

Operational resilience and command decision-making: A comparative analysis of Polish and British military command structures

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Abstract

This study examines how institutional operational resilience shapes command decision-cycle robustness in Polish and British military command structures under conditions of hybrid disruption. It addresses two research questions: (i) how institutional operational resilience affects decision-cycle robustness in each country, and (ii) which structural differences in command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing architecture, and adaptation mechanisms explain divergence in adaptive command performance between the two cases. Using a structured qualitative comparison of doctrinal, strategic, and secondary sources, the analysis codes command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing architecture, and institutional learning against a fixed codebook, with decision-cycle robustness as the outcome of interest. Each indicator is assigned to a limited, partial, or embedded band, while organisational size, operational domain, and technological integration are treated as control variables. The British military command structures are coded as embedded across all four dimensions, consistent with stable decision performance under disruption. Polish military command structures have shown substantial structural strengthening since 2014, although decision stability is improving unevenly, and domestic experts continue to flag persistent centralisation and reform gaps. Resilience does not raise decision performance linearly: optimal robustness instead occurs within a bounded equilibrium balancing decentralisation with coherence, reflecting an association rather than a statistically tested correlation. The analysis contributes to theoretical integration between resilience architecture and decision-cycle performance, and offers strategic implications for North Atlantic Treaty Organization interoperability and eastern-flank deterrence. Given the qualitative, document-based design, findings should be read as provisional pending validation through sustained operational experience.

Keywords:

resilience, leadership, operations, interoperability, command

Article info

Received: 16 February 2026

Revised: 27 August 2026

Accepted: 8 September 2026

Available online: 26 October 2026

Citation: Korda, R. (2027) 'Operational resilience and command decision-making: A comparative analysis of Polish and British military command structures', *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 57(1). doi: [10.35467/sdq/236161](https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/236161).

Introduction

The contemporary operational environment confronting Polish and British military command structures is characterised by persistent strategic competition, hybrid confrontation, and accelerated decision tempo. For Poland, the dominant security variable is the evolving threat environment on North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastern flank. Russia's actions since 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have reintroduced high-intensity conventional warfare in Europe, accompanied by cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and coercive signalling ([North Atlantic Treaty Organization \[NATO\], 2022](#), pp. 3–6). Hybrid pressure in Eastern Europe operates below and above the threshold of armed conflict, targeting military readiness, public confidence, and command coherence. Geographic proximity to the theatre of operations exposes Polish command structures to rapid escalation dynamics and persistent information operations.

The recent profile of British military command structures has been shaped primarily by prolonged expeditionary engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan and sustained coalition operations beyond Europe. The British doctrine formalises mission command, delegated authority, and adaptive execution within complex operational theatres ([UK Ministry of Defence, 2017](#), pp. 2–7). While recent strategic reviews re-emphasise Euro-Atlantic security and peer competition, culminating in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review's explicit reorientation towards warfighting readiness ([HM Government, 2023](#), pp. 8–12; [UK Government, 2025a](#), pp. 5–9), institutional experience remains shaped by expeditionary command environments requiring decentralised decision-making and coalition interoperability. The two cases therefore operate under a shared alliance framework, yet differ in threat immediacy, operational memory, and institutional rehearsal patterns.

Across both forces, information saturation and compressed decision cycles define the operational context. Digitised command systems, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, and open-source information streams increase situational awareness density while simultaneously amplifying cognitive load and vulnerability to manipulation ([Bousquet, 2018](#), pp. 171–174; [Libicki, 2009](#), p. 38). Decision-making increasingly unfolds under time pressure and incomplete attribution. The compression of observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) cycle ([Boyd, 1987](#); [Osinga, 2007](#), pp. 235–239) depends not solely on manoeuvre capability but also on institutional capacity to sustain coherent decision output under degraded informational conditions.

Resilience within NATO has traditionally been conceptualised as a societal and infrastructural requirement. Baseline requirements emphasise continuity of government, secure communications, energy supply protection, and civil preparedness ([NATO, 2016](#), pp. 1–2). These measures ensure that member states can sustain collective defence commitments during crisis. Contemporary operational dynamics indicate that adversarial activity increasingly targets command networks and decision processes rather than infrastructure alone. Organisational resilience theory defines resilience as the capacity to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruption while maintaining core functions ([Duchek, 2020](#), p. 220; [Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011](#), p. 244). At the military level, this logic extends to command structures rather than societal infrastructure, an extension that this study operationalises and defines precisely in the below-given Method section.

Polish and British military command structures constitute analytically suitable comparative cases because of shared NATO membership combined with distinct historical trajectories. Poland's post-Cold War transformation involved downsizing, professionalisation, and gradual NATO integration. Poland was a significant contributor to the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s and early 2010s, an expeditionary

phase that oriented force generation, training, and command practice towards coalition interoperability rather than territorial defence (Stach and Pizzolo, 2025). This was followed by a marked reorientation towards renewed emphasis on territorial defence and deterrence after 2014, as the eastern-flank threat environment displaced expeditionary engagement as the dominant driver of force posture. Structural reforms of the command system and the development of territorial defence forces (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej) reflect institutional adaptation to eastern-flank threat conditions. The United Kingdom retained expeditionary orientation throughout the same period, with doctrinal continuity in mission command and decentralised authority reinforced through overseas operations. Institutional reform in the United Kingdom followed evolutionary adjustment shaped by operational lessons, whereas Polish reform was more structural and accelerated in response to regional threat shifts. These differing trajectories create variation in how operational resilience is embedded and rehearsed. The precise unit of analysis and the scope of comparison are defined in the below-given Method section.

Despite expanding literature on resilience and military decision-making, bilateral comparative analysis between Poland and the United Kingdom remains limited. The existing studies frequently address NATO resilience at the macro level or examine mission command within single national contexts. Organisational resilience scholarship emphasises adaptive capacity (Duchek, 2020, p. 221), while decision theory focuses on cognitive mechanisms such as recognition-primed decision-making and bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2011, p. 20; Klein, 1998, pp. 17–20). The structural integration of resilience architecture and decision-cycle robustness at the institutional level is not examined systematically in a cross-national framework. In particular, the extent to which delegation thresholds, communication redundancy, and institutional learning influence decision latency and coherence remains under-analysed in comparative research. The existing research rarely integrates organisational resilience architecture with command decision-cycle robustness within a structured bilateral comparative framework.

