could be affected in defining the macro-securitisation of energy security.

Energy threats currently have the potential for their persuasiveness to increase in the future. The importance of energy on one side and a lower availability, as well as uncertainty regarding the availability, provide the necessary energy threats that

appear as convincing as an existential one. However, the development of human civilisation is accompanied by significant upheavals, coal was replaced by oil, and oil is increasingly changing gas and an increasing share of energy from renewable sources. New discoveries have been put on the back burner; the old gramophone record was a remarkable invention in its time to be replaced by tape recorders that can hardly be found today. This indicates that invention of new types of energy (for example, hydrogen) or better uses of some other already known species (wind energy, tidal energy, solar energy, etc.) is not impossible, which could remove the energy threats from the list of threats or reduce their significance.

Conclusion

The introduction of the securitisation theory in the analysis of security processes indicated a new angle for perceiving international relations. This theory was able to explain why some threats, although realistically of lesser importance than others, are seen as important to the security of the reference object. It also gave an answer to the question why one of the two same activities, which come from two sources, is considered a threat and the other one is not, interpreting security as a "speech act" and as a result of the social construction of threats or subjective feeling, which is based both on real images and the beliefs of actors who define security. The functioning of the securitisation theory and its extension, macro-securitisation theory, is based on the principle of identifying an existential threat to a particular reference object, and then the request made for the adoption of special measures. The main difference that separates these two theories is the level at which they are implemented, because the securitisation is implemented at the intermediate level, and macro-securitisation is a process that has a global reach.

The persuasiveness of the threats has an important impact on the level of politicisation, securitisation and macro-securitisation. Analysis of energy threats in the world indicates that they have the potential persuasiveness even for macro-securitisation. The main reasons for these statements can be found in a deficit of energy resources, supply disruptions, uneven distribution of energy resources, armed conflicts with an energy background, endangering the environment and

climate change. All of them summarised or individually can be a convincing argument for future macro-securitisation because they determine the lives of ordinary people to a large extent globally.

Energy security has become an integral part of the highest state security documents of the majority of the countries in the world, which politicised this issue. It is politicised by the USA, the EU, Russia, China, India and many other countries in the world. The importance of energy security is increasing for NATO as well; therefore, NATO highlighted it in its latest Strategic Concept. Certain aspects are politicised by the UN, as well as transnational energy companies. Strong politicisation has led to the emergence of securitisation energy threats. The suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine (and throughout Europe) in the middle of a cold winter day, as well as Russia's military action in Georgia, can be considered as special measures that confirm the successful securitisation. Military intervention by the "coalition of the willing" in 2003 in Iraq was another form of securitisation of energy threats. Although the securitisation of the global war against terrorism and the regime of Saddam Hussein were in the foreground, a secret securitisation of other energy threats was in the background.

The existence of politicisation at the global level, more securitisations and the persuasiveness of energy threats show that macro-securitisation of energy security is possible. The paper differentiates few: the lack of sufficiently powerful actors who would be interested in executing the macro-securitisation and which is currently not possible to recognise; the possibility that the persuasiveness of energy reduces threats by finding new forms of energy; the improvement of existing; and the subordination of energy threats under some other form of macro-securitisation where there is a possibility to recognise the threat of climate change.

Although energy is basically a commodity, its place and role in the life of modern man made it the important link for modern civilisation, and it became impossible to even imagine a world without oil, gas and electricity. Its significance influenced it to become a political issue and the subject of public debate, and then to its securitisation in certain regions of the world. The existence of a securitisation and the constantly increasing importance of energy as a drive for economic development in the world are providing the necessary impetus for executing macro-securitisation of energy security at a certain point.

Bibliography

Barton B., Redgwell K., Rinne K. & Zilman N. D. (2004) *Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment.* Oxforд University Press. in Савковић, М. (2007) „Да ли је Србија енергетски безбедна". *Безбедност западног Балкана*. бр. 4. стр. 30-35.

Buzan B. и Wćver O. (2009) „Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory". *Review of International Studies.* бр. 35..

Buzan B., Wćver O. и Wilde J. D. (1998) *Security. A framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Buzan B., Wćver O. и Wilde J. D. *Security*. у Buzan B. и Wćver O. (2009) „Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory". *Review of International Studies.* бр. 35..

Buzan, B. and Wćver, O.(2003) *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daojiong Z. (2006) „Energy Interdepedence". *China Security.* бр. 2..

Götz R. (2004) *Rublands Energiestrategie und die Energieversorgung Europas*. Berlin: Deutsches Institut Für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit у Kovačovská, L. (2007) „European Union´s energy (in) security: Dependence on Russia". *Defence & Strategy*. бр. 2. Available at: http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/en/current-issue-2-2007/articles/european-union-s-energy-in-security-dependence-on-russia.html (18. јун 2010.)

