The contemporary international security environment characterised by volatile security challenges such as terrorism, violent extremism, insurgency, conflicts, separatist movements, and many other transnational crimes, as well as the global pandemic, has reawakened the consciousness of governments across the globe on the need for CIP against attacks and vandalism by either individuals or groups and even natural disasters. Many national governments have made laws and established agencies for CIP in their various countries.

Critical infrastructure is vital infrastructure that helps society to function effectively and ensure the overall well-being of its citizens. This includes oil pipelines and refineries, power installation, transportation, telecommunications and information communication technology, the economy, dams, education facilities and so on (DCSINT, 2006). Apart from providing this infrastructure, the state guarantees its protection from destruction and hazards. Moreover, the destruction of such infrastructure or disrupting its effective functioning would have a long-term detrimental effect on the well-being of the people and the state. Therefore, the protection of critical infrastructure is key to the security and well-being of the society.

Critical infrastructure protection entails prevention, preparedness, and response to serious incidents that threaten the existence or effective functioning of critical national infrastructure (CRS Report, 2019). It could also involve recovery, in the case of the disappearance of or capturing of infrastructure. Such protection could either be physical or involve the use of modern technological equipment such as drones, balloons, helicopters, geo-spatial and satellite monitoring and the use of artificial intelligence. Though, these may not guarantee the total protection of such infrastructure because of its vulnerability to damage from evolving threats like pandemics, extreme weather, accidents or technical failure, sabotage and vandalism, acts of terrorism and cyber threats. But they can guard against the damage, take counter measures or early warning signals that could help the agencies responsible for protecting and regulating the infrastructure, to put in place certain precautionary measures that may avert the damage. In other words, the effective protection of critical infrastructure lies with the management of the agencies responsible.

In Nigeria, one of the measures taken by the government towards the protection of critical national assets and infrastructure (CNAI) in the country was the creation of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) under NSCDC Act 2003. It was amended in 2007 to give full authority to the agency as the lead security agency in the protection of CNAI (NSCDC, Amended Act, 2007). The establishment of NSCDC is a confirmation of the effort and commitment of the Federal Government of Nigeria to protect critical national assets and infrastructure in the country. While the NSCDC is the lead agency responsible for the protection of CNAI in Nigeria, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to the President is the coordinator of CIP in Nigeria. The ONSA also has a mandate to identify CNAI in the country (National Security Strategy, 2019).

Despite the efforts at ensuring the safety of CNAI in Nigeria given the establishment of the NSCDC and the Act governing CNAI, their vulnerability remains high. Though it might be attributed to the complexity of security challenges that have befallen the country and other institutional challenges such as lack of the financial ‘muscle’ required for the procurement of the required equipment and to build capacity of personnel as well as inadequate mobilisation of the stakeholders responsible for CIP in Nigeria. But the fact remains that at the core of these challenges and in the ineffective CIP is collective corruption perpetuated by institutional leaders responsible for the running of the various institutions of governance from the presidency to the lowest managerial cadre in the Nigerian Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). Corruption in Nigeria has been elevated to an institutional level, to the extent that it tends to appear as part of the norm in execution of public policies and governmental programmes. The paper therefore examines institutional corruption as a major obstacle to CIP in Nigeria.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Critical Infrastructure Protection and Institutional Corruption

The term “critical infrastructure” is relatively new and can be traced to the United States Congress Executive Order 13010, signed by President Bill Clinton on 15 July 1996, which defined critical infrastructure for the first time in official United States federal policy. The Executive Order defines critical infrastructures as systems that are “so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defence or economic security of the United States” (United States Executive Order 13010, 1996). The Order identified eight sectors in the United States as critical infrastructure that should be protected against any form of attack. These are telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply, emergency services, and continuation of government (United States Executive Order 13010, 1996).

Subsequently, the September 2001 attack, otherwise known as the 9/11 attack in New York and Washington, led to a redefinition and expansion of critical infrastructure by the US Congress through the Patriot Act 2001. The Patriot Act (2001) defined critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national, economic and social security, the stability of the economy, etc.”