This study has a single, precisely stated aim: To examine how institutional operational resilience influences command decision-cycle robustness in Polish and British military command structures, thereby linking institutional resilience mechanisms directly to operational decision continuity in a way that the existing scholarship has not pursued systematically. This aim is addressed through the following two research questions, which are not revised or qualified further at any later point in this article:

RQ1: How does institutional operational resilience affect decision-cycle robustness in Poland and the United Kingdom?

RQ2: Which structural differences in command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing architecture, and adaptation mechanisms explain divergence in adaptive command performance between the two cases?

The article proceeds with a review of theoretical approaches to organisational resilience and military decision-making, followed by a description of comparative institutional methodology. Subsequent sections examine the institutional architecture of each case prior to presenting cross-case findings and their implications for force development and alliance interoperability.

Literature review

The concept of resilience originates in ecological systems theory, where it was defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance without shifting into an alternative

equilibrium state (Holling, 1973, p. 17). Subsequent development within organisational theory reframed resilience as an adaptive capability encompassing anticipation, absorption, adaptation, and recovery (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011, p. 244). Duchek (2020, p. 220) further systematised resilience as a dynamic organisational process structured around preparation, coping, and learning. Within military contexts, resilience has progressively transitioned from an infrastructural concern to an operational variable influencing command effectiveness.

NATO's (2016, pp. 1–2) baseline resilience requirements provide a strategic framework emphasising continuity of government, secure communications, energy supply protection, and civil preparedness. While these measures are primarily societal and infrastructural, they establish a broader security environment within which armed forces operate. Recent NATO (2022, pp. 3–6) strategic guidance acknowledges that adversarial campaigns increasingly target decision structures and information domains rather than exclusively physical infrastructure. This evolution positions resilience not only as a national preparedness concept but also as a determinant of command continuity. However, doctrinal articulation does not automatically translate into institutional depth or procedural rehearsal at the military level.

Parallel to resilience scholarship, military decision-making theory has developed analytical models explaining how commanders operate under uncertainty and time pressure. Boyd's (1987) OODA framework conceptualises competitive advantage as the ability to accelerate one's own decision cycle while disrupting that of the adversary (Osinga, 2007, pp. 235–239). The OODA model highlights tempo and adaptability but remains primarily cognitive in orientation. It presupposes organisational structures capable of supporting rapid iteration without explicitly theorising institutional resilience mechanisms.

Recognition-primed decision theory provides further insight into command performance under stress. Klein (1998, pp. 17–20) demonstrates that experienced commanders rely on pattern recognition and mental simulation rather than comparative option analysis. This model explains effective decision-making in complex operational environments, including expeditionary operations undertaken within British command environments. However, it assumes institutional environments that permit decentralised initiative and do not constrain rapid execution through excessive hierarchical confirmation. The structural conditions enabling such recognition-based decision-making are often treated as background variables rather than independent determinants.

Bounded rationality theory introduces cognitive limits as a fundamental constraint on decision processes (Simon, 1957, p. 198). Kahneman (2011, p. 20) distinguishes intuitive and analytical processing systems, demonstrating susceptibility to bias and overload under pressure. In information-saturated operational environments, cognitive limits are intensified by digital data flows and adversarial manipulation (Libicki, 2009, p. 38). Yet the interaction between cognitive constraints and institutional resilience architecture remains underdeveloped in military scholarship. Decision robustness is frequently analysed at the individual or small-group level rather than as an emergent property of command systems.

Mission command doctrine represents an institutional response to uncertainty and tempo compression. The British doctrine codifies delegated authority, clarity of commander's intent, and disciplined initiative as foundational principles (UK Ministry of Defence, 2017, pp. 2–7). This doctrinal tradition reflects a longstanding emphasis on decentralised execution reinforced through expeditionary operational experience. In contrast, Polish military command structures underwent significant doctrinal and structural transformation following NATO accession and subsequent command reforms after 2014 (Graf, 2026a;

2026b; Koziej, 2018). Prior to 2014, however, the Polish defence policy had moved in the opposite direction, prioritising reduced force levels, full professionalisation without a developed reserve component, and an expeditionary orientation linked to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Koziej, 2018). The Polish doctrine formally incorporates mission command principles; however, institutional centralisation traditions and reform acceleration have shaped the depth and uniformity of decentralisation practices. Comparative doctrinal convergence therefore does not imply equivalent institutional internalisation.

Institutional adaptation and learning further shape resilience architecture. Military effectiveness research demonstrates that structured learning processes, including after-action reviews and doctrinal revision cycles, contribute directly to sustained operational performance (Farrell, 2010, p. 569). Organisational resilience literature similarly identifies learning as a core component of adaptive capacity (Duchek, 2020, p. 221). The concept of learning velocity, understood as the speed with which institutions translate operational experience into structural adjustment, is particularly relevant when comparing forces with differing operational histories. British military command structures institutionalised learning mechanisms through prolonged expeditionary campaigns, whereas Polish forces intensified adaptation primarily in response to regional security shifts after 2014. The depth and institutionalisation of learning processes therefore constitute a potential explanatory variable in comparative resilience analysis.

Despite these parallel strands of scholarship, integration between resilience architecture and decision-cycle performance remains limited. Organisational resilience theory rarely operationalises command-specific variables, such as delegation thresholds, communication redundancy, or succession protocols. Decision-making theory concentrates on cognitive models without systematically embedding institutional resilience mechanisms as structural moderators. Moreover, bilateral comparative research between the Polish and British operational command architecture remains sparse. The existing literature typically addresses NATO resilience at a macro level or analyses mission command within single national contexts. A structured comparative examination of how institutional operational resilience influences decision-cycle robustness in Poland and the United Kingdom has not been developed systematically.

The present study addresses this theoretical and empirical gap by integrating organisational resilience theory, military decision-making models, and institutional adaptation frameworks within a bilateral comparative design. By linking resilience architecture directly to decision-cycle robustness, the analysis seeks to move beyond descriptive doctrine comparison and towards an operationally grounded explanation of divergence in command performance under disruption.

Method

This study applies a comparative institutional analysis of Polish and British military command structures in order to examine how operational resilience architecture influences command decision-cycle robustness. The research design follows a structured, focused comparison model, enabling systematic evaluation of identical analytical dimensions across two cases (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 67–72). The purpose is explanatory rather than descriptive: the analysis seeks to identify structural mechanisms linking institutional resilience to decision performance under disruption. The principal unit of analysis is the institutional command structure, understood as the organisational architecture governing operational coordination, delegation, communication continuity, and adaptive decision-making processes.