Jervis, R. (1978) „Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics.* у Симић, Р. Д. (2002) *Наука о безбедности.* Београд: СЛ СРЈ и ФПН.

Klare M. (2005) *Крв и нафта.* Загреб: Знање. у Ковач М. и Стојковић Д. (2009) *Стратегијско планирање одбране.* Београд: ВИЗ.

Monaghan A. (2005) *Russian Oil and EU Energy Security*. Watchfield: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

Mueller J. (2006) "Is there still a Terrorist Threat". *Foreign Affairs.* September/October.

Nye J. S. (2006) *Како разумевати међународне односе.* Београд: Стубови културе.

Socor V. (2004) „The frozen conflicts: a challenge to Euro-Atlantic interests". Washington. Доступно на: http://www.jamestown.org/images/doc/KonstRon.doc (11. фебруар 2008.) у Јовић-Лазић А. (2008) „Сукоб у Грузији и Европска унија". *Међународна политика*. бр. 1130-1131. стр. 30-36.

Sharma A. (2007) „India and Energy Security". *Asian affairs*. бр. 2. стр. 158-172.

Stringer K. (2008) „Energy Security: Applying a Portfolio Approach". *Baltic Security & Defence Review.* бр. 10. стр. 121-142.

The New Energy Security Paradigm (2006) World Economic Forum in partnership with Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

Wćver O. *Securitization and Desecuritization* у Buzan B. и Wćver O. (2009) „Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory". *Review of International Studies.* бр. 35. *cmp*. 253–276.

Yergin D. (2006) „Ensuring Energy Security". *Forein Affairs*. бр. 2..

Božanić D. (2011) *Energetska bezbednost Republike Srbije*. Master rad. Beograd: FPN.

Vukasović, V. (2009) „Životna sredina i energetika". *Evropske sveske*. br. 6.

Dekanić I, Kolundžić S. i Karasalihović D. (2004) *Stoljeće nafte: Veza između nafte, novca i moći koja je promenila svet.* Zagreb: Naklado Zadro. u Lazić S. (2009) *Energetska bezbednost Evropske unije kao činilac njenih odnosa sa Rusijom*. Magistarski rad. Beograd: Fakultet bezbednosti.

Đajić N. (2002) *Energija za održivi svet.* Beograd: Rudarsko geološki fakultet.

Đukić S. (2009) Vreme energije. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Iveković, I. (2003) „SAD, Irak i geopolitika nafte". *Republika. br. 308-309.* Dostupno na: http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/2003/308-309/308-309_15.html (16. мај 2010.)

Janković, S. (2007) „Sukobi na Bliskom istoku – osnovna obeležja". *Međunarodni problemi*. br. 2-3. str. 266-307.

Jović-Lazić, A. (2008) „Sukob u Gruziji i Evropska unija". *Međunarodna politika*. br. 1130-1131. str. 30-36.

Kovač M. i Stojković D. (2009) *Strategijsko planiranje odbrane.* Beograd: VIZ.

Lazić S. (2009) *Energetska bezbednost Evropske unije kao činilac njenih odnosa sa Rusijom*. Magistarski rad. Beograd: Fakultet bezbednosti.

Litavski J. (2011) *Novi vidovi makrosekuritizacije nakon završetka hladnog rata*. Master rad. Beograd: FPN

Mavrak D. (2009) *Koncept borbe SAD protiv terorizma*. Magistarski rad. Beograd: FPN.

Mandal Š., Mihajlović Milanović Z., Nikolić M. (2010) *Ekonomika energetike.* Beograd: Ekonomski fakultet.

Milić A. (2011) *Terorizam i „humanitarne intervencije", kao oblici političkog nasilja, u cilju ostvarivanja političkih ciljeva u postbipolarnom svetu*. Magistarski rad. Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka.

Nadić D. i Milašinović S. (2009) „Politička ekologija energetske bezbednosti". *Nauka, bezbednost, policija*. br. 3. str. 134-151.

Petrović A. (2008) „Kanon osunčavanja u staklenoj bašti". *Limes plus.* br. 1. str. 41-52.

Petrović Z. P. (2010b) *Geopolitika Energije.* Beograd: Institut za političke studije, Centar Jugoistok.

Radoman J. (2007) „Sekuritizacija energije kao uvod u energetsku bezbednosnu dilemu". Bezbednost zapadnog Balkana. br. 4. str. 36-43.