In addition, DCSINT (2006) identifies critical infrastructure as those systems that are closely related to energy security, telecommunications, energy systems, gas and oil pipelines, the economy, transportation, water supply and water ways that lead to the efficient functioning of the State. Though the definition provided by the US Patriot Act tends to encompass other vital assets of the State, the emphasis is more on defence and the terrorism which resulted from the 9/11 attack on US infrastructure. Incidentally, developments around global and national security attacks have evolved the definition of critical infrastructure. Following these developments, CI has been expanded to include additional sectors that support public health, assure continuity of government services and maintain public confidence, such as the security of national monuments and special events (Brown, 2006). Presently, the official list of critical infrastructure sectors has expanded to fourteen and includes many subdivisions. However, these vary from country to country.

Following the foundation laid by the United States on the term critical infrastructure, several countries have given various definitions and descriptions to what they consider critical infrastructure in their respective countries, to ensure that they are properly identified and protected for the effective running of the society. In Australia, critical infrastructure represents “those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security” (NGPCIT, 2011). The Australian definition of CI is fashioned alongside the US Patriotic Act, thus, relating to defence and terrorism.

The United Kingdom also identifies critical infrastructure as “assets, services and systems that support social, economic and political life and their destruction can cause casualties, have impact on national economy, social consequences or be a priority goal of the government” (Mitrevska, 2019). However, the UK understanding of CI is restricted to social amenities infrastructure without considering security infrastructure.

In Germany, critical infrastructure is seen as “organisational structure and facilities of vital importance to society that their degradation and deficit would result in deficiencies, cause substantial decrease in supply, disruption of public order and other consequences” (Mitrevska, 2019).

In Croatia, national critical infrastructure encompasses “systems, networks and facilities of national importance, where their termination of work or services may have serious consequences for national security.” However, in Bulgaria, critical infrastructure is considered as a “system of facilities, services and information systems, whose disruption or destruction would have a negative impact on the safety of people, the environment, the economy or the overall effective functioning of the Government” (Mitrevska, 2019).

Although the definitions provided by different countries may slightly differ as regards what constitutes critical infrastructures, they all point to the fact that critical infrastructures are amenities of socio-economic good and security value that are essential to the state, the economy of the state and the well-being of the society at large. Any attack on such amenities would automatically have a severe effect on the well-being of the society and the effective running of government. Moreover, it shows that every nation has what they considered as critical national assets/infrastructure in their respective countries, and the obligation to protect such.

The idea of global and national governments protecting critical infrastructure was borne out of the complexities of contemporary global security challenges which exposed the critical importance of certain national assets and infrastructure to the state and the society at large based on the services or values they provide for the general well-being of the state and society. Though CIP, at the initial stage, focused more on defence and security infrastructure due to the 9/11 attack that precipitated it, recent global developments such as the COVID-19 pandemic and cyber threats have expanded it to other sectors.

Officially, there are more than 16 sectors listed globally as critical infrastructure that must be protected by national governments. These include, communication, health and public health, chemical, transportation systems, critical manufacturing facilities, information technology and commercial facilities. Others include water and waterways, defence industrial base, food and agriculture, dams, nuclear reactors, material and waste, energy, emergency services, government facilities, and the financial sector (CISA, 2020). It is therefore the responsibility of the government to protect critical national infrastructure from attacks and vandalism, to ensure the well-being of the people and the state. However, the effective protection of such is directly dependent on the efficient management of the agencies saddled with the responsibility of protecting them. In Nigeria, embezzlement and misappropriation of funds meant that the strengthening of the agencies responsible for CIP seems to be a major impediment to the proper functioning of the agencies and thereby affects service delivery in the country. These elements of corruption in public institutions in Nigeria have become so ubiquitous that the society seems to look at it as part of the institutional norm in governance.

Institutional Corruption

The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. It involves the seeking or extracting of a promise or receipt of a gift or any other advantage by a public servant in consideration of the performance or omission of an act, in violation of the duties required of the office. This means that when public office holders abuse their office for their own personal gain, corruption has taken place. It can be through embezzlement of institutional funds, misappropriation of institutional funds, bribery, accepting, soliciting or extorting using the office he/she occupies.

Corruption is, therefore, behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence (Nye, 1989). These include such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person, if in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowing of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private use) (Nye, 1989). This is what Owusu (1976) describes as “the opportunistic manipulation of regulations and rules of social conduct to achieve selfish, often materialistic desires, which in turn undermines the common good of the people or the institutions”.