To move from source material to comparative findings, document analysis followed a structured coding procedure rather than an unstructured narrative reading. Primary sources (doctrinal publications, national strategy documents, and official defence policy statements) and corroborating secondary sources (government reviews, expert and think-tank commentary, and academic literature) were coded against a fixed codebook derived from the four resilience dimensions used throughout the study: command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing architecture, and institutional learning. For each dimension, the codebook specified a small number of observable sub-indicators; for example, for command culture: delegation thresholds, tolerance of subordinate initiative, and confirmation requirements under disruption. Passages addressing a given sub-indicator were extracted into a per-case coding matrix and tagged by source, publication date, and document type (doctrinal, strategic, or secondary/critical). Coding was undertaken by the author in two passes: an initial open-coding pass identifying all passages relevant to each sub-indicator, followed by a verification pass, in which every coded passage was re-checked against the codebook definitions to reduce interpretative drift between the two national cases. Where doctrinal statements and secondary or critical commentary diverged—as in the Polish case, where official doctrine and domestic expert commentary disagreed on the depth of decentralisation actually achieved—both were retained in the matrix and reported rather than reconciled, so that the comparative findings reflect contested as well as consensus evidence rather than doctrinal self-description alone.

The case selection logic rests on three criteria. First, both Poland and the United Kingdom are [NATO \(2022, pp. 3–6\)](#) members operating within a shared doctrinal and strategic framework, ensuring baseline institutional comparability. Second, the two forces differ significantly in recent operational histories. The Polish armed forces prioritised territorial defence and deterrence on NATO's eastern flank, particularly after 2014 ([Koziej, 2018](#)). The British military command structures accumulated extensive expeditionary experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, reinforcing decentralised mission command practices ([UK Ministry of Defence, 2017, pp. 2–7](#)). Third, despite differences in size and operational emphasis, both forces possess comparable joint command structures and modernised capabilities, allowing structured comparison without introducing systemic asymmetry.

The independent variable is defined as institutional operational resilience. For the purposes of this study, it refers to the structured capacity of a military organisation to sustain command continuity and adaptive functionality under disruption. Operational resilience is operationalised through observable institutional indicators, including delegation thresholds, succession planning mechanisms, communication redundancy, distributed command configurations, and institutional learning cycles. The conceptual foundation draws on organisational resilience theory ([Duchek, 2020, p. 220](#); [Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011, p. 244](#)) and is adapted to the military domain by focusing on command-level architecture rather than societal infrastructure. Each indicator was assigned to one of the three operationally defined bands rather than scored on a continuous or numerical scale. An indicator was coded as limited, where doctrine authorised a practice in principle but the coded evidence base showed infrequent, inconsistent, or contested application; partial, where coded doctrinal and operational evidence showed consistent application in rehearsed or favourable conditions but uncertain or contested application under novel or high-pressure conditions; and embedded, where coded evidence—including independent secondary and critical accounts, not doctrine alone—showed consistent application across both rehearsed and non-rehearsed conditions. Band assignments were made per indicator per case from the coding matrix described above and were then aggregated qualitatively, rather than numerically, into the dimension-level assessments reported in the Institutional Architecture and Comparative Findings sections of this article. The same three-band scale

is applied to the dependent variable, described below, to keep the two sides of the comparison methodologically consistent.

The dependent variable is decision-cycle robustness. This construct refers to the capacity of command systems to maintain coherent, timely, and intent-aligned decision output under conditions of information saturation, time compression, and partial system degradation. The concept is derived from decision-cycle theory (Boyd, 1987; Osinga, 2007, pp. 235–239) and incorporates cognitive constraints identified in bounded rationality and recognition-based decision models (Klein, 1998, pp. 17–20; Simon, 1957, p. 198). Decision-cycle robustness is assessed qualitatively through indicators, such as latency under communication disruption, coherence across hierarchical levels, adaptive adjustment in ambiguous scenarios, and continuity during leadership or node transition. As with the independent variable, each robustness indicator was assigned to the limited/partial/embedded band described above on the basis of the coded evidence matrix, rather than derived from direct measurement of decision latency, which the available sources do not permit.

To isolate the relationship between resilience architecture and decision performance, three control variables are incorporated. Organisational size is included because scale influences coordination complexity and delegation demands (Mintzberg, 1979, pp. 103–105). Operational domain is considered due to variation in tempo and information density across land, maritime, air, and joint environments. Technological integration is treated as a control variable because digitisation level affects information flow and dependency on network infrastructure (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, pp. 87–92). These controls ensure that observed differences are attributed to institutional resilience rather than structural asymmetries.

Data sources consist primarily of authoritative doctrinal and strategic publications. For the United Kingdom, the analysis draws on the UK Defence Doctrine (JDP 0-01), the Integrated Review and its 2023 refresh (HM Government, 2023), and publicly accessible operational reflections. For Poland, core sources include the Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020, Doktryna Dowodzenia Sił Zbrojnych RP, and related defence policy documents. Publicly available operational reports and secondary academic literature supplement doctrinal analysis in order to enhance contextual validity. Source triangulation is applied to reduce interpretative bias and ensure consistency (Yin, 2018, pp. 115–120).

The analytical framework is based on a structured comparison matrix that aligns resilience dimensions with observable institutional indicators and corresponding measurement logic. Each dimension—command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing architecture, and adaptation mechanisms—is evaluated across both cases using identical criteria. This systematic comparison enables identification of convergence, divergence, and equilibrium configurations in command architecture (Ragin, 2014, pp. 87–92). The matrix does not quantify performance numerically; instead, it categorises resilience depth and decision robustness in relative comparative terms.