Rapaić S. (2009) „Tržište energenata u Evropskoj uniji i interesi Srbije". *Međunarodni problemi.* br. 4. str. 515-535.

Simić, R. D. (2002) *Nauka o bezbednosti.* Beograd: SL SRJ i FPN.

Simurdić M. (2009a) „Gasna kriza i energetska bezbednost". *Međunarodna politika*. br. 1133. str. 48-58.

Simurdić M. (2009b) „Evropska strategija bezbednosti i energija". *Evropske sveske.* br. 6. str. 6-7.

Sinanović, DŽ., Jahić, A., Botalić, A. (2010) „Energetska strategija Evropske unije i neki aspekti primene obnovljivih izvora energije u regiji jugoistočne Evrope". *Energija/ Ekonomija/Ekologija*. br. 2, str. 5-9.

Stojanović S. (2009) *Globalizacija i bezbednosne perspektive sveta.* Beograd: VIZ.

Čomski N. (2008) *Intervencije.* Novi Sad: Rubikon

Proceedings

Novičić Ž. i Đukanović D. (2010) „Energetska bezbednost: globalni trendovi i interes Srbije". *Srbija u savremenom geostrateškom okruženju.* Zbornik radova. str. 419-437. Beograd. Medija centar „Odbrana" i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Petrović Ž. (2010a) „Rusko srpsko strateško partnerstvo: sadržaj i domašaj". *Odnosi Srbije i Rusije na početku HHI veka.* Zbornik radova. str. 25-40. Dostupno na: http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Odnosi-Rusije-i-Srbije-na-pocetku-XXI-veka.pdf (11. јул. 2011.)

Trenin D. (2009). „Geopolitika energije u odnosima Rusije i EU". *Cevovodi, politika i moć.* Dostupno na: http://www.emins.org/sr/publikacije/knjige/09-cevovodi.pdf (21. decembar 2009.)

Trifunović D. (2010) „Bezbednosni aspekti geostrateškog okruženja Srbije - Energetska bezbednost ili pakao". *Srbija u savremenom geostrateškom okruženju.* Zbornik radova. str. 300-309. Beograd. Medija centar „Odbrana" i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Documents

European Commission (2004) „Report on the Green Paper on Energy" у Грошељ. К. (2007) „Енергетска безбедност у партнерству Русије и Европске уније". *Безбедност западног Балкана*. бр. 6. стр. 4-17.

Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the NATO: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010. Доступно на: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (13. мај 2011.)

Bezbedna Evropa u boljem svetu – Evropska strategija bezbednosti. (2006) Beograd: ISAC Fond. Dostupno na: http://www.isacnd.org/download/Evropska%20strategija%20bezbednosti.pdf (13. maj 2011.)

Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije (2009) Dostupno na: http://www.mod.gov.rs/lat/dokumenta/strategije/strategija_%20nacionalne_bezbednosti_lat.pdf (21. јануар 2010.)

Statistics

Europe in Figures - Eurostat year book 2009. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-07-001/EN/KS-CD-07-001-EN.PDF (11. август 2010.)

Other

„Russian SS-21 and SS-26 missiles used against Georgia" Available at: http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/doc/10006919/Iskander%2017.11.pdf (17. novembar 2008.) u Trifunović D. (2010) „Bezbednosni aspekti geostrateškog okruženja Srbije- Energetska bezbednost ili pakao". *Srbija u savremenom geostrateškom okruženju.* Zbornik radova. str. 300-309. Beograd. Medija centar „Odbrana" i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Giegerich B. (2010) „Novi strateški koncept NATO i transatlanski odnosi". *Predavanje u Institutu za strategijska istraživanja Ministarstva odbrane.* Održano 15. jun 2010. godine u vremenu od 11.00. do 12.15.

OPEC (2012) *Basket **price.*** Dostupno na: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ (25. март 2012.)

Bartuška V. (2010) „Izazovi postizanja energetske bezbednosti u Evropi". *Predavanje u Beogradskom centru za bezbednosnu politiku*. Održano 14. juna 2010. godine u vremenu od 14.00. do 15.00. časova. Kraće obaveštenje o sadržaju predavanja dostupno na: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/cms/view.php?id=3780&start=175 (07. август 2010.)

D. Savić (2011) „Merkelovu na izborima potukli atomi". *Večernje novosti **online.*** Dostupno na: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.299.html:324588-Merkelovu-na-izborima-potukli-atomi (31. maj 2012.)

Đorđević, M. (2008) „Rat za južni tok". Dostupno na: http://www.kim.sr.gov.yu/cms/item/ news/rs.html?view= story&id = 4965&sectionId=8 (13. јун 2009.)