Corruption is associated with a whole set of factors which will prevail even if the rules attempt to construct a regime that fights it. Mitrevska (2019) identified two general forms of corruption, institutional and non-institutional personal corruption. Non-institutional personal corruption is corruption of persons outside institutional settings. Such corruption pertains to moral character of persons and consists in the despoiling of their moral character.

Institutional corruption presupposes both the notion of an institution and that of institutional authorities exercising institutional discretion and social power at the same time (Miller, 2017). It tends to explain how those in government institutions purposely manipulate administrative structures to control corruption or may become involved in corrupt behaviour on behalf of the institutions for their own personal interest.

According to Lessig (2013), “institutional corruption is manifest when there is systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.” Though Lessig’s definition of institutional corruption tends to capture a type of corruption that happens in institutions of government that are meant to provide public good and value to the society, it underplays such elements of corruption like bribery and embezzlement that most often define corruption.

Smith-Crowe and Warren (2014) characterise institutional corruption as collective wrongdoing spread across individuals saddled with the responsibility of managing government institutions. Unlike non-institutional personal corruption, institutional corruption undermines the effective functioning of institutions in the delivery of their mandates. It undermines the capacity of the institutions to function efficiently because of considerable discretion members of the institutions have over the management of the institutions and the extent of their involvement in corrupt practices in the institutions.

Drawing on the points of agreement among normative institutionalists in explaining institutional corruption, the normative theorists constructed a tripartite conception known as the elements of institutional corruption. These include institutional gain, institutional advantage and the connection between the two (Thompson, 2018). They tend to instigate corruption through established and legitimate institutional procedures such as the payroll system, institutional budgets, recruitment, training fund, research and development, capacity building training and conferences. They manipulate these procedures in collaboration among themselves or the supervising institutions through over invoicing, no existing staff in payrolls, ghost worker system, irrelevant conferences and allocation of fictitious contracts among themselves and many others. The implication is that it entrenches a form of hybrid corruption in the long run which eventually undermines the efficient functioning of the institutions and puts the institutions long-term survival at risk.

Institutional Corruption and Critical Infrastructure Protection in Nigeria

Corruption is corruption, be it either institutional or personal. Despite the challenge of definition, ethical or legal fault line “corruption” is generally accepted as “the active or passive misuse of powers by appointed or elected officials for private financial or other benefit” (OECD, 2002). It has proven to be inimical to development, and the entire security indicators, whether grand, petty, retail or systemic or sectoral, institutional or personal. This is because whichever way it goes, it undermines the effectiveness of its institutions, undermines the economy and entrenches underdevelopment. The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) and the National Bureau of Statistics reports on Human Development index ranking (HDI) from 1999 to 2020 rank Nigeria low on HDI due to infrastructure deficit. Nigeria was recently in 161st position out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP 2020) due to institutional corruption that has weakened the state capacity to effectively discharge its duties.

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended in Section 15(5) encapsulated charges that the state would “abolish all forms of corrupt practices and abuse of power” (Nigeria Constitution, 1999). This is because corruption threatens Constitutional obligations including good governance, freedom, equality, justice and welfare of everyone in the country (Nigeria Constitution, 1999 as amended). It also threatens the security of government institutions and the efficient running and protection of critical national assets and infrastructure.

In addition, the Nigeria government established anti-corruption agencies to fight against the menace of corruption. Amongst these are the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) established by the Act of the National Assembly, in 2000 and 2003 respectively (Enweremadu, 2022). Despite the avalanche of anti-graft agencies and the Constitution’s position on corruption, corruption continues to rise in Nigeria. Corruption perverts every sector in Nigeria, from the executives at the federal to the executives at the state and local government councils and the critical infrastructure protection sector are not excluded. Corruption has become systemic among institutions of government and they now cooperate or collaborate in entrenching it as a normative element of government transactions. From the preparation of the national budget by the Executive arm of government through the defence of the budget by MDAs in the National Assembly to the execution of the budget by the MDAs, the process is laced with corruption, and every institution of government that has a role to play in the budget partakes in the facilitation of corruption.