A related methodological question is as follows: Whether a sandbox or generative AI (GenAI)-based simulation exercise, allowing systematic manipulation of disruption variables, would have offered additional insight into how command architectures respond to induced disruption? Such a simulation was considered but not undertaken in this study, for two reasons. First, a simulation designed and populated by a single researcher risks encoding the researcher's own assumptions about resilience into the disruption scenario itself; the document-based approach adopted here instead relies on independently authored

doctrinal, governmental, and critical secondary accounts of how each command system has described and evaluated its own performance under real disruption episodes—including degraded communications during exercises, coalition operations, and eastern-flank deployments—rather than on researcher-constructed scenarios. Second, constructing a simulation with sufficient operational fidelity to be informative would require exercise-specific and, in places, classified detail that lies outside the publicly available source base used here. A sandbox or simulation-based extension, ideally co-designed with serving or former practitioners and validated against real exercise data, is accordingly identified as a priority for future research, rather than as a substitute for the present document-based comparative design; this is addressed further in the concluding section.

Several limitations are acknowledged. The analysis relies on publicly available doctrinal and policy documents, which may not fully capture informal practices or classified operational procedures. Direct measurement of decision latency is not feasible due to data restrictions; assessment is therefore based on institutional indicators and validated secondary accounts. Cross-national comparison introduces contextual differences in strategic culture and political oversight that cannot be entirely standardised. These constraints are mitigated through structured comparison, transparent operationalisation, and careful distinction between doctrinal formulation and institutional implementation (Yin, 2018, p. 42).

The methodological design thus provides a coherent framework for examining how institutional operational resilience influences decision-cycle robustness in the Polish and British operational command architecture while maintaining analytical transparency and comparability.

Institutional architecture: Poland

Russia's aggression against Ukraine, beginning in 2014 and intensifying after the full-scale invasion of 2022, has been the principal shock driving substantial transformation in the institutional architecture of the Polish armed forces over the past decade. Four aspects of that architecture are examined here: command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing capacity, and institutional learning mechanisms. The analysis considers how deeply and coherently each has changed conditions of operational resilience and, in turn, decision-cycle robustness.

Command culture here is the product of several institutional layers rather than a single doctrinal moment. Warsaw Pact traditions of hierarchical centralisation gave way, after 1999, to progressive NATO integration; doctrinal convergence followed, with mission command principles formally adopted in Polish doctrine (Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 2014). Practice, however, lagged behind doctrine: delegation thresholds stayed comparatively conservative, and decision authority was frequently retained at higher echelons, particularly where operations carried political sensitivity.

An expeditionary phase, largely overlooked in prior comparative accounts, sits between these two poles. From the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, Poland contributed substantial troop numbers—task forces running into the thousands—to the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, taking on provincial reconstruction and combat roles within NATO- and coalition-led command structures (Stach and Pizzolo, 2025). That experience exposed Polish commanders to the same coalition-interoperability pressures that shaped the British doctrine over the same years, building closer alignment with allied planning procedures and a greater tolerance for delegated tactical decisions inside multinational task forces.

The engagement was, however, shorter and smaller relative to total force structure than Britain's decades-long expeditionary commitment, and it was cut short when the eastern-flank threat after 2014 redirected priorities towards territorial defence, mobilisation, and deterrence. As a result, the decentralising lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq were only partially absorbed before force generation and command culture pivoted to homeland defence, leaving a shallower institutional residue than in the British case ([Stach and Pizzolo, 2025](#)).

That pivot came with concrete reforms. Between 2014 and 2018, the command system was restructured to sharpen operational chains of command and reduce ambiguity between the strategic and operational levels, including a reallocation of responsibilities between the General Command and the Operational Command intended to ease friction during mobilisation and crisis response ([Rzeczpospolita Polska, 2020](#)). The underlying aim was straightforward: shorter command pathways and clearer unity of command for high-intensity contingencies.

Formal endorsement of decentralisation has not fully displaced centralising habits in practice. Political oversight structures and the imperative of territorial-defence readiness continue to shape delegation thresholds, and Poland's geographic proximity to potential escalation scenarios—unlike the distant theatres of an expeditionary deployment—makes unauthorised engagement or escalation decisions a live political concern. Decentralisation therefore operates within narrower guardrails than in long-established expeditionary militaries, thus limiting but not eliminating subordinate commanders' scope for independent judgement. The gap has not gone unnoticed domestically: Polish commentators and serving generals have repeatedly pressed for further reform of the command decision-making system, arguing that residual centralisation still constrains operational responsiveness ([Borowski, 2024](#); [Polska Agencja Prasowa \[PAP\], 2026](#)).

Structural redundancy has been the second pillar of reform. Establishing territorial defence forces served simultaneously as a force-expansion measure and a resilience mechanism ([Rzeczpospolita Polska, 2020](#)), giving Poland distributed territorial presence, decentralised mobilisation capacity, and closer civil–military integration. For an adversary, a deeper force structure of this type complicates any attempt to target a single command node—although folding territorial and operational command together remains an unfinished institutional task that still requires procedural rehearsal.

Continuity and survivability have received parallel attention, with investment in hardened infrastructure, distributed headquarters concepts, and improved mobilisation procedures raising structural robustness on paper ([Rzeczpospolita Polska, 2020](#); [Stach and Pizzolo, 2025](#)). Investment alone does not guarantee depth, however: alternate command nodes are formally codified, but how often they are actually activated and rehearsed will determine whether they hold up under real disruption. Poland's distributed command practice has intensified only recently, compared with states that have rehearsed expeditionary command for decades, and it remains a work in progress.

Modernisation programmes have done much the same for information-processing architecture: digitised command-and-control systems, new ISR platforms, and integration into NATO intelligence frameworks have improved situational awareness and interoperability ([Stach and Pizzolo, 2025](#)), while participation in NATO exercises and multinational formations has reinforced alignment with allied intelligence fusion and planning standards. Together, these developments have strengthened the technical side of resilience.

Technical strength is only half the equation, however: rapid digitisation also raises dependency on networked systems and, with it, vulnerability to cyber disruption. Polish reforms

have prioritised secure communications and encrypted networks, but layered redundancy and analogue fallback remain the decisive factors in containing systemic risk (NATO, 2016). Decision robustness under saturated conditions ultimately turns on how far information triage and cognitive-load management are formalised in doctrine; Polish doctrine increasingly recognises information-domain contestation as a problem, but the institutional safeguards to manage it are still being expanded.

A further dimension comes from outside the national architecture altogether: integration within multinational corps structures and forward-presence frameworks builds procedural familiarity with alliance standards (NATO, 2019), and joint exercises sharpen both command-system interoperability and cross-domain coordination. This alliance embedding functions as an external multiplier of resilience, adding procedural redundancy that Poland's own architecture does not by itself provide—at the cost of extra coordination complexity in high-tempo operations, particularly at the point where national and multinational command authority meet.

Institutional learning has accelerated since 2014, as the security environment forced doctrinal reassessment, force expansion, and capability modernisation (Stach and Pizzolo, 2025); lessons from exercises, eastern-flank deployments, and multinational cooperation have fed iteratively back into force posture and readiness planning. That learning velocity, however, is bounded by reform tempo and bureaucratic capacity—structural change tends to outpace full cultural adaptation—and the institutionalisation of after-action review cycles and systematic doctrinal revision is still maturing rather than settled.

Set against forces shaped by two decades of sustained expeditionary campaigning, Poland's learning architecture looks less like gradual, cumulative evolution and more like rapid adaptation to a fast-moving regional threat; its own Afghanistan and Iraq experience, although significant, was briefer and was overtaken by the post-2014 pivot before its decentralising lessons could be fully institutionalised (Stach and Pizzolo, 2025). The difference matters for how resilience mechanisms get rehearsed and normalised: where learning is embedded in recurring expeditionary cycles, decentralisation and adaptive initiative become institutional reflexes almost by default, whereas in Poland resilience has so far been built primarily through modernisation and structural reform, with cultural decentralisation still catching up.

Taken together, the Polish armed forces show measurable resilience gains over the past decade, particularly in structural redundancy and technological integration, and decision-cycle robustness benefits accordingly from clearer command pathways and greater force depth. Yet the combination of centralised command traditions, an accelerated reform timeline, and still-evolving decentralisation practices leaves a transitional equilibrium whose durability has not been tested by sustained high-intensity conflict—and the picture is not one of unambiguous progress. Polish commentators and serving generals continue to describe the command system as insufficiently reformed, citing persistent procurement delays and unresolved friction between political oversight and operational command autonomy (Borowski, 2024; PAP, 2026). Polish operational resilience is thus substantial and strengthening in structural terms, but still consolidating—and, on the assessment of domestic experts, incomplete—where fully internalised decentralised command culture and procedural rehearsal depth are concerned. It is against this baseline that the British case is evaluated next.

Institutional architecture: United Kingdom

Where Poland's transformation has been compressed and accelerated by regional threat escalation, the British military command structures rest on a long-standing

doctrinal commitment to mission command, built up gradually through decades of overseas campaigning rather than through a single reform push. That slower, more iterative trajectory has left its mark on command culture, structural redundancy, information-processing systems, and institutional learning alike, each of which is considered in turn below.

Mission command is not an aspiration here but a codified operational norm: the UK defence doctrine formalises delegated authority, clarity of intent, and disciplined initiative as standard practices ([UK Ministry of Defence, 2017](#), pp. 2–7), and divisional-level ethnographic research corroborates the picture, describing a shift from individualistic, hierarchical generalship towards a more collective, networked model, in which decision-making is spread across a professionalised staff ([King, 2019](#), pp. 16–24). Iraq and Afghanistan gave that doctrine a stress test: brigade and battalion commanders routinely exercised autonomous decision authority within their commander's intent, often with degraded communications or incomplete situational awareness, and repeated rehearsal under those conditions turned decentralisation into an institutional reflex rather than a doctrinal abstraction.

Coalition operations shaped risk-acceptance culture in a similar way. Acting within multinational command structures forced subordinate leaders to interpret intent flexibly while still holding coherence with coalition partners, and balancing political oversight against tactical initiative became a routine skill rather than an exception. The result is a comparatively high tolerance for initiative within defined guardrails. Because subordinate commanders are used to operating without constant higher-level confirmation, decision latency under disruption tends to be mitigated by delegation thresholds that are already normalised rather than newly asserted under pressure.

Structural redundancy has followed a parallel logic of distributed command and joint integration. The United Kingdom has progressively refined distributed headquarters structures to be able to function in both expeditionary and homeland-defence settings. The Joint Force Command, later restructured into Strategic Command, institutionalised cross-domain coordination and centralised integration while leaving execution decentralised at the operational level. Spreading headquarters' functions this way reduces dependency on any single node and improves survivability against cyber or kinetic targeting, and repeated rehearsal of these arrangements in multinational exercises deepens the resilience they provide.

A joint framework spanning land, maritime, air, cyber, and space components within unified planning cycles adds a further layer of structural robustness, cutting compartmentalisation and improving coherence in cross-domain operations. Redundancy here is not confined to physical infrastructure: it extends to procedural interoperability across the services, reinforced by rehearsed succession planning and clearly defined transfer-of-authority mechanisms, particularly within expeditionary task-force constructs, so that command continuity survives the loss of any single commander or headquarters.

The information-processing architecture benefitted from early adoption of digitised command-and-control platforms and intelligence fusion processes, driven in large part by the operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, where ISR inputs, coalition intelligence feeds, and local situational awareness required rapid integration. Intelligence fusion centres became a standard feature of operational headquarters, pulling multi-source data into structured analysis; the result is a fusion architecture that keeps the orientation phase of the decision cycle from fragmenting and manages information overload through hierarchical filtering rather than raw volume.

Digitalisation has progressed in step with a doctrinal emphasis on information advantage, with network-enabled capabilities and integrated communication systems improving real-time situational awareness. Digital sophistication alone would not be enough, though, and the British approach pairs it with contingency planning for degraded environments—fallback communication protocols and rehearsed command transitions—so that advanced digital systems sit alongside, rather than instead of, redundancy that reduces vulnerability to single-point failure and cyber disruption.

Learning and doctrinal adaptation are arguably the defining features of British institutional resilience. Years of expeditionary campaigning generated iterative cycles of after-action review, lessons-learned integration, and doctrinal revision, and the British Army's adaptation during counterinsurgency operations is frequently cited as a case study in institutional learning under operational pressure (Farrell, 2010, p. 569). Lessons drawn from Iraq and Afghanistan were fed directly into revised doctrine, training frameworks, and command structures, building an institutional capacity to recalibrate quickly when operational shocks occur.