Even the judiciary partakes in the business of corruption in Nigeria, by taking advantage of their vast knowledge of the weak criminal justice system to create legal difficulties that make the heads walk freely in the country despite the serious allegations of corruption “hanging on their neck”. Studies have shown that heads of anti-graft agencies, high ranking police chiefs, legislatures, justices of the courts, senior military officers, attorneys general of the federation, ministers and heads of parastatals and MDAs have in many instances been found culpable in corrupt practices relating to misappropriation, embezzlement, and diversion and stealing of funds under their various institutions and subversion of the law.

Reportedly, on 18 February 2021, the Chairman, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in a one-day interactive session with directors of finance and accounts and internal auditors in key Nigeria Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the federal government, stated that the commission mopped up excess cash totalling N147 billion, which some MDAs illegally diverted from the 2020 budget as personnel costs (Vanguard, 18 February 2021). The Chairman further disclosed that investigation by the commission also revealed that 51 health sector institutions were involved in budget manipulations.

The summary of findings from the 51 health sector institutions investigated by ICPC showed that they engaged in padding of nominal rolls and widespread misuse of personnel cost allocation to non-personnel related expenditure, especially on outsourced services, amounting to the tune of N4.5 billion, including fraudulent diversion of funds through manipulation of account numbers of beneficiaries on the Government Integrated Financial and Management Information System (GIFMIS) platform (Vanguard, 18 February 2021). The Commission chairman also revealed that as part of its 2019 System Study and Review of MDAs, it also mopped up N42 billion (personnel cost), after it was issued a warrant to do so by the Minister of Finance.

The Human and Environmental Development Agenda (HEDA) 2021 report revealed that Nigeria loses the sum of $15 to $18 billion annually as a result of illicit financial flow (HEDA Report, 2021). It further stated that Nigeria’s loss from illicit financial flow accounted for “about 30 percent of Africa’s loss to IFF which is at $50 billion per annum in the last 10 years”. The HEDA Report echoed the Thabo Mbeki report of 2018 which reported that the African continent loses between $50 and $60 billion per year through illicit financial flow, and Nigeria accounted for 30 percent of the amount (Mbeki Report, 2018). This is an indication of the monumental economic losses the country is experiencing annually through illicit financial flows (IFF). In real terms, money meant for health, education, infrastructure development, social welfare and development is taken out of Nigeria annually by seemingly harmless contractual transactions with MNCs by tax evasion, transfer pricing, trade mis-invoicing, falsification of contract records, abuse of confidentiality clauses in extractive contracts, loan agreements, etc., unreasonable grant of tax waivers, falsification of intellectual property agreements, illegal award of contract to self, all denying the country of vital resources for development and job creation, thereby undermining government capacity to effectively provide for the security and welfare of the people. Today, the SDGs remain a mirage in the country.

One, might ask such a question as how quickly will pervasive corruption destroy the economy and affects effective running of government and even CIP?

Bad governance, corruption, and failure to uphold the rule of law lead to monumental economic losses through illicit financial flows (IFF) collectively taken from revenue and expenditure of the government with severe consequences on the effective running of government. The CIP is key to the effective running of government and any disruption or destruction on the CI affects the overall well-being of the country, hence corruption can lead to financial loss in government revenue and expenditure directly affecting the running of government. This is because when funds meant for the running, maintenance and protection of critical national assets and infrastructure are either embezzled, misappropriated, or diverted into something else, that sector will definitely suffer. A good case study to explain this is the DASUKIGATE or DASUKI Corruption Scandal in Nigeria’s budget defence spending.

DASUKIGATE typifies institutional corruption in defence spending in Nigeria and aptly demonstrates the implications of deliberate misallocation of resources or diversion of allocated resources meant for the security of the state. Traditionally, in Nigeria, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to the President is allocated a generous budget in view of the importance of intelligence to the stability, peace and security of the nation. ONSA under Colonel Sambo Dasuki (retired) became a political tool and conduit for purported allocation to security which was looted and diverted to fund party cronies, re-election campaigns, politicians, prayer warriors, political strategists, friendly media houses and owners, unrelated research etc. (Owasanoye, 2021).