Doctrinal evolution has continued in recent strategic reviews, from the Integrated Review and its refresh (HM Government, 2023, pp. 8–12) through to a considerably more far-reaching step—the 2025 Strategic Defence Review and its accompanying National Security Strategy, which together commit UK defence planning to a 10-year transformation and an explicit “warfighting” footing against peer and hybrid threats (UK Government, 2025a, pp. 5–12; 2025b). For the Royal Navy specifically, the 2025 Review reaffirms the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, commits to a new SSN-AUKUS attack-submarine programme, and adds the cyber and electromagnetic environment as a distinct operational domain alongside land, maritime, air, and space—all of which extend distributed command and redundancy principles into new domains (UK Government, 2025a, pp. 20–34). Independent assessment has been more guarded than the government's own framing: the 2025 Review sets out an extensive reform agenda without a fully costed future force structure, and delivery depends on defence-spending commitments that remain provisional (Royal United Services Institute [RUSI], 2025). Adapting expeditionary-honed decentralisation practices to homeland-resilience contexts is itself a structural challenge, and while the pre-existing culture of delegation and rehearsal gives the United Kingdom a resilient foundation for that adjustment, how it translates into the new domains created by the 2025 Review has not been tested operationally yet.

Set against the Polish case, then, the British institutional architecture shows a longer-term internalisation of decentralised command culture and structured learning cycles: resilience depth built up through expeditionary rehearsal and iterative doctrinal refinement, structural redundancy underpinned by distributed headquarters and joint integration, and information-processing resilience resting on mature intelligence fusion and layered contingency planning for communications.

None of this leaves the British institutional architecture free of its own adaptation pressures. Moving from counterinsurgency to high-intensity peer competition means recalibrating assumptions about tempo, scale, and attrition, and folding homeland-defence considerations and alliance deterrence dynamics into command models built for expeditionary warfare. British resilience going forward therefore depends on translating accumulated expeditionary learning into a deterrence-focused environment without diluting the decentralised effectiveness produced by learning.

In sum, the British military command structures combine deeply embedded mission command culture, mature structural redundancy, advanced information-processing

integration, and an institutionalised pace of learning—features that together support decision-cycle robustness under disruption. Whether, and how far, these characteristics actually diverge from the Polish case is the question taken up next.

Comparative findings

Table 1 summarises, for each resilience dimension, the descriptive band assigned to each case under the limited/partial/embedded scale defined in the Method section, together with the principal sources underpinning that coding. The qualitative comparison that follows should be read against this coded evidence base rather than as a claim of statistical correlation; no numerical aggregation or significance testing is implied by the term “correlation,” where it is used descriptively as mentioned below.

Read against Table 1 and the underlying document matrix, the comparison between the Polish armed forces and the British military command structures points to a recurring qualitative pattern: higher levels of institutionalised resilience architecture tend to go together with lower decision latency under disruption. This is a pattern observed across the coded indicators, not a statistically tested correlation, but it recurs consistently across delegation thresholds, structural redundancy, information-processing integration, and institutional learning alike.

The British case is coded as embedded across all four dimensions shown in Table 1—mission command culture, distributed headquarters’ structures, layered communication redundancy, and iterative learning cycles—and this depth is consistent with the reduced decision latency described in the sources reviewed for degraded-communication scenarios. Because subordinate commanders are structurally and culturally conditioned to act within their commander’s intent without waiting for higher confirmation, orientation and decision phases keep going even when the flow of information is partially disrupted. That compression of the decision cycle owes as much to institutional normalisation of decentralised execution as to any technological capability.

Poland presents a more qualified picture. Resilience enhancement over the past decade has reduced some structural vulnerabilities—in force expansion, command clarity, and

Table 1. Summary of coded resilience indicator bands (Poland vs. the United Kingdom), derived from the document coding matrix described in the Method section.

Resilience dimension	Poland (coded band)	United Kingdom (coded band)	Primary basis of coding
Command culture (delegation thresholds, tolerance of subordinate initiative)	Partial	Embedded	Borowski (2024) ; Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (2014) ; PAP (2026) ; UK Ministry of Defence (2017)
Structural redundancy(distributed headquarters, succession planning)	Partial	Embedded	Rzeczpospolita Polska (2020) ; Stach and Pizzolo (2025) ; UK Ministry of Defence (2017)
Information-processing architecture(ISR integration, fusion, communication redundancy)	Partial	Embedded	NATO (2016; 2019) ; Stach and Pizzolo (2025)
Institutional learning(after-action review, doctrinal revision cycles)	Partial	Embedded	Farrell (2010) ; HM Government (2023) ; Stach and Pizzolo (2025)

interoperability—but the improvement remains untested under sustained combat conditions and is contested by domestic experts who point to continuing procurement delays and command friction (Borowski, 2024; PAP, 2026). The coded evidence is consistent with decision latency staying more sensitive to hierarchical confirmation thresholds here: where communication channels are degraded, continuity depends more on vertical coordination than in the British case. That is not evidence of institutional fragility so much as a transitional equilibrium in which structural resilience has outpaced full decentralised cultural internalisation—and whose actual robustness under disruption remains, absent a major conflict test, an open empirical question rather than a demonstrated fact. The link between resilience depth and latency reduction does appear in the coded material, but it strengthens most in the specific areas where decentralisation practices have been rehearsed most consistently.

Delegation itself acts as a critical moderator of adaptive adjustment, and here the two cases diverge sharply. In the British command structures, delegated authority functions as a resilience amplifier: adaptive adjustment under ambiguous or hybrid conditions happens at subordinate levels while still tracking strategic intent, because expeditionary experience has made initiative tolerance a stable institutional feature. The link between delegation and adaptive performance is, as a result, strong and direct (Duchek, 2020; Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011).

In Poland, delegation practices are formally codified but only variably embedded in practice. Adaptive adjustment under disruption works well in rehearsed scenarios—multinational exercises and eastern-flank operational planning, in particular—but escalation sensitivity and political oversight frameworks keep delegation thresholds narrower than in the British case, so adaptive adjustment happens within tighter operational guardrails. Institutional centralisation traditions and the pace of reform therefore continue to moderate the delegation–adaptation relationship, although that moderating effect should weaken as decentralisation becomes more thoroughly normalised through training and joint integration.

Decision performance does not appear to rise linearly with resilience investment; the comparative model instead suggests a stabilising curve. At low resilience levels, incremental structural improvements—clearer command chains and basic communication redundancy—yield substantial reductions in decision latency. Gains remain significant but begin to level off in mid-range environments as institutional mechanisms mature, and beyond a certain threshold, excessive procedural layering or over-engineered coordination can itself introduce friction, marginally lengthening the decision cycle. Decision robustness, in other words, operates within a bounded optimisation zone rather than accumulating without limit.

Within that model, the two forces are placed at different points on the curve. British command structures occupy a mature resilience band, with embedded decentralisation and iterative learning keeping decision performance stable across moderate disruption and degrading gradually rather than abruptly under stress. Poland, by contrast, is still on an ascending trajectory: structural improvements have strengthened robustness considerably, but equilibrium remains in consolidation, particularly around delegation normalisation and rehearsal frequency. The trajectory points towards eventual convergence rather than permanent structural divergence.

Two distinct equilibrium states emerge from the analysis. A stable operational equilibrium combines moderate decentralisation, clearly codified delegation thresholds, layered communication redundancy, distributed command survivability, and institutionalised

feedback integration; in this configuration, decision latency stays controlled, adaptive adjustment holds up, and coherence with commander's intent is preserved. The British institutional model approximates this equilibrium, built up through long-term rehearsal and doctrinal continuity.

An alternative configuration is visible in transitional architectures, combining strong structural redundancy and modernised information-processing capacity with decentralisation practices that are only partly internalised. Decision continuity here is robust in rehearsed scenarios but grows more sensitive under novel or politically complex disruption. The Polish institutional configuration fits this transitional equilibrium, reflecting rapid structural adaptation set within cultural parameters that are still evolving.

Cross-case divergence, then, is less a matter of doctrinal difference—both forces formally endorse mission command and resilience principles—than of how deeply those principles have been internalised, which shows up in rehearsal frequency, delegation normalisation, and learning velocity. Britain's resilience rests on long-term operational rehearsal and doctrinal iteration; Poland's resilience rests on accelerated structural reform and interoperability enhancement within a fast-shifting threat environment.

None of this implies that one architecture is simply superior to the other; each reflects the strategic context that produced it. The British model benefits from expeditionary rehearsal but must now adapt that rehearsal to high-intensity continental deterrence; the Polish model benefits from the immediacy of threat driving rapid reform; however, it is still internalising decentralised cultural practices. What the comparison indicates, overall, is that operational resilience depends less on formal doctrine than on procedural rehearsal depth, delegation maturity, and learning velocity.

Taken as a whole, the coded comparison is consistent with institutional operational resilience acting as a structural determinant of decision-cycle robustness: higher resilience depth is associated with reduced latency and sustained adaptive adjustment, although optimal performance appears to sit within a bounded equilibrium zone that balances decentralisation with coherence. The Polish and British cases illustrate two distinct resilience pathways, shaped by different strategic contexts and historical trajectories. These qualitative, document-based insights ground the theoretical interpretation and policy implications developed in the Discussion section that follows, and should be read together with the limitations set out in the Method section.

Discussion

The comparative findings carry several theoretical and strategic implications. At the theoretical level, the analysis supports the proposition that operational resilience should be conceptualised not as an infrastructural safeguard but as an institutional determinant of decision-cycle robustness. The existing resilience scholarship, rooted in systems theory ([Holling, 1973](#), p. 17) and organisational adaptation frameworks ([Duchek, 2020](#), p. 220), emphasises absorptive and adaptive capacity. Military decision-making theory, by contrast, concentrates on cognitive tempo and pattern recognition ([Boyd, 1987](#); [Klein, 1998](#), pp. 17–20). The present study integrates these strands by demonstrating that the institutional resilience architecture moderates decision-cycle performance. Decision robustness emerges as a systemic property shaped by delegation thresholds, redundancy layering, and learning velocity, rather than as an outcome of individual cognition alone.

The findings refine the theoretical understanding of the relationship between resilience and tempo. The non-linear equilibrium model identified in the comparative analysis suggests that resilience produces stabilising effects within a bounded optimisation zone. Below a certain threshold, structural reinforcement yields substantial reductions in decision latency. Beyond that threshold, additional procedural complexity may introduce friction. This observation aligns with bounded rationality theory (Simon, 1957, p. 198) and extends it to the institutional level: organisations, like individuals, operate within limits where excess structure can constrain adaptive performance. The theoretical implication is that resilience should be evaluated in terms of balance between decentralisation and coherence rather than in terms of maximal redundancy or maximal autonomy.

The analysis also clarifies the distinction between institutional and cultural determinants of decision robustness. Institutional determinants include formal command structures, codified delegation protocols, distributed headquarters architecture, and communication redundancy. Cultural determinants encompass internalised norms of initiative tolerance, risk acceptance, and trust within the chain of command. In the British case, prolonged expeditionary operations embedded decentralised practices as cultural reflexes. In the Polish case, accelerated structural reform has strengthened institutional resilience on paper, while cultural internalisation of decentralisation continues to consolidate; whether this institutional strengthening translates into actual decision-cycle robustness has not been tested by a sustained high-intensity conflict, and domestic military commentators continue to describe the underlying command system as requiring further reform (Borowski, 2024; PAP, 2026). The comparative evidence indicates that institutional reform can enhance resilience rapidly, but cultural transformation requires iterative rehearsal and generational continuity, and claims of enhanced robustness should accordingly be read as provisional rather than demonstrated. Decision-cycle robustness therefore depends on alignment between structural design and command culture. Misalignment produces states of transitional equilibrium characterised by robust infrastructure but constrained delegation depth.

From a NATO interoperability perspective, the findings carry operational significance. Alliance effectiveness depends on harmonised command practices across national contingents. Divergence in delegation thresholds and initiative tolerance can generate friction within multinational headquarters. British decentralisation culture may operate at different autonomy expectations than Polish command practices shaped by heightened escalation sensitivity on the eastern flank. Interoperability therefore extends beyond technical compatibility; it encompasses shared understanding of acceptable delegation margins and risk management frameworks (NATO, 2019, pp. 2–4). Joint exercises and multinational formations serve as resilience equalisation mechanisms by normalising delegation expectations and rehearsing distributed command under shared operational conditions.

The comparative model also suggests that resilience asymmetry does not automatically undermine alliance cohesion. Complementarity may enhance collective robustness. The British system contributes mature decentralised execution experience and distributed headquarters integration. The Polish system contributes forward-positioned territorial defence depth and heightened mobilisation readiness driven by proximity to potential escalation zones. Effective interoperability requires alignment of these strengths within integrated command frameworks. Institutional transparency in delegation protocols and rehearsal frequency becomes a key enabling factor.