The Dasukigate gulped fifty-four billion, six hundred and fifty nine million, five hundred thousand naira (N54, 659,500,000.00) equivalent to $US 273,297,500 (at an average of two hundred naira exchange rate per dollar in 2015). The money was shared by 21 individuals and companies. The money was over two billion naira above the entire appropriated constituency Zonal Intervention Project (ZIP) of 2015 (N51, 829,913,012) for 1278 projects across the six geopolitical zones of the federation including the MDAs (Owasanoye, 2021). Regrettably, only a fraction of the diverted funds was recovered and the perpetrators were barely punished. The inability to enforce sanctions reflects the underbelly of a corruption-complicit culture and tacit social acceptance of corruption. It also indicates the status of the Nigeria criminal justice institutions that were easily manipulated to frustrate the best interests of the people. The society becomes the loser with similar malfeasance being repeated (Owasanoye, 2021). The opportunity cost of the money to infrastructural development in Nigeria is shown below.

With such a huge amount of money meant for the defence and security of the nation, especially in a critical period when the country is battling with the Boko Haram Terrorist group in the Northeast and the Lake Chad basin with troops complaining of inadequate arms and ammunitions, poor hazard allowances and other institutional challenges being diverted into party campaigns, political media hype, prayer ministries, etc., and other irrelevant spending unrelated to defence and security, we cannot imagine anything less than increasing insecurity across the country.

Table 1.

Opportunity Cost of Dasukigate to infrastructural development in Nigeria (based on Owasanoye, 2021). Professor Bolaji Owasanye, SAN is the current Chairman of ICPC.

DescriptionAmount (Billion Naira)Remark
Looted in Dasukigate54,659,500,000Shared by 21 individuals and companies
Appropriated zonal intervention projects (ZIP) 201551,829,913,0121278 Projects across six geo-political zones
 Zonal breakdown 
MDAs (others)1,059,400,00098.06%

Another remarkable area of concern is the Oil and Gas Sector in Nigeria which accounts for Nigeria’s main revenue. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa. It holds the largest natural gas and second largest oil reserves on the continent and was the world’s fifth-largest exporter of lignified natural gas (LNG) in 2018, with estimated known reserves of 37 billion barrels of oil and five trillion cube metres of natural gas (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2021). However, the country lacks the needed infrastructure to harness the benefits of these natural resources because of corruption. Even where they are provided, production is affected by sporadic supply disruptions. Corruption has eaten deep into the heart of the Nigerian system to the extent that it has become institutionalised in almost every sector. For instance, in spite of the contribution from the oil and gas sector to the nation’s GDP, the sector is characterised by weak infrastructure support, rickety and poorly maintained, thereby producing below the installed capacity (Olwale, 2018).

Additionally, Nigeria has been reported to have one of the largest CI networks in the oil and gas sector in the world: the lengths of condensate gas, liquid petroleum gas, oil and refined products pipelines are 124, 4045, 164, 4441, 3,940 kilometres respectively (Abolurin, 2013). This is in addition to 12, 325.29Km of power transmission lines and over 30,000 telecom mast locations (Abolurin, 2013). The country’s CI is network is highly vulnerable to vandalism and destruction, which necessitated the creation of the NSCDC in 2003. The Corps is mandated to ensure the safety of the entire Critical National Assets and Infrastructure spread across the country (Mboho and Udousoro, 2014). For the purpose of effective monitoring of pipelines, the Corps operates a Command and Control Centre with trained personnel on the use of drones through the Nigerian Energy Security Command (NESEC) in the Niger Delta region (Mboho and Udousoro, 2014). However, the Corps is not fully mobilised to carry out this mandate due to shortage of manpower and requisite equipment, thus leading to frequent vandalism of Nigeria’s CI with severe consequences for the effective running of government. Corruption has remained one of the major reasons for shortage of manpower and equipment by the agencies responsible for the protection of CI in Nigeria, because the funds meant for their protection are diverted to other non-important issues or misappropriated through institutional corruption.

Effects of Institutional Corruption on Critical Infrastructure Protection in Nigeria

Some of the major effects of institutional corruption to CIP in Nigeria include infrastructural decay, infrastructural deficit, erosion of State capacity for CIP, lack of resources for CIP, decline in human security indicators, and incessant vandalism on CIP

Infrastructural Decay

Corruption has been identified as the major impediment to CI decay in Nigeria due to the amount being taken on an annual basis from revenue earnings of government through illicit financial flows and national budget expenditure through padding, diversion and misappropriation, thus, eroding the capacity of the government to maintain its critical infrastructure. Studies have shown that across the states of the federation, the basic infrastructure such as pipe borne water, the dams, electricity supply, hospitals, road networks, and schools is in a deplorable state. A critical example is the education sector. While the Nigerian public schools are disappearing, institutional leaders in collaboration with their cronies are building private schools for their own private gains. A typical example of the biblical “stealing from Paul to pay Peter”.

Critical Infrastructure Deficit

The UNDP and NBS reports show that Nigeria is ranked low in HDI from 1999-2020 because of infrastructure deficit in 161st position out of 189 countries and territories and when juxtaposed with the over $20 billion illegally taken out of the country’s revenue earnings and budget expenditure annually, one begins to see the direct effects of corruption on infrastructural deficits. The money meant for development of critical infrastructure has either been misappropriated, diverted or wrongly applied to non-capital projects for private gain.

Erosion of the State Capacity for Critical Infrastructural Protection

Consistent stealing of huge sums of monies from revenue earnings of the government and inappropriate padding of national budget expenditures erodes the capacity of the state to effectively protect its critical infrastructure. A critical example is the DASUKIGATE, where the funds meant for the defence and security budget in the Office of the National Security Adviser were shared among political cronies for political campaigns and prayers at the detriment of arms and weaponry procurement meant for the security of the country. The effects of this are evident in the northeast and around Lake Chad where the country is at war with the Boko Haram terrorist group.

Lack of Resources for CIP

Critical Infrastructure Protection requires resources both financial and human, the paucity or lack of which will lead to its vulnerability and eventual vandalism and destruction by either hoodlums, vandals or anti-state groups. In Nigeria, studies have shown that the nation’s critical infrastructure is highly vulnerable, especially CI such as oil and gas pipelines, power transmission lines and telecom mast locations. Recently, with the emergence of terrorism and armed banditry, it has included electoral institutions, the education sector, and the transportation sector. Unfortunately, the funds meant for the protection of these structures are either embezzled or diverted into personnel cost where they might benefit the institutional leader but are detrimental to CIP. In many instances, the NSCDC, the agency responsible for CIP in Nigeria, has lamented on the problems of shortage of manpower and requisite equipment due to lack of funds (Abolurin, 2013; Theophilus, 2015).

Decline in Human Security Indicators

Increase in human security indicator is inextricably linked to the development of functional infrastructure in a country. The UNDP and the NBS report (2020) which ranked Nigeria 161st out 189 countries and territories attributed the factors to the Human Development Index. HDI is an indicator for the Human Security Index. The continuous stealing of the country’s resources through odious means (institutional corruption), which renders the State ineffective in the provision of infrastructures and the overall well-being of the society, is detrimental to the overall human security in Nigeria.

Incessant Vandalism of CIP

As a result of the shortage of funds and personnel to safeguard the CNAI in Nigeria because of corruption, the CNAI have been subjected to incessant attacks and vandalism by terrorists and other anti-state forces. This is evident in the incessant vandalism on oil and gas pipelines, electoral institutions, kidnapping and abduction of students, teachers and lecturers from schools, abduction of passengers on the road and the recent attacks on rail lines in Nigeria with their attendant human and economic loss.

Conclusion and Way Forward

It is a proven fact that corruption is the bane of CIP in Nigeria due to the amount capital illegally taken out of government revenue earnings and expenditure by way of institutional corruption. Beyond facilitating the decay and deficit of infrastructure in Nigeria, institutional corruption weakens the capacity of the State to protect its critical infrastructure as the funds meant for the protection of this are either embezzled or misapplied on non-capital cost, thereby denying the agencies responsible for CIP the funds needed for the procurement of equipment and mobilisation of human resources.

In light of the above, the study recommends a whole-of-society approach as a means towards enhancing CIP in Nigeria. The need for the whole-of-society approach is that it encompasses the government, private sector investors, the communities and the traditional institutions of the various communities where the infrastructures are sited, the civil society organisations, the media and other stakeholders involved in CIP, as well as shares roles and responsibility for all in the protection of the infrastructure. Moreover, the whole-of-society approach will ensure education, enlightenment and engagement for the population, proper monitoring of the budgetary allocations, transparency in the preparation of budget expenditure for CIP, appropriate quality monitoring and service delivery-linked payment that could enhance the level of service. Above all, it will fight institutional corruption by ensuring that transparency prevails in the management of funds for CIP.