Strategically, the implications for NATO's eastern flank are substantial. The deterrence environment in Eastern Europe requires decision continuity under compressed timelines and contested information domains. For Poland, continued consolidation of

decentralised command culture within strengthened structural redundancy is intended to enhance rapid response capacity, although this expectation remains untested against sustained high-intensity conflict and is disputed by domestic commentators who continue to press for further command reform ([Borowski, 2024](#); [PAP, 2026](#)). Sustained rehearsal of distributed command and delegation under high-intensity simulation conditions will accelerate cultural internalisation, but should not be assumed to have already done so. For the United Kingdom, adaptation of expeditionary-honed mission command practices to high-intensity peer competition scenarios is critical, and is now the explicit subject of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review and National Security Strategy, which commit the armed forces to a decade-long transformation, a distinct cyber and electromagnetic operational domain, and expanded submarine and air-defence capability precisely in order to make this transition ([UK Government, 2025a](#), pp. 5–34; [2025b](#)). The transition from counterinsurgency tempo to deterrence-based posture demands recalibration of assumptions regarding scale, attrition, and homeland resilience integration; independent commentary suggests that, a year on from the 2025 Review, the required force-structure and funding detail remains incomplete, which is itself informative for how command-level resilience claims should be weighted pending implementation ([RUSI, 2025](#)).

The broader strategic implication concerns resilience as a deterrence multiplier. Decision-cycle robustness contributes directly to deterrence credibility. An adversary's calculation of escalation depends not only on force posture but also on perceived command continuity under disruption. Institutions capable of sustaining coherent decision output during cyber interference, information manipulation, or leadership targeting reduce adversarial incentives to exploit ambiguity. The Polish case demonstrates rapid structural strengthening in response to eastern-flank threat dynamics, although, as with the British case's own reform trajectory, its actual deterrent value under sustained conflict remains an open question rather than a demonstrated fact, and domestic critics continue to question whether structural investment has yet translated into a fully reformed command system ([Borowski, 2024](#); [PAP, 2026](#)). The British case illustrates long-term institutionalisation of decentralised execution under coalition conditions, although its own transition to high-intensity peer warfighting is likewise still in progress and, per independent assessment, not yet fully resourced or force-structured ([RUSI, 2025](#)). Together, these models provide complementary resilience pathways within the alliance, whose comparative credibility ultimately rests on evidence that neither case can yet fully provide.

The discussion reinforces that operational resilience is not a static capability but a dynamic equilibrium between institutional design and cultural internalisation. For both Poland and the United Kingdom, continued refinement of delegation practices, redundancy rehearsal, and learning integration will determine long-term decision robustness in contested environments. The theoretical contribution lies in linking resilience architecture directly to command performance. The strategic contribution lies in identifying resilience depth as a decisive variable in eastern-flank deterrence and alliance interoperability.

Conclusions

This study set out to examine how institutional operational resilience influences command decision-cycle robustness in the Polish armed forces and the British military command structures. By integrating organisational resilience theory with military decision-making models and applying a structured comparative institutional framework, the analysis has demonstrated that resilience functions as a structural determinant of decision performance under disruption, rather than as a peripheral infrastructural safeguard.

The coded comparison is consistent with a recurring association between resilience depth and decision-cycle robustness, rather than a statistically demonstrated correlation. Higher levels of institutionalised delegation, structural redundancy, distributed command survivability, and embedded learning mechanisms are associated in the coded material with reduced decision latency and sustained adaptive adjustment under conditions of information saturation and degraded communications. The British military command structures exhibit mature decentralisation practices reinforced by expeditionary rehearsal and iterative doctrinal refinement. This configuration produces stable decision performance within a bounded equilibrium zone, where decentralised authority operates within clear intent frameworks. The Polish armed forces demonstrate rapid structural strengthening in response to eastern-flank security deterioration, particularly in force expansion, command system reform, and interoperability enhancement. Decision robustness has improved on structural indicators, although full cultural internalisation of decentralised practices remains in consolidation, and Polish military commentators continue to describe the command system as requiring further reform, citing unresolved procurement delays and centralisation pressures (Borowski, 2024; PAP, 2026).

The comparative model indicates that resilience does not increase decision performance linearly. Optimal command robustness emerges within a balanced configuration combining delegation maturity, redundancy layering, and institutional learning velocity. Excessive centralisation constrains tempo under disruption, while excessive decentralisation without structural guardrails risks fragmentation. Both cases illustrate distinct pathways towards equilibrium shaped by historical trajectory and strategic context.

The practical implications of these findings are operational and doctrinal. For Poland, sustained rehearsal of distributed command structures and expanded internalisation of delegation practices will enhance rapid response capability under compressed timelines. Integration of cognitive load management mechanisms and structured after-action learning cycles can further stabilise decision continuity. For the United Kingdom, adaptation of expeditionary-honed decentralisation to high-intensity peer competition and homeland defence contexts remains a strategic priority. Maintaining layered redundancy while avoiding procedural over-complexity will preserve decision agility in evolving threat environments.

From a policy perspective, NATO interoperability requires alignment not only in technical systems but also in delegation norms and resilience depth. Multinational exercises should explicitly rehearse degraded command scenarios to harmonise escalation thresholds and initiative expectations. Institutional transparency in command protocols strengthens collective deterrence by signalling continuity under disruption. On the eastern flank, resilience depth directly reinforces deterrence credibility by reducing adversarial incentives to exploit ambiguity in decision architectures.

Future research should expand comparative analysis to additional NATO members in order to refine the equilibrium model across diverse institutional contexts. Quantitative examination of decision latency under controlled simulation environments, including a sandbox or GenAI-based exercise capable of systematically manipulating disruption variables and, ideally, validated against exercise or wargaming data, would complement the qualitative institutional analysis presented here. Further investigation into the interaction between cyber resilience and cognitive load management could deepen understanding of resilience within digitally saturated operational theatres. Longitudinal study of reform trajectories in Poland and doctrinal adaptation in the United Kingdom would also clarify how institutional learning velocity shapes long-term decision robustness.

Operational resilience emerges from this analysis as a dynamic equilibrium between structural design and cultural internalisation. In both Polish and British cases, resilience architecture directly conditions command effectiveness under hybrid and high-intensity conditions. Strengthening this architecture remains a strategic imperative for sustaining decision advantage in contested environments.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Publicly available datasets were analysed in this study. These data can be found in the sources listed in the References.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

The author read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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